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FOREWORD
The U.S. Naval Academy’s naval history symposium, named the McMullen Naval 
History Symposium since 2006, has been held regularly in Annapolis, Maryland, 
since its first meeting in 1971. Initially, it was a small event for a limited group 
of invited speakers, but in 1973 it began to take on its present form. Today, this 
symposium continues to be one of the most important events for the scholarly and 
professional exchange of ideas and interpretations in the field of naval history. It 
serves this purpose not only in the United States, for American naval history, but 
in the world at large, for global naval history. It has certainly become the largest 
regular meeting of naval historians in the world. Its meeting location in Annapolis, 
on the historic grounds of the U.S. Naval Academy, with its large and active history 
department, fine museum, rich historical collections, and numerous naval memo-
rials, is ideal for bringing together such a large group of highly informed experts, 
including naval professionals and civilian academics, to exchange research infor-
mation and ideas on a scholarly level.
More than a dozen published volumes of selected papers have captured the es-
sence and growth of the Naval Academy’s symposium over the decades. Like this 
volume, most have carried the now well-established title of New Interpretations in 
Naval History. Typically, each volume in the series has been a selection from the 
many papers presented at each symposium and has ranged widely across all peri-
ods of naval history and the histories of many navies. Not limited to any particular 
theme, other than presenting a new interpretation of whatever subject on which the 
researcher is working, each symposium and its resulting volume present very useful 
samplings of current thinking, new themes, and new approaches in naval history. 
Collectively, the series has been a great stimulus to advancing and to encouraging 
naval history. The volumes that these symposia generate continue to chart the state 
of naval history as a field of research and inquiry. 
This particular volume, from the seventeenth symposium, adds further to the 
fine tradition established by its predecessors. The eleven excellent papers in this 
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collection range from studies on ancient Rome to China in the twentieth-first cen-
tury. In between, the subjects vary in focus from seventeenth-century piracy to 
topics in British, German, and American naval history. 
In publishing this volume, the Naval War College, as a graduate-level educa-
tional and research institution, and the Naval Academy, at the undergraduate level, 
join together in the mutual interest of helping to promote a better and deeper un-
derstanding of navies and naval history.
John B. Hattendorf, D.Phil.
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Chairman, Maritime History Department
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PREFACE
The McMullen Naval History Symposium met at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) 
from 15 to 16 September 2011. More than two hundred scholars and historians 
from around the world and more than a hundred midshipmen participated in three 
dozen panels on a broad range of topics in naval and maritime history. The pres-
ent volume consists of only a small selection from the outstanding contributions 
of the symposium’s participants, as is made necessary by practical and financial 
constraints. That we have selected so few from so many worthy papers should in no 
way obscure the great diversity and high standards that characterize the remainder.
The Naval History Symposium could not have taken place without generous 
financial assistance from the McMullen Seapower Fund, a gift from the late Dr. 
John J. McMullen, USNA Class of 1940. Dr. McMullen credited his education and 
development at the Naval Academy for his extraordinarily productive career, which 
culminated in the establishment of one of the most successful naval architectural 
and marine engineering companies. In addition to supporting the symposium, 
the McMullen Seapower Fund underwrote the research for symposium papers by 
Phyllis Culham, Lori Lyn Bogle, Virginia Lunsford, William McBride, and Marcus 
Jones—a reminder of how crucial such support is for advancing our knowledge of 
naval and maritime affairs. Those papers appear in the present volume.
The 2011 symposium followed the general pattern of past meetings, consist-
ing of a two-day event with a call for papers, multiple simultaneous sessions, and 
the broadest possible representation from the international community of naval 
and maritime historians. The keynote speaker was Dr. Craig Symonds, the Class of 
1957 Distinguished Professor of American Naval Heritage in the History Depart-
ment of the U.S. Naval Academy for the 2011–12 academic year. After a stimulating 
reception in the Naval Academy Museum, Dr. Symonds delivered an account of 
his exciting research on the battle of Midway to an audience of nearly five hundred 
symposium attendees, officers, and midshipmen in Mahan Auditorium.
NWC_HM23.indb   11 12/8/15   9:00 AM
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Fundamental to the success of the symposium were the tireless efforts of the 
2011 Symposium Committee, including Cdr. John Freymann, Capt. Rebecca Bish-
op, Lt. Barry Cohen, Assistant Professor Sharika Crawford, Professor Robert Love, 
Assistant Professor Aaron O’Connell, Assistant Professor Richard Ruth, Lt. Keith 
Skillin, Lt. Cdr. Joseph Slaughter, and Maj. Mark Thompson. Without the dedica-
tion of our professional officers and faculty to the academic missions of the Acad-
emy and History Department, organizing and hosting the Naval History Sympo-
sium would be impossible.
MARCUS O. JONES
Associate Professor, Department of History
U.S. Naval Academy
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I Piracy during the First Jewish War
PHYLLIS CULHAM
There is no doubt that the First Jewish War (named, obviously, from the Ro-man point of view) was primarily a land war in a very Roman genre, relying on the Romans’ ability to move massive yet deeply supported forces into 
any arena. It will not be surprising to readers of naval history that ports were there-
fore of not only tactical- but strategic-level concern. But one of the oddest conse-
quences, never anticipated by either side at the outset, was an outbreak of Jewish 
piracy that proved a temporary but strategic-level threat, as was, immediately af-
terward, waterborne raiding on shipping and on Roman forces in the Black Sea. 
It is vital to approach these naval questions with some understanding of how 
overwhelming Roman force in the Judaean theater both appeared and was. In 67 
ce, Vespasian brought two legions and other units into Judaea, meeting his son 
Titus, with a third legion from Egypt, at Ptolemaїs, a port with an ethnically Greek 
majority. In Josephus’s picture of events, Jewish forces, who had previously been 
confident in their ability to outnumber the Romans tactically at any point in the 
theater, lost confidence at the appearance of Roman professionals, with their fa-
mously perfect order and unit cohesion, which looked like fearlessness when it 
was maintained in the face of hostilities. Vespasian began a deliberate campaign 
of state-directed terror, with the massacre of Gabara.1 He then attacked Jotapata, 
where Josephus had taken charge as the Jerusalem-assigned commander of com-
batants in Galilee. Jotapata fell, and Josephus the captive became translator and ad-
viser to Vespasian and then Titus. His consequent histories are the basis for much 
of what follows here on the theater in Judaea.2 
Josephus was not the only ancient author to refer to people whom we might 
identify as political resisters as robbers, brigands, or—if boats were involved— 
pirates. Often it was not obvious who was a pirate and who was a politically moti-
vated naval combatant. Judaea was hardly the only theater in which Romans had 
difficulty telling resistance movements from criminal gangs. Advice on this point 
would have been something useful Josephus could have supplied his Roman cap-
tors; if he had done it badly or deceptively, however, it would have won him no Ro-
man affection, and his later affluent life of leisure in Rome would become harder to 
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explain. Josephus was brutally clear about those participants in the Jewish rebellion 
whom he consistently calls robbers—that is, that they were bands from among the 
impoverished and feckless of the countryside and the underclass of the cities fol-
lowing manipulative gang leaders who sought wealth, power, or both. And they 
were bad Jews. That last opinion is really the only one that distinguishes Josephus 
from most other elite, affluent, highly educated authors writing in Latin and Greek. 
It is equally difficult to tell whether the Black Sea raiders simultaneous to the Jewish 
Revolt were economically desperate pirates without allegiance or political resisters 
of Roman hegemony. We can deduce less about them since their polyglot, pan-
ethnic microsocieties produced no Josephus to testify from the inside; also, as we 
will see later, it is even less clear what they aimed for. 
As the campaigning season of 67 wore down, Vespasian returned to Ptolemaїs 
and then went on to Caesarea, with its advanced, ocean-engineered breakwaters 
and superb docking facilities. One deduces that Vespasian wanted to winter on the 
coast in a friendly, majority-Greek port with outstanding facilities where he could 
easily be supplied and reinforced. Then Jewish pirates threatened the well-being of 
his forces, as well as Roman strategic interests. Josephus reports that two groups, 
one of those expelled from their towns in factional infighting (stasis, in the notori-
ous Greek term) and another of refugees (literal diaphugontes, the fleeing) who had 
survived the destruction of their towns, gathered at Joppa (modern Jaffa) and pro-
ceeded to rebuild it. (The provincial governor Cestius had sacked and burned the 
Jewish-majority port and massacred its inhabitants before Vespasian had arrived.)3 
Josephus notes that the refugees who were rebuilding the city turned to piracy be-
cause they were surrounded and cut off on the land.4 
That put pirates between Vespasian and the grain shipments from Egypt, which 
were also the lifeline of urban Rome and Italy. The late, great E. Mary Smallwood’s 
endnote to the Penguin Josephus on this point states concisely the potential sever-
ity of the strategic problem: “At this season Northwest winds prevented direct voy-
ages from Alexandria to Italy, and the Egyptian corn fleet had to sail via the coasts 
of Palestine, and Asia Minor, and the Aegean.”5 This meant that Jewish insurgents 
in cheap, small boats could visibly impede one of the biggest bureaucracies in the 
city of Rome, as well as threaten the emperor himself with political unrest in the 
capital. If the grain fleet were not visibly delivering plenty of food to Rome, that 
would be even more politically destabilizing than the delay of American Social Se-
curity checks or their arriving with face values lower than expected. Tacitus says 
with his usual color that “since grain has been imported from [the province of] 
Africa and from Egypt, the life of the Roman people has been tossed about by ships 
and disasters.”6 The clearest hint that the new population of Joppa were not merely 
the desperately displaced, raiding “the Egyptian route” for grain to survive, is that 
they also sailed the waters off Syria and Phoenicia. That sounds as though they 
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were, as Josephus terms them, pirates, or, as they might have claimed to us in our 
terms, insurgents. Although they were not prepared later to stand up to Roman 
legions on land, they were apparently willing to risk conflict with the ships of the 
great Phoenician naval cities Tyre and Sidon.7 That is surely a clue regarding the 
identity of these sailors (or pirates). 
A significant percentage of the resettling, new population of Joppa was prob-
ably from Galilee, most likely Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Tarichaeae. If we specifi-
cally search for displaced groups who had lost factional disputes in their towns, 
we find the rapidly and repeatedly whipsawing allegiances of Sepphoris, Tiberias, 
and Ta richaeae in Galilee. For instance, when Vespasian sent one of his legionary 
commanders with a detached force to Sepphoris, where Josephus had recorded sig-
nificant support for the revolt, the town opened its gates and advised surround-
ing villages to join it in cooperation with the Roman government. After this defec-
tion of Sepphoris, “the best reputed” city of Galilee, Josephus reports that stasiodes, 
those engaging in stasis, and robbers fled to Mount Asamon near Sepphoris to take 
a stand. “Those engaging in stasis” were clearly those who were urging on other Jews 
in their communities to open attacks against Romans; arrival of Roman legions had 
rendered them dangerously unpopular with other Jews in some places. Josephus 
identifies factionalism even among Jews already under arms in the field, where the 
most determined members of the war party, those unlikely to accept an amnesty, are 
to Josephus the stasiastai, those who had been caught up in stasis. In short, there was 
serious, continuous factionalism among the populations of the major towns on the 
coast of the Sea of Galilee, and there are no other obvious sites named in Josephus’s 
text from which the alleged drivers/casualties of factionalism might have come.8 
Others in the second category who turned to piracy in Joppa—that is, refu-
gees who had no cities to which to return to—were not exclusively Galilean; some 
refugees were created well south of Galilee.9 It is most likely that both groups who 
resettled Joppa, “those who had been driven from towns by stasis” and “those flee-
ing the destruction of their homes,” were mainly Galilean, since the documented 
cases that would have created refugees of both types were in Galilee. If most of the 
new population attempting to rebuild Joppa were Galileans, that would suggest 
something about the naval capabilities of new squatters from around the Sea of 
Galilee itself. The other refugees from northern Galilee had economic interests and 
strategic concerns centered on Phoenician Tyre, not Jerusalem, and would have 
been well aware of regional trading patterns for valuable merchandise. Meyers has 
even claimed that “the importance of this fact cannot be overstated; namely, that 
the heartland of Upper Galilee is trading with and oriented toward the Phoenician 
coast and not primarily with the Sea of Galilee or Akko-Ptolemais.” In fact, Talmu-
dic anecdote paints a later picture of even rural sectors of Upper Galilee as major 
suppliers of diverse merchandise in regional trade networks. Potters and weavers 
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did not need to be in a city to work. Upper Galilee came to dominate the regional 
oil markets, as did Galilean potters, and the area was later well known for flaxen 
fabrics; small farmers made clothing, which was expensive once it reached the af-
fluent Phoenician coast. Coin finds in Galilee are heavily Syrian, supporting Mey-
ers’s claim that trade networks in Upper Galilee reached northward.10
It may initially seem improbable that rowdy, anti-authoritarian, agrarian fac-
tions in northern Galilee would have been quite familiar with Phoenician and re-
gional economic and trade patterns, but that population had become very mixed 
along the Galilean/Phoenician/Syrian frontier, as political and administrative lines 
drawn by the Seleucid empire, and after them the Romans, proved very fluid. Nor 
did these administrative districts ever reflect or affect the inhabitants’ senses of 
their own identity, nor did they have any identified impact on residents’ definitions 
of themselves. In short, they were completely artificial political units imposed for 
what an ill-informed external power believed to be its convenience. Galilee was 
the constant center of both religious and agrarian unrest, and the two inevitably 
intermingled.11 
Syrians and Phoenicians had taken advantage of Jewish infighting and general 
chaos before the Roman Pompey’s (political and administrative) “settlement” of the 
region in 63 BCE to move themselves into villages in northern Galilee, where arable 
land was hard to come by. The triumvir responsible for the area in 42 BCE, Marc 
Antony, ordered Tyre to return to the Jewish high priest and ethnarch Hyrcanus 
all places taken from Jews by force during the chaos of the recent Mediterranean-
wide Roman civil war. A northern Galilean warlord Hezikiah, often identified as 
a forerunner of both John of Gischala and the Zealots, was executed by Herod 
for raiding “Syrian” villages along that demographic frontier, this execution a po-
lice action much praised by Romans. Nonetheless, Hyrcanus summoned Herod 
before the Sanhedrin back in Jerusalem for executing Jews without a trial under 
the “ancestral laws,” a harbinger of how one man’s commitment to responsible re-
gional peacekeeping under the Roman hegemon was another’s disloyal ceding of 
Jewish-inhabited territory.12 Nor did the famous “Roman Peace” of the empire end 
Galilean–Tyrian conflict. Josephus notes in passing that Titus set up a Roman camp 
at Cydasa, which he labels a heavily fortified, populous town of Tyre always at war 
with the Galilean people.13 To integrate the economic history of Galilean flaxen 
fabrics and oil in Mediterranean-wide trade with local, agrarian, ethnic conflict: 
Jews of northern Galilee must have known a lot about Phoenicians and Syrians of 
the coast without having much reason to be influenced by them, or—in the case 
of Syrians, who kept encroaching on their arable land—to like them. They knew 
enough about what shipped out of or put into what ports and how it was protected 
to be pirates. 
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Another seemingly odd attribute to associate with my posited Galilean refu-
gees is in Josephus’s casual statement that the new settlers in Joppa built them-
selves pirate ships. Actually, there is a little-known history of resistance by Galilean 
fishermen, as well as other repurposing of shallow-draft boats for combat. Those 
former residents of Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Tarichaeae on the Sea of Galilee are 
especially likely suspects for such activity. In the tense months before the initial 
Roman onslaught, Josephus himself had gathered at Tarichaeae all the skapha (usu-
ally translated “skiffs”) that he could locate quickly to use in intimidating Tiberias, 
so he must have believed that such skapha could plausibly bear combatants who 
could at least threaten an opposed landing.14 All dwellers on the Sea of Galiliee 
would have been familiar with these skapha. We can recover some of their capabili-
ties from Vespasian’s encounter with them at Tarichaeae in the spring of 68. Since 
many resisters had gathered into Tarichaeae by that spring, Vespasian began to set 
up an especially fortified marching camp between the trouble spots of Tiberias and 
Tarichaeae. The inhabitants had already gathered a large flotilla of skapha either to 
evacuate or to see through a naval battle (quite literally: dianaumachein), depend-
ing on how things went. Combatants on this flotilla of skapha assaulted the Ro-
man camp in time to damage the structure in progress. Josephus claims that they 
got back on their boats ahead of the Roman counterattack with no casualties and 
formed up in boats, “just as if arrayed in a phalanx,” that kept up arrow fire against 
the Romans, “conducting a naval battle in a war on land.”15 
Others at Tarichaeae took the unwise decision to emerge from the city to fight 
the Romans on land, merely because the defenders greatly outnumbered them. De-
fenders in flight as the city was overrun launched skapha onto the sea. Many were 
killed before they got away from the shore. They may have planned continued re-
sistance from missile-firing formations again, since they were still right there the 
next day when Vespasian ordered that schediai (usually translated “rafts”) be put 
together to end the battle. Oddly, the Romans managed to launch them in such a 
way as to force the skapha in the direction of the shore so they could not escape. 
The Jewish skiffs went after the Roman rafts rather than the Romans lining the 
shore. In the ensuing “naval battle,” the superiority in numbers of rafts over skiffs 
was material, as was, Josephus claims, the fact that the skiffs were comparatively 
weaker in structure than the rafts, since they were “small and built for piracy.”16 Ad-
ditionally, their small crews were afraid to take on Romans densely packed on rafts, 
preferring to throw stones and merely scrape up against the rafts. Clearly, they had 
planned for the likelihood of more “naval” action, or they would not have had rocks 
on board. They were probably out of arrows, since Romans did fire arrows from the 
rafts, and that arrow fire was unanswered. As Josephus notes, it was not the rafts 
that were damaged in these collisions. 
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We know, therefore, that a number of inhabitants of the cities ringing the Sea 
of Galilee knew how to equip their boats for hostilities on water and to “fight their 
boats,” many of them preferring to stand against Romans on land from the water, 
even when there was little hope of tactical victory or even escape. Josephus’s ini-
tially mysterious remark that these skapha were “small and built for piracy” is a clue 
that matches with two others from, respectively, archaeology and art. In 1985, near 
Migdal (ancient Tarichaeae), a couple of residents of a local kibbutz discovered what 
proved to be a small fishing boat probably built around the turning of the first cen-
tury BCE to the first of the Common Era. The boat had been much repaired and in 
long use in antiquity, so it had not been wrecked in action in 68. This craft is gener-
ally called “the Galilee boat” (or “the Kinneret boat,” after the Hebrew name of the 
sea). It is 8.8 meters long and 2.5 meters wide; it has a very shallow, uniform draft of 
1.5 meters and a hull remarkably squarish in cross section. The boat’s missing rig-
ging was reconstructed on the basis of a mosaic from ancient Tarichaeae, probably 
of the first century CE.17 It did not escape the notice of excavator and curator Shelley 
Wachsmann that this craft was the right size to have supplied Josephus’s fast flotilla 
under sail out of Tarichaeae and the later combatant vessels used against Vespasian.18 
I also completely concur with Wachsmann that Josephus’s mysterious tagline 
about pirate craft must actually mean that the ships in the action at Tarichaeae were 
of a type also commonly used in the piracy always rife along the Syrian and south-
ern coastline—not that there was piracy on the Sea of Galilee itself.19 The Galilee 
boat’s extremely shallow draft and nearly flat bottom would have been perfect for 
hiding among rocks on the Judaean coast and for beaching in tiny, hidden coves. 
Joppa itself was more an anchorage than a port in its all-but-crescent shape. Far 
from being protective in all conditions, its “horns” had sheer faces and were accom-
panied by hidden reefs. Josephus stresses that in a north wind staying in the “har-
bor” was more dangerous than riding it out at sea. In fact, the Greek geographer 
Strabo identified Joppa as the sheer rocky site to which the mythical Andromeda 
had been bound, endangering any rescuer.20
When Vespasian attacked the Jewish pirates on land at Joppa, he found the city 
unguarded. Josephus states that the inhabitants were unwilling to face the Romans 
on land, counting on getting to their boats, on board which they stayed at anchor, 
just out of reach of Roman arrows.21 Then they were struck in the night by what Jose-
phus claims was the famous “black norther,” although this meteorological phenom-
enon is not otherwise named in antiquity (see note 5 on prevailing winds). There 
was no battle for Joppa, since the ships broke up and most of those on board were 
dashed by waves against sheer rocks. To summarize what we know about these in-
habitants of Joppa in action: they built themselves “pirate skapha” once they decided 
they were cut off from the land side; they decided beforehand that when Romans 
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came, they would not oppose land forces; they would ride it out in their boats out of 
range, just as the Galileans who confronted Vespasian at Tarichaeae had. 
If we ask who could easily and quickly build a fleet of skapha to feed themselves, 
had sufficient experience with small boats to range as far as Syria, could face naval 
attention from Syrian, Egyptian, Phoenician, and Roman hostile craft, and viewed 
small craft at sea as safer than encountering Romans on land, refugees from the cit-
ies surrounding the Sea of Galilee are excellent candidates. As we have seen above, 
Upper Galilean refugees would have understood much about Syrian and Phoe-
nician trade and probably about the anchorages of the grain fleet while coasting 
virtually straight northward at that point from Egypt. They would have known that 
even some comparatively small vessels carried Roman grain, precisely because they 
could take advantage of small anchorages in the stormy season.22 It is very likely, 
therefore, that the vast majority of the Joppan pirates were Galilean and that they 
were less determined to survive the war than they were to do strategic-level damage 
to Roman interests. Running into Judaea rather than, say, the desert to the south, 
attempting to take refuge with the large Jewish community of Egypt, as other refu-
gees did, was not fleeing trouble. 
Josephus’s obvious sympathy for the plight of the pirates—he devotes ten times 
more space in his text to their terrible fate than he does to their depredations—
is surprising, given his utter lack of similar sympathy for raiders on land, whom 
he calls “robbers,” “brigands,” “gangs,” “revolutionaries,” and the like. He does not 
similarly categorize the pirates at Joppa as conducting disguised class warfare or as 
trying to take over the Jewish state in order to enjoy power. Interestingly, Strabo, 
writing at about the turn of the first century BCE to the first century CE, reports an 
earlier history of piracy from Joppa, noting that “the ports of robbers are nothing 
but robbers’ hideouts,” so the suitability of the site for hiding small craft might have 
been well known, even as far as Upper Galilee.23 So the seaworthy resettlers of Joppa 
might well have come there fully intending to support themselves in the chaos of 
revolt by raiding the grain fleet and, if they were fortunate, to take revenge against 
the invaders by inflicting strategic damage on them at home. It would explain Jo-
sephus’s uniquely sympathetic view of these particular (waterborne) raiders, if he 
believed they were fighting for ancestral land rather than private gain.
This episode of Jewish piracy was quickly followed by another outbreak of naval 
insurgency or piracy in the Black Sea the next year. After Nero’s suicide the next 
summer, in 68, Galba marched on Rome to become emperor. Vitellius successfully 
followed his example not long after, winning a war with Otho, who had quickly re-
placed Galba. By the summer of 69, Mucianus, the governor of Syria, and Vespasian 
planned for Mucianus to campaign in Europe to make Vespasian emperor, while 
Vespasian ensured that Judaea and perpetually riotous Egypt were under control. 
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The fact that 69 is called “the year of the four emperors” suggests that there were 
plenty of reasons for wrongdoers to hope that they might not attract much attention 
from the usual defenders of peaceable travel and property rights. Mucianus prob-
ably provided the immediate, local inspiration for an outbreak of piracy, when he 
moved the Black Sea squadrons from Trapezos to Byzantium. The obvious reason 
to do that would be to guard the crossing of legions from Asia Minor and farther 
south into Europe, but Tacitus assigns him a more offensive intent, claiming that 
he wanted to be ready in case it seemed like a good idea to blockade the Adriatic 
or even to harass the coasts of Italy to divide Vitellius’s forces well outside Rome.24 
Unfortunately, back in 64, Nero had already removed from power the client 
dynasty assigned to Pontus, the Polemonids, who seem to have been pretty well 
behaved creatures of their Roman masters, supplying forces in regional conflicts; 
Rome had treated the family as a ready reserve of utility monarchs in the region.25 
When Rome changed Pontus from a client kingdom to a province, it turned the 
former royal navy into a squadron of the imperial navy based at the free, ethnically 
Greek city of Trapezos, leaving former units of the royal army, whose members had 
been given Roman citizenship and Roman weaponry, as the guard of the new impe-
rial squadron. Polemo II made no known fuss when Pontus became a province, and 
Roman sources claim he agreed to resign.26 
However, in the chaos of 69, Anicetus, a freed slave of Polemo II who had become 
admiral of Pontus’s royal navy, rejected the new Roman political configuration and 
started looting. He allied himself with peoples who seemed to Roman authors to 
epitomize the term “barbarian” and tried to get the destitute of Roman Asia Minor 
to join him for the loot.27 He himself, however, directly attacked formerly Pontine 
forces at Trapezos, in an effort to destroy the main Roman defense on that coast. He 
claimed to have done this because he was a partisan of Vitellius in the civil war, but 
Tacitus maintains that he resented the loss of his high position and the turning of 
the Pontine kingdom into a province. Tacitus refers to Anicetus’s forces as a “fleet” 
(classis) of “barbarians,” sailing freely over a sea left unpoliced by Mucianus in boats 
called camarae, thrown together with no metal fittings, a type even more strangely 
constructed than the skapha of the Sea of Galilee. Their bows and sterns were iden-
tical, and their freeboard was adjusted for water conditions by adding or taking off 
planks, like leaves of a dining table. In fact, they could be encased by these add-on 
modules, so that they went bouncing along rough seas like footballs.
Whatever the amusement value of the camarae, the problem had strategic sig-
nificance, since grain and fish from the Black Sea had been important to the Greek-
speaking cities of the Aegean for centuries. Vespasian would have viewed hunger 
in Ephesus or Athens as a problem requiring his personal attention, if not as dan-
gerous as hunger in Rome, and as a usurper he surely did not want to start his 
regime with the more literate, wealthier, more populated eastern, Greek-speaking 
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Mediterranean world thinking that he represented a return to the bad old days of 
the Republic, when Roman hegemony had been famously unable or unwilling to 
cope with resurgent piracy. Various scholars have suggested other strategic themes, 
even believing that the creation of a province from a loyal, nontroublesome client 
kingdom could have been part of an effort in grand strategy to secure Armenia 
against constant Parthian interest, to keep the Sarmatians from coming farther 
south, or to deal with other long-term concerns.28
Vespasian sent vexillationes from his legions under Virdius Geminus to do what 
he had done himself in Galilee, which was to attack the waterborne looters on land. 
Having done that successfully, Virdius rapidly built actual liburnii, the standard 
working ship of the Roman navy—a pirate-chasing type, modeled on pirate ships. 
With them he blockaded Anicetus at the mouth of the River Chobus in Colchis, 
part of modern Georgia, under the king of the Sedochezi, whom Anicetus had 
bribed to protect him. Of course, the king kept his money and handed him over to 
Virdius. Tacitus states that in November 69 Vespasian got the news of the success-
ful outcome in Pontus simultaneously with word of his forces’ civil war–winning 
victory at Cremona in Italy. 
There are significant differences between the two nearly contemporaneous in-
stances of waterborne raiding. In Judaea, this raiding was perpetrated by ethnically 
homogeneous, desperate refugees and hard-core resisters who had already been 
under arms before they took to the sea. Although Josephus discusses at length (very 
unfavorably) charismatic leaders of various revolutionary (or brigand) factions in 
Judaea, he names no leader for the pirates in Joppa, and he was sympathetic to 
their plight, not accusing them of seizing goods for profit while waving the flag 
of revolution. In the Black Sea, a single experienced naval commander produced 
chaos at sea by calling for economically motivated piracy by polyglot peoples of the 
eastern shore of the sea—peoples whom Romans and Greeks believed to be wild 
and prone to witchcraft (although Anicetus wanted to attract impoverished Greeks 
also)—while he attacked Roman military power in Asia Minor.
Nonetheless, there were also meaningful similarities. In both cases, although 
the pirates worked together purposefully and with initial success at robbing others, 
they had joined for differing motives, and desperation in times of war motivated 
some in each case. In both instances, in the absence of regular Roman patrols, sail-
ors without formal naval training were able to do significant damage to Roman 
strategic-level, not merely tactical- or even theater-level, interests with traditional 
types of cheap, repurposed craft. In both cases, threats to grain supplies—in one 
case to Rome itself and in the other to Athens and other significant cities of the 
Aegean—left an emperor’s moral authority vulnerable to injury by peripheral, not 
generally respectable peoples. The standard Roman practice of isolating the pirate 
havens on land was a vital part of the solution, forcing the pirates pro tempore to 
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ill-judged actions at sea. In both theaters, pirates were able to profit from confine-
ment of shipping of vital raw materials to narrow sea-lanes. 
 I am deeply grateful for the award of a McMullen 
Seapower Fellowship, which enabled me to explore 
the complexity of the relationship between insur-
gency and piracy during the period of insurrection 
addressed by this paper.
 1 Although the town offered little resistance to a 
consular-rank commander with a force of com-
mensurate size, Vespasian killed outright all but the 
smallest children and then burned the town itself 
and all the villages around it. The population of 
some of these had already fled; where they had not, 
he enslaved all captured inhabitants. BJ 3 [Josephus, 
The Jewish War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1927), vols. 1–4, p. 134ff].
 2 Josephus’s narrative in Greek is the basis for this 
paper; although many have noted Josephus’s highly 
educated, urbanized, elite bias when he talks about 
the most dispossessed and anti-authoritarian groups 
in the region, it is still possible to distinguish dif-
ferently motivated people among those who drove 
the revolt. The Greek terms into which Josephus’s 
(probably Aramaic) draft was translated carry much 
cultural resonance from earlier Greek historians, 
and Josephus would have understood that. I am 
going to proceed under the assumption that he 
means what his text is saying in Greek, which he 
certainly read and understood, even if he needed 
help composing in it. I propose one later exception 
in note 19 and related text in terminology describing 
a local ship type for which there would have been no 
standard Hellenistic Greek terminology.
 3 Leaving 8,400 dead; BJ 2, p. 509.
 4 BJ 3, pp. 414–31.
 5 Josephus, The Jewish War, trans. G. A. William-
son, revised, annotated, appendixes by E. Mary 
Smallwood (New York: Penguin, 1970), p. 440 note 
3. Judaea was ordinarily self-sufficient in wheat, and 
there would have been no necessity for raiding the 
Roman grain fleet out of Egypt; Ze’ev Safrai, The 
Economy of Roman Palestine (New York: Routledge, 
1994), p. 111. Of course, things might have been 
different in the midst of a war. One may suspect that 
the grain shipments did not usually literally round 
the coasts of the Aegean or even cling to the south-
ern coast of Asia Minor, the most notorious lair of 
“barbarous” pirates in the Mediterranean, but rather 
engaged in island hopping, Cyprus–Rhodes–Crete, 
since these were especially well established legs of 
trading routes even for luxury merchandise; Paul 
Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 
pp. 188–89. Prevailing winds off the coast of Joppa 
were southwesterly (and still are for modern Jaffa—
there is still a tendency for the port to silt with mate-
rial from the Nile), but winter storms often came 
from the north; Shlomo Aronson, “Jaffa,” in Jewish 
Virtual Library, ed. American-Israeli Cooperative 
Enterprise, www.jewishvirtualibrary.org/; Ellsworth 
Huntington, Palestine and Its Transformation (Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), p. 64. 
 6 Annales 12.43.2 [Tacitus, The Annals, Books IV–VI, 
XI–XII (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1937)]. On the necessity of the Egyptian shipments 
for feeding the capital, Erdkamp, Grain Market in 
the Roman Empire, pp. 228–35; on how close they 
often cut it in winter, p. 245. 
 7 Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 
p. 210, notes that the proximity of overwhelming 
land forces to the pirate base meant that “it was un-
necessary to employ any naval units in its suppres-
sion.” De Souza further comments that there is no 
evidence that any imperial squadron was assigned 
to control piracy on this rich coastline, along which 
piracy was common; in fact, there is no attestation 
of a classis Syriaca, a Syria-based squadron, before 
Hadrian, whose reign started in 117. De Souza 
guesses that the classis Alexandrina, the high- 
priority squadron assigned to protect the grain fleet 
as it sailed from Alexandria, “was felt sufficient to 
fulfill any naval duties in the area.” The mission 
of the imperial navy was to control piracy, and it 
consisted therefore of predominantly lean, pirate-
chasing ship types. Small ships manned largely by 
ethnically Levantine sailors are not well attested in 
the epigraphic testimony for any era, so absence of 
evidence is not decisive.
 8 Josephus certainly describes brutal factionalism in 
Jerusalem, but he claims that the more moderate 
and peaceable people had left and more combative 
ones flooded in from the countryside. It is surely 
not likely that the peaceable, frightened groups at-
tempting to escape war in Jerusalem took up piracy. 
I am assuming that refugees from such earlier events 
as anti-Jewish rioting in Caesarea in 66, unsettled 
and uncommented on, would not have been roving 
along the coast for more than a year. 
 9 BJ 2, p. 513. Cestius had sent forces against some 
sort of tower at Aphek, where he had heard that 
forces were gathering. When he got there, it was 
already abandoned, as were the villages around 
it, from where I am guessing that armed group of 
resisters had come; so he burned all the villages in 
the area. Nonetheless, we are also told, by Josephus, 
that refugees from these actions were pouring into 
Jerusalem to make a stand there, so we cannot 
assume that many of those left homeless by Cestius 
were still available to resettle Joppa. We have already 
noted that Vespasian’s first target after he arrived in 
the theater was Galilean Gabara, from which some 
potential combatants had already fled. Nonetheless, 
he created more Galilean refugees by destroying 
towns and villages in that area, many of which had 
already been abandoned, so populations in hiding 
could not return to their homes.
 10 Ibid., pp. 525, 587–600; Josephus, Vita 13 [Josephus, 
The Life; Against Apion (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1926)]; Eric M. Meyers, “The Cultural 
Setting of Galilee,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
römischen Welt, ed. Hildegard Temporini and  
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Wolfgang Haase (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979) [here-
after ANRW with vol., part, and page numbers and 
year], vol. II, part 9.1, p. 700. See Safrai, Economy 
of Roman Palestine, pp. 201–202, on the garment 
industry, well known throughout the Mediter-
ranean world. Donkey caravans wove through the 
countryside picking up merchandise and taking 
it mainly to Tyre and Sidon. The donkeys bore 
Galilean merchandise only into the metropoles—
nothing came back on the donkeys; Safrai, Economy 
of Roman Palestine, pp. 236–37, 264. Maurice 
Sartre, The Middle East under Rome (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap, 2005), pp. 260–63, notes that Tyre 
was probably minting the only high-silver-content 
universally acceptable coinage in the region. Safrai, 
Economy of Roman Palestine, p. 402, notes that 
Galilee was closely tied to Tyre economically by ef-
ficient roads, including the Via Maris.
 11 Sartre, Middle East under Rome, pp. 113–15. 
 12 Josephus, Antiquitates Iudaiorum 14.167 [Josephus, 
Jewish Antiquities, Books XII–XIV (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952)]. The decree 
asserts that this action follows a general policy of 
forcing everyone to cede territory taken by force in 
order to restore “justice and piety”; also BJ 1, pp. 
204–11. Shortly thereafter, one Malichus, an enemy 
of Herod associated by Josephus with a belief that 
“other peoples” ought not to be brought among 
“dwellers of the country” during their periods of pu-
rification, faced execution by the Roman governor 
of Syria as a revolutionary (literally, “among those 
eneoterisen,” “those undertaking a new order”). 
Subsequently, he tried to slip his son out of Tyre 
itself, where he was being held hostage for Mali-
chus’s continued good conduct—implying insider 
knowledge of Tyre on the part of Malichus, as well 
as excellent contacts there; BJ 1, pp. 229–32. On the 
history of conflict in this zone, Shimon Applebaum, 
“Judaea as a Roman Province,” in ANRW II.8 (1977), 
pp. 382–83, 387, noting that this implies a very 
different, more favorable interpretation of John of 
Gischala than that offered by Josephus, namely, that 
local defense against marauders was still necessary 
and raiding and counterraiding customary. On 
John’s own trading expertise in dealing with Phoeni-
cians as middleman, BJ 2, pp. 525, 587–600. 
 13 BJ 4, p. 105.
 14 BJ 2, pp. 635–41; Josephus, Vita, 9.12. 
 15 BJ 3, pp. 466–69.
 16 Ibid., pp. 522–31.
 17 It matched the Galilee boat in its distinctive high 
curved stern and especially sharp cutwater, as well 
as the arrangement of oars and shape of hull, to the 
extent that that can be seen in the mosaic; Shelley 
Wachsmann, The Sea of Galilee Boat (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Perseus, 1995), pp. 303–309. Fishing was tre-
mendously important to the Galilean and Judaean 
diet. Fish were even imported from Egypt. Galilean 
fishermen were central in meeting regional needs 
for fish, especially fishermen around Tiberias, so a 
high percentage of the male population would be 
very familiar with fishing boats; Safrai, Economy of 
Roman Palestine, pp. 163–64. In addition, the Sea 
of Galilee was important as a water transportation 
route per se; ibid., p. 290. 
 18 Wachsmann has done the math on Josephus’s crews 
of four, with pilot, and his arrested dissidents, and 
I am simply going to accept all of her work on that; 
Wachsmann, Sea of Galilee Boat, pp. 312–17.
 19 Ibid., pp. 318–19. We will have to chalk this up to 
Josephus’s inability to enroll in a course in advanced 
Greek composition or to his imperfect communica-
tion with (or proofreading of the work of) the Greek 
editors often hypothesized for his literary efforts 
back in Rome. 
 20 BJ 3, pp. 419–22; Strabo 16.2.28 [Strabo, Geography, 
Books XV–XVI (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1930)], places Andromeda at Joppa. Hunting-
ton, Palestine and Its Transformation, p. 64, explains 
the cliffs and the sharp rocks at widely varying 
depths in proximity; the shoreline, not geologi-
cally old, consists of many kinds of rocks of varying 
hardness, so that they do not erode at the same rate, 
making the coastline particularly unpredictable. 
 21 BJ 3, pp. 422–27; de souza, Piracy in the Graeco- 
Roman World, p. 120, claims that the best way to 
fight pirates in antiquity was from the land, deny-
ing them havens. This was certainly the Romans’ 
ordinary procedure. 
 22 Erdkamp, Grain Market in the Roman Empire, p. 
178. Incentives were offered to draw larger ships 
into the trade (p. 245).
 23 Strabo 16.2.28 and 16.2.37 states that Moses’s 
descendants were less pious and turned “robbers,” 
preying on Syria and Phoenicia. This is no help in 
dating the first Jewish pirates at Joppa; perhaps it re-
fers to otherwise unattested events during the chaos 
of the Roman civil wars. If earlier, it might explain 
Pompey’s decision to take the coast away from the 
Jewish state. 
 24  Tac. Hist. 2.83, 3.47 [Tacitus, Histories I–III (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1925)].
 25 Suet. Nero 18 [Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press: 1914), vol. 
2]; E. Olshausen, “Pontos und Rom (63 v.Chr.–64 
n.Chr),” ANRW II.7.2 (1980), pp. 910–11; R. D. Sul-
livan, “Dynasts in Pontus,” ANRW II.7.2 (1980), pp. 
926–30. The evidence for the date of the creation of 
the province is coinage stamped with references to a 
new “era.” 
 26 Parts of Cilicia had been given him by Claudius, so 
he might have retired to mountain climes or used 
his experience to deal with even worse pirates on the 
notorious Cilician coast.
 27 Strabo, a Greek, describes what he claims to be 
seventy peoples with different languages in what is 
now Georgia and its environs; he claims that others 
refer to three hundred distinct peoples. He states 
that they live separately and do not try to talk to 
each other, because of their “obstinacy and ferocity”; 
Strabo 11.2.1. 
 28 David Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (Prince ton, 
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 562, and 
vol. 2, p. 1418 note 63, entertains various theories 
for Roman strategic thinking about the political 
status of Pontus. 
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II Sea Power without a Navy?
Roman Naval Forces in the Principate
JORIT WINTJES
When one thinks about the Roman military of the Principate, naval forces are likely not to be the first thing that springs to mind. While Rome was, during the time of the Republic, capable of exerting considerable 
power at sea—as proved, for example, in the Punic Wars—the Rome of the emper-
ors is still primarily seen as a land-based power arranged around a peaceful central 
lake, the Mediterranean, and Roman naval history as basically coming to a dramat-
ic end in the battle of Actium.1 To this day the most powerful and iconic symbol 
of Roman military might is the legion with its eagle, a unit that—at least during 
the Principate—is supposed to have consisted of hardy professional soldiers drawn 
from the Roman citizenry and serving as heavily armored infantrymen. In reality, 
however, Roman legions were anything but pure infantry units, combining instead 
a number of different combat as well as noncombat capabilities; beside artillery 
(i.e., catapults and the like), cavalry, and various types of engineering, a certain na-
val capability was also part of what was at the disposal of a Roman legionary com-
mander. Naval forces did indeed matter to the Romans during the Principate, even 
though large-scale fleet action was, with very few exceptions, a thing of the past.
Unfortunately, looking closer at the naval forces of imperial Rome can at times 
be a discouraging experience, as understanding is significantly impaired by three 
main issues. First of all, the nature of the available sources—and they are few and 
far between—is unlikely to raise much enthusiasm. Apart from the odd men-
tion of a particularly spectacular feat of arms or navigation (like the—possible— 
circumnavigation of Jutland under Augustus or the circumnavigation of Britain 
under Domitian), ancient historiography is decidedly uninterested in Roman na-
val forces. While some inscriptions and other material of a documentary nature 
do indeed survive, they pale almost into insignificance compared to the mass of 
source material available for Roman land forces.2 Second, combat at sea being the 
ultimate raison d’être of naval forces, the issue of how these naval forces were actu-
ally employed comes up: What did the Romans actually do with their naval forces, 
and how did they do it? It is probably not too far-fetched to assume that while 
the Romans seem not to have issued doctrinal publications, some sort of thinking 
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about operational matters certainly must have existed, though almost nothing of 
it survived.3 And finally, current thinking about Roman naval forces is still deeply 
influenced by modern, and to a certain extent Western, concepts of how naval 
forces should be organized. It is thus quite common, particularly in the case of naval 
units stationed in the provinces, to speak of “fleets,” which are supposed to have 
been organized in “squadrons”—although that assumption is totally unsupported 
by evidence.4
There is very little that can be done about the first issue. Literary references in 
general are, as was already mentioned, sparse. A considerable amount of specifi-
cally military literature both from Greece and from Rome survives, but the same 
cannot be said of naval matters, apart from a small corpus of Byzantine texts on war 
at sea.5 Epigraphical evidence is—with a few exceptions—fairly rare, too rare for 
useful statistical evaluation. Archaeological evidence is likewise rather limited; for 
example, compared to legionary garrisons, which are well attested and consequent-
ly well understood, very little is known about naval bases or their layout.6 Also, 
ship finds provide only a very selective picture of Roman military shipbuilding, 
warships being nearly totally absent from the archaeological record.7
The second issue is closely connected to the first. Ancient authors rarely talk 
about naval forces, and when they do they talk neither directly about doctrine nor 
even generally about the way naval forces were actually employed. Nor do they give 
any information about all the appurtenances of large-scale naval operations, rang-
ing from logistics to signaling. As a consequence, operational aspects of Roman na-
val history have elicited little scholarly interest, which is more than a little bit odd, 
as the primary purpose of any naval force is obviously combat at sea. Even if there 
is no fitting Latin equivalent to the clear statement that can be found at the begin-
ning of the U.S. naval doctrine publication on naval warfare that “the success of an 
organized military force is associated directly with the validity of its doctrine,” it 
cannot be doubted that the Romans (or, for that matter, any other ancient operator 
of naval forces) saw things in exactly the same way.8 For anyone handing out large 
amounts of money for the construction of ships usable for nothing but combat and 
for the upkeep of a considerable infrastructure to support these ships, employing 
them in the most effective way must have been far more important than legal sta-
tus, naming conventions, etc. Nonetheless, while a closer look at Roman operations 
could indeed reveal quite a bit about Roman operational procedures, these are not 
the main purpose of this paper.
Instead, this paper will concentrate on the third issue—the fact that the literature 
on the Roman navy, which goes back at least to the seventeenth century, is to this 
day heavily influenced in its thinking about the structure of Roman naval forces 
by a modern way of categorizing that distinguishes between the army on the one 
hand and the navy on the other. As a result, the classical historical model of Roman 
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military organization is simple: on the one hand, there was the army, divided into 
the legions and the auxiliaries, while on the other hand there was the navy, again 
divided into the “imperial” fleets stationed in Italy and the “provincial” fleets based 
on the periphery. The most important distinction, in this model, between “imperi-
al” and “provincial” fleets was that the former were manned by citizens, while men 
serving in the latter had the same legal status as soldiers in auxiliary army units. 
This parallel construction of an army divided into units of citizen and noncitizen 
soldiers and an accompanying navy also consisting of citizen and noncitizen crews 
and soldiers has been the underlying assumption of nearly all research into Roman 
naval forces ever since Johannes Scheffer wrote his groundbreaking study De mili-
tia navali veterum in 1654.9 Yet this assumption is fundamentally flawed.
Dealing with the whole range of Roman naval forces—of which there were more 
than the “fleets” just mentioned—would be a massive undertaking. Therefore this 
paper will concentrate on key aspects of the so-called provincial fleets, which the 
Romans called classes and which are usually seen as scaled-down variations of the 
large imperial fleets, also called classes—that is, as naval auxiliary cohorts to the naval 
legions, to put it pointedly.
Provincial Classes, Not Provincial “Fleets”
Perhaps the easiest aspect of Roman classes is that of their commanders’ social sta-
tus, if only because quite a reasonable amount of evidence for it survives. It is fairly 
clear that the commanders of the classes stationed in Egypt, on the Danube, and 
in Syria earned sixty thousand sesterces a year, an entry-level salary for a Roman 
equestrian intent on making a career in the imperial administration.10 Although the 
command positions over the classes in Britain and Germany were better paid, they 
were still seen as low-ranking offices in the course of an equestrian career. Several 
examples of Roman equestrians are known whose successful careers—after the in-
itial military offices of the militia equestres—began with command over provincial 
classes;11 even a combined command over more than one of these units, a rare oc-
currence, was not at the top of the career ladder.12 Commanding one of the imperial 
classes in Italy, however, was quite different—these posts were usually either the 
final steps of very successful careers or stepping-stones to one of the small number 
of highly important and eminently prestigious offices, like the prefecture of Egypt.13
A comparison between the social status of someone commanding a classis in 
one of the provinces and that of the commander of one of the imperial classes may 
not appear very interesting at first. After all, there was also a considerable social gap 
between the commander of an auxiliary cohort and a legionary commander. Yet 
this comparison points precisely to an important characteristic of the classes sta-
tioned in the provinces. That is, just as an auxiliary cohort had only a fraction of the 
manpower of a legion, so a classis on the Rhine or the Danube or in one of the other 
border provinces cannot have come even remotely near to the manpower of the 
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classes in Italy—otherwise the rank and social status of commanders of provincial 
classes would have been higher. Indeed, if one looks at the commanders of cavalry 
units, one finds that those of large alae miliariae, units of a thousand cavalrymen, 
were on the same salary level as most men commanding provincial classes.14 This 
gives a clear indicator for the overall strength of a provincial classis: even taking 
into account the inherent complexity of naval units, which required extensive sup-
port services to function properly, it cannot have greatly exceeded the manpower of 
one of the large alae. Allowing for a considerable staff, support services in the home 
port, etc., a classis may have had perhaps around two thousand, certainly no more 
than three thousand, men on strength. Oared warships being extremely manpower 
intensive, a classis like the classis Britannica, in the English Channel, may have op-
erated fifteen to twenty ships at most.15 So, as “fleets” come, these classes were tiny.
This is important to bear in mind—provincial classes cannot have been large 
units with hundreds of ships and thousands of men, because their command-
ing officers were far too junior for such responsibilities, and this in turn means 
they can obviously have had only small numbers of ships at their disposal. In 
other words, instead of being smaller clones of the Italian classes, they were quite 
unlike the naval units stationed in Ravenna and Misenum. The classis in Mise-
num, perhaps the larger one of the two, must have mustered tens of thousands 
of men in the early empire. Not only was it possible for Nero in ad 68 to recruit 
from it a legion, legio I adiutrix (which, even assuming it was understrength, still 
had several thousand trained soldiers), but even after that the classis was still ca-
pable of military operations after hiving off so many trained soldiers, strongly 
suggesting there were considerably more available in the first place.16 Barely two 
years later, an Italian classis again served as a manpower reserve, when a new le-
gion, legio II adiutrix, was created from personnel from the classis Ravennata.17 
The capability gap, so to speak, between the classes stationed in Italy and those sta-
tioned in the provinces must have been enormous.
Yet—and this is one of the great mysteries of Roman naval history and its 
scholarship—Roman naval operations, of which there were many on a large scale 
throughout the empire, are still very often seen only in the context and within the 
framework of the provincial classes: if there was naval activity going on in a prov-
ince or on the frontier, then it must have been in the domain of the relevant pro-
vincial classis. Further, one is tempted to add, that was presumably true because the 
provincial classis was the navy’s arm in the affected province; only if the planned 
operation exceeded the capabilities of the provincial classis did detachments of the 
imperial ones become involved. Even the very brief look at the possible size of the 
provincial classes has shown, however, that such reasoning simply does not fit their 
actual nature. Instead, a look at large-scale naval operations in the provinces—of 
which there were many—reveals that although the provincial classes did indeed 
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have parts in them, they must have been, numerically speaking, minor. One of the 
important requirements for any large-scale operation was to have a large number 
of ships available. For example, the amphibious operations of Germanicus off the 
German coast in AD 16 involved more than a thousand ships, as did Claudius’s in-
vasion of Britain in AD 43; several operations right up to the end of Roman rule in 
northwestern Europe were on a similar scale.18 These impressive numbers cannot 
have been produced by the provincial classes alone.
Instead, ships and crews for such undertakings came from three distinctly dif-
ferent sources. First, there were indeed the classes, which supplied warships and 
their crews, as well as—one would assume—key personnel necessary for a major 
operation, ranging from pilots to logistics specialists. However, in terms of sheer 
numbers, classes can have contributed relatively little, not least because warships 
formed only a small part of any substantial amphibious force, being probably quite 
unsuitable in the troop-carrying role.19
A much bigger share fell to the army, the second important source for ships and 
crews, and one that often gets overlooked. There is evidence from Lower Germany 
of Roman legions having been involved in ship construction;20 there also survives 
a list of immunes—specialists exempt from certain everyday duties—of the legion, 
a list composed by the praetorian prefect Tarrutienus Paternus at the end of the 
second century that includes both naupegi, shipwrights, and gubernatores, helms-
men.21 One of the latter, a certain Marcus Minucius Audens, served in the second 
or third century AD with legio VI in York, as his funerary inscription shows.22 Thus 
the legion apparently included personnel experienced in operating ships; indeed, 
surviving anchors with legionary stamps on them are tangible evidence of these 
ships.23 So, just as modern army formations can have boats at their disposal, the 
Roman legions had some sort of naval capability, which may well have included 
“proper” warships.24 Given the considerable resources in terms of both manpower 
and logistical support at the disposal of a legionary commander, it is perfectly pos-
sible that under certain circumstances the naval element, so to speak, of a legion 
was comparable in size and capability to those of a provincial classis.
The third important source for ships and crews was the civilian sector, again 
something that has seen very little scholarly attention. What is clear from the avail-
able sources is that Roman commanders, when necessary, commandeered civilian 
ships.25 There is much less certainty about the crews; while some evidence exists for 
the hiring of civilians to man ships either newly constructed or commandeered, 
the practical implications are unknown.26 For many problems, ranging from the 
legal status of the hired crewmen (what power did a noncommissioned officer have 
over a civilian?) to the eventual fate of the ships involved in a large-scale operation 
(did they simply rot away, were they recycled in some way or another, or dumped 
onto the civilian ship market?), there is insufficient evidence to find answers. Yet it 
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is obvious that the civilian sector must have played a major role in any large-scale 
naval undertaking.
Large-scale operations are instructive for two reasons. One, their sheer size and 
the fact that the Romans managed to stage them with surprising frequency point 
to the limits of what the provincial classes could actually provide for such opera-
tions. Two, they are reminders of how multifaceted Roman naval operations were 
in reality. Indeed, there were other units that evidently had naval capabilities but 
were very different from the classes. For example, coastal units of unknown size 
and function are attested in Spain;27 river guards, potamophylaces, served on the 
Nile—underscoring that Roman naval operations were anything but confined to a 
Roman navy.28 
When the Romans went to sea, they did not call solely on a Roman navy; in-
stead, they tapped very different sources for ships and manpower. Comparing these 
cases leads to the suspicion that of the three elements involved in getting large-scale 
operations off the ground—classes, legions, and civilian ships and crews—these 
operations were most likely run by the element with the highest status, the legion. 
Moreover, in addition to being senior to any nonlegionary unit, the legion had the 
largest permanent staff organization; the legion—or one of the legions participating 
in a large-scale campaign—was home to the overall commander, and the highest- 
ranking officers in any campaign invariably served with the legions. To put it point-
edly, one could therefore argue that the history of large-scale naval operations in 
the Roman Principate is not so much “navy history” as “legionary history”—or 
“army history.”
Roman Provincial Classes: What Were They Good For?
Having had a closer look at the nature of Roman provincial classes—and in the 
process having said more about what they were not than about what they were—we 
still face one key question: Given their fairly limited capabilities, what might have 
been their purpose in everyday life, beyond taking modest parts in large-scale op-
erations? For an answer to this question it is useful to turn to the classis stationed 
in Roman Syria, the classis Syriaca.29 The general assumption is that this unit was 
stationed at Seleucia Pieria, the port of Antioch-on-the-Orontes, one of the biggest 
cities in the East and throughout the Principate the key staging post for any cam-
paign against the Parthians or the Sassanids.30 All the military supplies and most 
of the personnel involved in such campaigns went through Seleucia Pieria, which 
saw extensive building activity right down to late antiquity intended to keep the 
harbor from silting up.31 As the most important harbor in Roman Syria, it is more 
than likely that Seleucia Pieria was indeed the base of the classis Syriaca, though 
less than a dozen inscriptions of the unit have been found there. Seleucia, which 
has never been properly excavated, also yields inscriptions of sailors serving with 
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the classis stationed in Misenum.32 As luck would have it, a papyrus from Egypt, 
a contract between two sailors about the sale of a slave boy, survives as well;33 it 
clearly states that in Seleucia was a base of the classis from Misenum.34 It therefore 
offers a good starting point for thinking about the function of provincial classes in 
relation to the units stationed in Italy, in the overall context of Roman naval forces.
Obviously, a naval base in or near Seleucia must have existed where the squad-
ron from Misenum was garrisoned, although so far it has not been found. But at 
the same time—accepting the general assumption that the Syrian classis was indeed 
stationed in Syria’s most important port—the classis Syriaca had a base there as well. 
Why then did the Romans, not known for unnecessarily duplicating military capa-
bilities, station both a detached squadron of the large and powerful Misenate classis 
and also the Syrian classis in one and the same port? Merely increasing the overall 
number of naval personnel stationed in Seleucia cannot have been the reason, as 
that would have been much easier to achieve by simply increasing the detachment 
of the Misenate classis. The only plausible answer is that the classis Syriaca offered 
some military capability inherently different from that of the classis from Misenum. 
What was this military capability? Provincial classes seem to have been equipped 
mainly with ships of the liburna type, smaller vessels capable of operating in coastal 
waters but less well suited to the high seas;35 that, at least, is what the admittedly 
poor epigraphical record seems to suggest.36 This assumption is supported by the 
fairly small size of the classes and the large crew requirements of bigger warships. 
It is therefore likely that a unit like the classis Syriaca was mainly used for coastal 
patrols and police duties. Although piracy is generally assumed to have been elimi-
nated by Pompey in his great campaign of 67 BC, low-intensity piracy of the variety 
best described as petty crime at sea—for example, robbing a fisherman of his catch 
or capturing a small ferry with two or three passengers—surely continued along the 
coasts of the Mediterranean, just as highwaymen existed throughout the Roman 
empire.37 To keep such activity at a manageable level, units were needed to fulfill the 
function of something similar to a coastal police or coast guard.
Just as cavalry regiments stationed on the frontiers sent out patrols on a daily 
basis into neighboring villages to keep contact with the inhabitants of the frontier 
zone and to act as a border police, units like the classis Syriaca will have sent out 
ships to coastal communities, showing the flag and dissuading potential trouble-
makers.38 This kind of policing work off the coasts of, for example, Roman Syria 
clearly required a very different set of skills and capabilities than did, for example, 
controlling the sea-lanes in the Mediterranean or guarding convoys to and from 
Italy. An in-depth knowledge of both the coast and presumably its immediate hin-
terland was needed, as was the ability to operate small vessels in both coastal and 
riverine environments, assets that the classes stationed in Italy did not need for 
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their high-seas work. The provincial classes thus appear as units composed of spe-
cialists whose involvement in large-scale military operations must have been main-
ly due to their special skills, particularly their intimate knowledge of their coasts.
Provincial Classes: A New Model and Its Consequences
So far it has been shown that the commonly accepted picture of what provincial 
classes were is in need of revision. Naval units stationed in the provinces were 
small, comparable in size to large cavalry regiments and functionally similar to 
coast guards. This revision has two important consequences regarding the possible 
existence of naval units currently unattested and the eventual fate of Roman naval 
forces in late antiquity.
The literature on Roman naval forces has traditionally been careful about as-
suming into existence provincial classes for which there is no epigraphical evidence. 
Thus, a certain Caius Iulius Libo is attested as a trierarchus, a captain, of classis 
nova Libyca, in an inscription from Constantine in Algeria that happens to be the 
only evidence for that unit; it has been suggested accordingly that this classis was 
in fact only temporary, possibly consisting of ships detached from either the Italian 
classes or the provincial ones in the eastern Mediterranean.39 However, given the 
fairly small size of provincial classes and the fact that other units are almost as poor-
ly attested—the classis Syriaca appears on less than a dozen inscriptions, which just 
as easily might not have survived—it is perfectly possible that other naval units did 
exist, just as auxiliary units did of which no trace is left. These naval units may have 
been additional classes, like the classis nova Libyca, but they may just as well have 
been of different types, given that Roman naval forces came in a variety of forms.
As for the eventual fate of the provincial classes, it is often assumed that Roman 
naval forces were run down during the latter half of the third century and that the 
reforms under Diocletian and Constantine then broke up the older, larger units 
into smaller squadrons with new names. Units like the classis Anderetianorum and 
the classis Sambrica, attested in late-fourth-century Gaul, have been interpreted 
as examples of this development:40 it has been suggested that these two Gaulish 
squadrons were the remnants of the old classis Britannica.41 Such a process—the 
splitting up of a larger classis into smaller squadrons that continue to operate as 
separate units—rests, however, on the assumption that the provincial classes were 
large enough to allow such a division in the first place. That was not the case, as 
has been shown above. Even if the classis Britannica was indeed larger than, for 
example, the classis Syriaca (and the fact that its commander earned more than 
his Syrian counterpart is a good indicator that it was), it would not, as has been 
shown above, have exceeded the total manpower of a legion, making a strength of 
anything much beyond twenty ships highly unlikely. That number, however, is far 
too small to allow, first, a running-down of the classis and then a separation into 
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two units—which, incidentally, must have meant a considerable increase in admin-
istrative and other support personnel.
In any case, there is no proper evidence for any downscaling or reorganizing of 
Roman naval forces in the latter half of the third century. Thus in Roman Syria, a 
classis Seleucena was stationed in late antiquity at Seleucia Pieria; it was probably 
simply the classis Syriaca under a new name.42 Most of the unit names known from 
the early and high Principate disappear in late antiquity; if one were to draw up 
two lists of naval units, those of the Principate and of those of the late empire, there 
would be considerable differences, with a sizable number of new units appearing in 
the latter.43 Yet taking these differences at face value is methodologically unsound, 
as they first and foremost reflect a considerable change in the nature of the avail-
able sources. Most unit names from the Principate—not only of naval units but 
throughout the whole Roman army—are attested on private inscriptions; in the 
course of the third century, however, the “epigraphical habit” of setting up these 
private inscriptions changes considerably, and their number rapidly decreases.44 
Thus the lack of epigraphical evidence for naval units in late antiquity must be seen 
against the background of a general lack of epigraphical evidence for any military 
unit in that period. On the other hand, most of the unit names from late antiquity 
come from documentary sources like the notitia dignitatum or, in the case of the 
classis Seleucena, the codex Theodosianus. Depending on how official one is in-
clined to consider these sources to be, they could well preserve unit designations 
that predate late antiquity but do not appear in the epigraphical evidence simply 
out of personal preference of the sailors; most of the inscriptions did not have an 
official character, after all.
In conclusion, a closer look at the provincial classes—which in the past have often 
been interpreted as fleets of considerable strength—has shown that they were very 
different from the classes stationed in Italy and were in fact small, highly specialized 
units fulfilling a very specific function in the overall spectrum of Roman naval war-
fare. While their contribution to large-scale operations probably was significant in 
terms of skills and capabilities, provincial classes could not run such operations by 
themselves, nor were they responsible for organizing them; on the frontiers, only 
the Roman legions had the staff and logistics to support large-scale operations. We 
have therefore compared the provincial classes to coast-guard units; one might also 
interpret them as army units equipped with boats to gain sufficient mobility for 
patrolling. One thing they were not—an auxiliary part of a Roman navy that itself 
was in some way separate from the Roman army.
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III Toward a Model of Piracy 
Lessons from the Seventeenth-Century Caribbean
VIRGINIA LUNSFORD
The spate of attacks by Somali pirates in recent years has taken the world by surprise. Now, Nigerian pirates are making themselves known as well, and they present a growing problem. That piracy exists today—and exists in 
a form powerful enough to produce hundreds of attacks and captures—surprises 
many. Indeed, this is not the mythical and romanticized piracy of Hollywood, of 
ships flying the Jolly Roger and “swashbuckling” captains in search of buried trea-
sure. No, this piracy—like all true piracy—is disturbing, frightening, and costly. It 
has also been irrepressible. Various naval assets, including a multinational naval 
task force with U.S. Navy participation (Combined Task Force 151, established in 
2009), have been conducting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off 
Somalia’s coast for the last several years, and their presence appears to have resulted 
in a decrease in piratical activity.1 Attacks and captures are still occurring, however, 
and show no sign of ceasing altogether; also, the pirates are becoming more creative 
in their approach and expanding their reach geographically.2 Indeed, the United 
Nations secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, warns that “while the effectiveness of na-
val disruption operations has increased and more pirates have been arrested and 
prosecuted, this has not stopped piracy. The trend of the increased levels of vio-
lence employed by the pirates as well as their expanding reach is disconcerting.”3 
The secretary-general’s frustrations have long been felt by those charged with 
suppressing piracy, for as history reveals, the problem of entrenched and flourish-
ing piracy has never been solved by high-seas naval action alone. The “Golden Age 
of Piracy,” from about 1530 to around 1730, was the time in history when seagoing 
robbery was most prevalent, extensive, profitable, and threatening. Throughout the 
era and around the globe, a variety of piratical groups practiced their trade. Their 
depredations challenged the authority of the expanding European empires and the 
viability of the nascent world economy. As Marcus Rediker has said about piracy 
vis-à-vis the eighteenth-century British, “pirates created an imperial crisis with 
their relentless and successful attacks upon merchants’ property and international 
commerce. . . . Their numbers . . . were extraordinary, and their plunderings were 
exceptional in both volume and value.”4 His comment could be equally applied to 
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the Dutch, the French, the Portuguese, and the party who probably was victimized 
most severely, the Spanish.
Those who endeavor to combat contemporary piracy would be wise to look 
back in time, to this Golden Age of Piracy of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-
teenth centuries. These early-modern episodes provide instructive case studies that 
reveal how piracy blooms and flourishes over time. In turn, they offer us ways to 
analyze the pirates of the contemporary world—including those now operating off 
the coasts of Somalia and Nigeria—so that we can ascertain these modern raid-
ers’ viability and learn how to combat them. Although the means, ends, locations, 
and characters of Golden Age pirate groups often differed noticeably from one to 
another, pirate communities that achieved lengthy and remunerative existences 
shared several key qualities. In sum, long-term, intractable, thriving piracy is a 
complex activity that relies on six integral factors: an available population of po-
tential recruits, access to goods (via vulnerable trade routes or places where wealth 
is stockpiled), at least one secure base of operations, a sophisticated organization, 
some degree of outside support, and cultural bonds engendering vibrant group 
solidarity. Actions that interfere with the smooth workings of any of these factors, 
especially with more than one, weaken the piracy’s sustainability.
Elsewhere, I have analyzed the example of the North African corsairs, whose 
marauding activities lasted for some three hundred years.5 The Caribbean bucca-
neers represent yet another important case study. Who were the buccaneers? The 
term is typically but erroneously utilized to refer to pirates in general. In actual-
ity, the “Buccaneers” proper (as it will be given hereafter) were a specific group of 
marauders: a motley yet ferocious brotherhood based in the seventeenth-century 
Caribbean. While various European countries suffered from their depredations at 
one time or another, their central operational goals were to assault Spain’s Amer-
ican colonies, prey on Spain’s lucrative trade in the Americas, and raid Spanish 
ships bound for Europe. This they did with great savagery and ferocity. The move-
ment expanded over time, ultimately boasting invasion forces numbering in the 
hundreds and even thousands of men. It captured a number of Spanish ships and, 
even more strikingly, conquered established and sizable Spanish settlements in the 
Caribbean, despite the colonies’ formidable defensive measures. The wealth the 
Buccaneers plundered is staggering in its value; the numbers of settlements they 
attacked and of people they brutally tortured and slew are stunning. 
The Buccaneers’ piratical endeavors were serious, sensational, and sustained 
over a lengthy duration of time. Their success can be attributed in large part to 
the fact that these Caribbean marauders met the six conditions for successful and 
long-term piracy. That is, they possessed a steady supply of available (and talented) 
recruits; access to Spanish trade in the Caribbean as well as to Spanish colonial set-
tlements, both coastal and inland; several secure bases of operations; sophisticated 
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organization; financial and political support from several European states; and in-
tense cultural bonds engendering tight group solidarity. The result was a communi-
ty of fierce, brutal, and seemingly invincible marauders who voraciously raided and 
terrorized the Caribbean for decades (c. 1600–c. 1700, especially c. 1650–1700).
Our knowledge of Buccaneer exploits and practices comes from a remark-
able primary source, Alexander Exquemelin’s Buccaneers of America, a physician’s 
candid account of his life among the marauders (hereafter, citations to his work, 
aside from glosses, are given as page numbers in the text).6 Exquemelin’s work, first 
published in Amsterdam in 1678 as De Americaensche Zee-Roovers and thereafter 
translated into various foreign languages and reprinted a myriad of times, is a rare 
and revealing window into the history of this long-lost brotherhood. In his remark-
ably vivid and densely detailed text, Exquemelin recounts his knowledge about the 
seventeenth-century West Indies, describing its flora and fauna, the customs of its 
native inhabitants, its climate and weather, the region’s natural resources, and the 
food, occupations, and colorful lifestyles of the colonists. He is no less attentive 
in presenting information about the Buccaneer community—of which he was a 
member, serving as a “surgeon” (medical officer) during the era of Henry Morgan 
—and provides a unique glimpse into this elusive criminal group. Furthermore, 
what makes Exquemelin’s account even more valuable is that it is generally reliable; 
modern historians judge it to be largely accurate in its descriptions.7
These descriptions include revealing accounts of Buccaneer mores, missions, 
tactics, and means of attack and thus give us greater insight into how this force of 
outsiders could have been so effective in challenging the organized state power of 
Spain. The Buccaneers came into existence organically, developing from a concen-
tration of dispossessed hunters and indentured servants on the islands of Hispan-
iola and Tortuga. Originally French in origin and always retaining a heavy French 
contingent, their community came to include men of a variety of European ethnic 
backgrounds, most significantly English and Dutch. 
From their first forays around 1602 until the movement ended about a hundred 
years later, the Buccaneers pressed the Spanish relentlessly. Even more striking, 
Buccaneer warfare escalated and evolved over the course of the century, trans-
forming itself from mere ship-on-ship attacks by crews of between twenty-five and 
thirty to sophisticated amphibious landings that involved hundreds, ultimately 
thousands, of men who raided substantial settlements—sometimes far inland—
that they occupied for weeks or even months after victory. One cautious estimate 
avers that between 1655 and 1671 alone, the Buccaneers sacked eighteen cities, four 
towns, and thirty-five villages.8 The monetary results of these raids were impres-
sive; while earlier practitioners, such as the crews of Pierre François of Dunkirk 
and Bartoloméo Portugues, managed to capture prizes of, respectively, a hundred 
thousand and seventy thousand pieces of eight, later missions resulted in heists 
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valued conservatively at 250,000–260,000 pieces of eight—and these estimates do 
not include such ancillary proceeds as slaves, munitions, grain, herds of cattle, and 
textiles (passim). The Buccaneers sought to capture lucrative goods, ships, prop-
erty, and people (that is, those who could be ransomed quickly), for their intent was 
simply to amass as much wealth as possible.
The Spaniards—and later, other European powers who established colonies in 
the Caribbean—tried to combat the marauders’ assaults by sending more soldiers, 
amassing greater numbers of arms, and building stronger fortifications;9 neverthe-
less, colonial settlements often remained quite defenseless.10 Consequently, beyond 
the loss of goods and capital, the Buccaneers left death, despoliation, and destruc-
tion in their wake. Part and parcel of the Buccaneer style was the constant and often 
creative use of brutal violence to achieve desired ends. Exquemelin dispassionately 
reports “the usual manner” of tortures the Buccaneers used.11 For example, they 
routinely put their prisoners on the rack, dislocating their arms; in a torture known 
as “woolding,” they twisted cords around their victims’ foreheads and wrung so 
hard that their victims’ “eyes bulged out, big as eggs” (p. 200); they hanged prison-
ers, whipped and bludgeoned them, sliced off noses and ears, singed faces with 
burning straws, and finally stabbed them to death. Prisoners were strappadoed 
“so violently that . . . [their] arms were pulled right out of joint.”12 Captives’ hair 
was set on fire, burning fuses were placed between their fingers and toes, and they 
were crushed by rocks and stones until they were bloody and broken (pp. 147–50, 
200). Women were kidnapped, abused, raped, and held for ransom.13 Children were 
starved, forced to march long distances, and allowed to perish. Men were hung 
by their genitals “till the weight of their bodies tore them loose,” after which the 
Buccaneers “would give the wretches three or four stabs through the body with a 
cutlass. . . . Others they crucified” (p. 151). 
Perhaps the barbarous François l’Ollonais stands out for his sheer inventiveness 
in the infliction of sadistic cruelty:
The Buccaneers . . . took a number of prisoners, whom they treated most cruelly, inflicting 
on these poor folk every torment imaginable. When l’Olonnais had a victim on the rack, if 
the wretch did not instantly answer his questions he would hack the man to pieces with his 
cutlass and lick the blood from the blade with his tongue. . . . After most of their prison-
ers had been done to death by the cruelest atrocities, the Buccaneers at last found two . . . 
men to lead them to their next destination. . . . Then l’Olonnais, being possessed of a devil’s 
fury, ripped open one of the prisoners with his cutlass, tore the living heart out of his body, 
gnawed at it, and then hurled it in the face of one of the others, saying, “Show me another 
way, or I will do the same to you.”14
No less repugnant were the practices of the “maniac” Dutchman Rock Bresiliaan, 
who, according to Exquemelin, “perpetrated the greatest atrocities possible against 
the Spaniards. Some of them he tied or spitted on wooden stakes and roasted them 
alive between two fires, like killing a pig” (p. 80). Other sources relate the gruesome 
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tale of a woman captive who, according to Spanish reports, was “set bare upon a 
baking stove and roasted, because she did not confess of money” (p. 80). Equally 
grisly was Montbars of Languedoc, who sliced open the stomachs of his victims, 
removing one end of the intestines and nailing it to a post, thereafter forcing the 
prisoners to dance to their deaths by beating their buttocks with burning logs.15
In addition to extreme human suffering, this Buccaneer carnage wrought great 
damage on Spanish colonial trade. The entire Spanish economic system relied on 
American bullion, primarily Peruvian silver. Spain’s claims in the Caribbean and 
Central American region (incontestably validated, so Spain argued, by God via the 
pope in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas) were organized into a colonial system predi-
cated on the fundamental need to ensure the successful extraction, transport, and 
delivery of this precious resource.16 Settlement patterns, military defense, naval op-
erations, and political administration were largely dictated by the supreme need to 
safeguard the transit of the annual “treasure fleets,” each carrying the year’s cargo 
of precious metal, from the West Indies to Seville. The Buccaneers regularly at-
tacked key nodes, pinpointing such “treasure ports” as Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Porto 
Bello, and Panama for raids and causing Spain to spend money and resources to 
protect the system’s vulnerabilities. Naturally, Buccaneer assaults on intercoastal 
traffic within the Spanish West Indies dampened local trade as well. As Exquemelin 
relates, “The Spaniards were compelled to equip . . . frigates to protect their ship-
ping and cruise against the Buccaneers . . . [and] were driven to reduce the number 
of their [merchant] voyages—but this did them no good” (pp. 69, 83).
The military apparatus guarding Spain’s Caribbean colonial system was not in-
consequential and, in retrospect, was quite effective against assaults in general. It 
is easy to focus only on the penetrations of this system, the victories obtained by 
attackers, and conclude that Spain’s defense against outside challengers was flimsy. 
However, as Paul Hoffman, who has examined the elements of the Spanish defense 
system in great detail, concludes, the Spanish system was difficult to breach; attack-
ers required both military ingenuity and a concentration of resources if they hoped 
to achieve their goals.17 While imperfect and sometimes erratic in its implementa-
tion, the defense system consisted of a formidable network of designated nodes 
(the treasure ports and smaller, ancillary cities) protected by extensive and often 
well-armed fortifications, several dedicated fleets, local naval patrols, garrisons of 
Spanish soldiers, and local militias. The Spanish also collected and utilized relevant 
intelligence and transported the most valuable cargoes under secrecy and heavi-
ly armed naval escort.18 Havana—the jewel in the Caribbean colonial crown, as it 
were, and the most important of the treasure ports—was so heavily protected that 
attackers never did it any real damage and indeed were usually hesitant to attack 
it at all (pp. 128–29). Proof that the defensive system largely worked over several 
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centuries is that the all-important annual treasure fleet was captured only once 
(1628), despite many attempts to take it.19
So how were the Buccaneers able to succeed to the extent they did against this 
formidable Spanish system? What were the keys to their terrifying effectiveness? 
One can cite many Buccaneer advantages, including their tactical creativity and 
flexibility. Paramount, however, was their possession of the six qualities integral to 
resilient piracy. 
First, the Buccaneers had access to a near-limitless pool of potential recruits—
alienated, indigent, and dispossessed sailors, soldiers, hunters, and indentured 
servants who represented the flotsam and jetsam of the harsh colonial systems of 
France, England, and the Netherlands. Indeed, the Buccaneering movement had 
its origin in a coterie of French boar and bull hunters on French Hispaniola and 
Tortuga (a small island off the northwestern coast of Hispaniola), and these hunt-
ers continued to support and join the movement as it evolved and expanded (pp. 
54–59, 68, 167–68). Sailors and soldiers drifted into the group as well.20 
According to Exquemelin, however, indentured servants from the French colo-
ny of Tortuga/Hispaniola and, after 1655, the English colony of Jamaica represent-
ed an especially significant source of men.21 The rough lives of these men, typically 
characterized by “atrocious cruelties” and deprivation, noted Exquemelin, tough-
ened and hardened them both physically and psychologically (pp. 55–57, 64–66). 
Servants who managed to survive their terms of indenture were free but lacked 
means to support themselves. Thus, they naturally gravitated toward buccaneering, 
Exquemelin relates, drawing from personal experience. Exquemelin himself had 
been an indentured servant of the French West India Company on Tortuga. When 
he completed his period of servitude (which he characterized as very cruel and 
exploitative, he having fallen “into the hands of the wickedest rogue in the whole 
island”), he was penniless and, devoid of other opportunities, had no choice, he 
tells his readers, but to join the Buccaneers (p. 34). Even such celebrated Buccaneer 
captains as François l’Ollonais and Henry Morgan initially arrived in the Caribbean 
as indentured servants.22 
Second, the Buccaneers enjoyed secure and permanent bases of operation, 
namely, the two islands of Tortuga and Jamaica. The existence of a refuge was hard-
wired into the movement, in fact, for the brotherhood was born in Tortuga and 
French Hispaniola in the early years of the seventeenth century, and it was based on 
Tortuga thereafter. Although early on, Spain tried twice to invade and capture Tor-
tuga to quell the movement and eradicate the growing French presence there, the 
island’s mountainous terrain ultimately made this effort impossible (pp. 31–33). 
When in 1655 the English invaded and captured Jamaica, buccaneering immedi-
ately spread there as well. By the mid-seventeenth-century, then, the movement 
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was firmly entrenched in two key locations, Port Royal (Jamaica) and Tortuga, 
with Buccaneers from each location freely communicating, supporting, and join-
ing forces with one another (pp. 119–21, 128, 141, 167–68). As a result, the move-
ment quickly intensified, expanding in numbers and evolving in scope and mission 
(pp. 83–85). Moreover, in addition to these two permanent bases, the Buccaneers 
utilized an informal network of isolated islands and coastal locations as temporary 
staging bases and rendezvous points. These spots—such places as Cabo Gracias a 
Dios, Isla de la Vaca, Bayamo, and islets off the southern coast of Cuba, Bleeckveldt 
Bay, Cabo Tiburón, and El Golfo Triste—functioned as temporary havens where 
the Buccaneers could acquire provisions, careen and repair ships, and meet with 
one another (pp. 72, 79, 80, 168, 171, 215, 219, 224).
Fortunately for the Buccaneers, Tortuga’s and Jamaica’s strategic locations with-
in the Caribbean gave the marauders a third key advantage—easy access to Spain’s 
colonial settlements and to local and transatlantic shipping routes. The Buccaneers 
were close to the lively intercoastal traffic of Spanish Hispaniola, Cuba, and the 
Spanish Main. The treasure ports of Cartagena and Porto Bello were nearby (and 
Havana too, for that matter, although as noted they opted never to attack seriously 
this supremely fortified location) (pp. 128–29). Vulnerable settlements, remuner-
ative as targets, abounded. Indeed, as the crow flies, no target was more than a 
couple of weeks’ sail away (p. 69). Occasional impediments, such as uncooperative 
weather or currents, Spanish naval patrols, hostile or recalcitrant native peoples, or 
a lack of provisions, sometimes presented problems (for example, see pp. 113–17, 
209–18). In general, however, Tortuga and Jamaica offered superb, centrally lo-
cated staging grounds and sanctuaries. Moreover, these bases were made available 
by a fourth Buccaneer advantage—the support of the outside parties of France and 
England, who envied Spanish predominance in the region and aimed to strengthen 
their own hands at Spanish expense. 
Per the Treaty of Tordesillas, the Spanish considered the Caribbean region to 
be theirs alone; thus all other Europeans were in Spanish eyes invaders and inter-
lopers. Naturally, the French, English, and Dutch were eager to break this Spanish 
monopoly. All three aided the Buccaneers by providing sporadic legal protection 
(such as occasional letters of reprisal), donations of materiel, trade opportunities, 
and injections of capital.23 Even more important, the French and English eagerly 
welcomed the quasi-military support that the Buccaneers offered on the colonies 
of Tortuga and Jamaica. After all, even if the French and English authorities could 
not directly control the marauders, hosting them in Tortuga and Jamaica delivered 
formidable advantages. True, the Buccaneers followed no outside party’s orders per 
se, but they represented both a savage attack force that did great damage to the Span-
ish colonial system and a body of fearless defenders who protected Tortuga and Port 
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Royal. Additionally, they were the source of periodic economic stimulus, returning 
from operations with their plunder and spending it in wild orgies and debauchery 
(pp. 81–82). 
Spain, obviously aware of this French and English complicity, repeatedly en­
deavored to use diplomatic entreaties and pressure at the highest levels to end it. 
However, taking advantage of the plausible deniability that hosting the Buccaneers 
conferred, the French and English monarchs ignored the Spanish protestations. 
Both claimed they had neither knowledge of Buccaneer activities nor control over 
them. As Exquemelin explains, 
The [Spanish] ambassadors were informed that these men were not subjects of the French 
and English kings. . . . The King of France excused himself by saying he had no fortifications 
on Hispaniola [or Tortuga], and received no tribute from the island. The King of England de­
clared he had never commissioned those on Jamaica to conduct hostilities against His Catho­
lic Majesty [of Spain], and to satisfy the Spanish court he recalled the governor of Jamaica 
and installed another in his place. Meanwhile, the rovers continued their marauding. (p. 67)
Two other factors were central to Buccaneer success, and they were no less in­
strumental: effective organization and intense cultural solidarity. These qualities 
both derived from one of the most distinguishing and core qualities of the Buc­
caneers, their radical and homegrown form of direct democracy. Indeed, this was 
the fundamental around which their entire society was arranged, the virtue that 
anchored their special community. The fluid and egalitarian system resulting from 
their democratic practices and culture produced a potent force of highly organized, 
passionately committed, cohesive, and adaptable warriors who were impressively 
successful in their military exploits. 
According to Exquemelin, when men joined the Buccaneers they entered a sep­
arate culture, a vibrant and rich “manner of living” and “way of life” (pp. 70, 119, 
156); it was a society marked by, in the words of pioneering sociologist Émile Durk­
heim, a distinctive “collective consciousness” that enabled its members to establish 
deep bonds of solidarity despite their large numbers, their traditional rugged self­
reliance, the geographical dislocation between French Tortuga and English Jamaica, 
and their diverse ethnic backgrounds.24 Participation in the brotherhood was en­
tirely voluntary; the only requirement was that each member bring “what he needs 
in the way of weapons, powder and shot.”25 There was no formal hierarchy within 
the society, no system of operational rank or chain of command. All Buccaneers 
were equal in status. Together, they resolved “by common vote where they shall 
cruise” and to that end collectively drew up for each foray a sort of labor agreement 
—which they called the “chasse partie” (literally, the “division of the hunt”)—that 
specified the terms for the mission and the distribution of the profits. Typical 
chasse parties called for equal wages among the men, after the needs of the carpen­
ters, the provisioners, the ship, and the wounded had been met.26 As Exquemelin 
explains, “Everything taken—money, jewels, precious stones and goods—must 
5608-03_HM23_Chapter-3.indd   32 12/21/15   11:45 AM
 TOWARD A MODEL OF PIRACY 33 32 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
be shared among them all, without any man enjoying a penny more than his fair 
share” (pp. 71–72). 
The functioning of this brotherhood of equals participating in a direct democ-
racy relied on honor, trust, and integrity. The Buccaneers were, as Exquemelin 
notes, “extremely loyal and ready to help one another.” They also were “generous to 
their comrades: if a man has nothing, the others will come to his help” (pp. 72, 82). 
Pledging commitment to their fellows and comportment in accordance with group 
dictates, the Buccaneers swore solemn oaths (on the Bible, no less) to the group 
and the group code. Before embarking on a military operation, they shook hands 
and swore oaths “to stand by each other till death” (p. 100). The oath, then, played 
a vital role in the functioning of the society, in recognition of which the brother-
hood declared that “should any man be found to have made a false oath, he would 
be banished from the rovers, and never more be allowed in their company” (p. 72). 
They had a justice system—“the duel is their way of settling disputes”—but again, 
dishonorable conduct in a duel brought severe punishment, execution (pp. 72, 133). 
During the course of missions—especially those that were large in scope, involv-
ing thousands of men—a modicum of “military” order and rank was established, 
but this stratification was temporary and existed only because the men complied 
with it. Thus the system of rank was not hierarchical in the classic sense but existed 
rather for the sake of military efficiency and the sensible division of labor. And 
always, all major decisions were determined by common vote (pp. 100, 171–73). 
There was a mission leader—the captain—but he was chosen by the other Buc-
caneers (usually because of his courage, experience, access to a ship, or military in-
genuity) and thus led only because his men permitted him to do so.27 Even in cases 
where a man possessed his own ship and thus considered himself to be a “captain,” 
the other Buccaneers could choose whether they wished to work under his com-
mand.28 If men became dissatisfied with a captain’s leadership, they reserved the 
right to leave (for example, pp. 133, 207–208). Additionally, while a captain always 
retained the luster of his fame and the influence that renown conferred, once an 
operation was over his formal leadership power evaporated. The captain’s status, 
then, was mission-specific and temporary; he was only the first among equals, so 
to speak, and his rank was bestowed on him by his brother Buccaneers, making 
him the creature of his men. He was the leader, yes, but was considered no better 
than any other brother and had to rely on the men’s goodwill and concurrence in 
order to lead. While he had the right and responsibility to provide military leader-
ship during a mission, his underlying equality in social status was manifested in 
Buccaneer mores. Exquemelin explains, for example, that “the captain is allowed 
no better fare than the meanest on board. If they notice he has better food, the men 
bring the dish from their own mess and exchange it for the captain’s.” Likewise, 
“when a ship has been captured, the men decide whether the captain should keep it 
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or not” (pp. 70–71). Also, the captain’s portion of the profits, which were typically 
a bit greater in compensation for his leadership, had to be authorized and voted on 
by the men (p. 172).
Notwithstanding these constraints, Buccaneer captains inspired fervent loyalty 
from the men. These captains, apparently imbued with special qualities, such as un-
usual bravery and insight, appear to have enjoyed the distinctive allure of what Max 
Weber termed “charismatic domination.”29 As a result, a captain was recognized as 
“singular” and was duly honored by his peers’ election of him to the supreme posi-
tion of power within Buccaneer society. Because of the brotherhood’s democratic 
process, however, each man had a say in the leadership and thus followed because 
he wanted to follow. As Weber said about those who hold charismatic authority, 
“the leader is personally recognized as the innerly ‘called’ leader of men. Men do 
not obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him.”30 
Buccaneering’s democratic ethos and the practices that flowed from it contrast-
ed strikingly with the rigid, hierarchical structure of regular European societies 
and militaries. During the seventeenth century, Western military culture was in 
the midst of the profound changes wrought by the early-modern “military revo-
lution,” the series of radical transformations that resulted in the creation of the 
modern, professional, military force. Armies (and navies) were growing in size and 
complexity, and the tactical role of the infantry and the technological capabilities 
of artillery were taking center stage. As the state amassed greater power and finan-
cial strength, it maintained large, standing military forces rather than disbanding 
them at the end of conflicts. These standing troops, in turn, were inculcated with 
both a sense of unity and national identification (manifested in the newly devel-
oped uniform) and a deep sense of discipline instilled through incessant drill and 
the strict, incontestable, and hierarchical leadership of a multitude of junior and 
middle-grade officers belonging to a new entity, the “professional officers corps.”31 
Training was routinized, responsibilities were tied to rank, and as William McNeil 
avers, “soldiers became replaceable parts in a sort of human machine, and so did 
their officers.”32 Even England’s New Model Army, the militarized arm of Crom-
well’s Puritan forces in the Civil War, retained a conventional, hierarchical struc-
ture and nature, despite the leveling rhetoric of Puritan ideology.33 It is easy to see, 
then, how the comparatively liberating and democratic culture of the Buccaneers 
would be alluring to poor, young men, especially since their options elsewhere were 
bleak. Indeed, despite all the violence and dangers that the buccaneering life in-
evitably entailed, its participants remained devoted to their special brotherhood, 
Exquemelin affirms, “for they are so accustomed to the buccaneering life that it is 
impossible for them to give it up” (p. 226).
After decades of unbridled success, how did the Buccaneer phenomenon come 
to an end? Spanish naval intervention and tough defensive measures, while helpful 
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in mitigating the effects of buccaneering, ultimately were not enough to eradicate 
it. Rather, the demise of buccaneering was primarily due to the weakening of sev-
eral of the “six factors of piracy,” as outlined above. Specifically, the Buccaneers lost 
the help of outside parties, their permanent bases of operations, and their sources 
of personnel. 
The withdrawal of support from rival European states at the close of the sev-
enteenth century had manifold consequences on the buccaneering movement and 
it certainly undercut the Buccaneers’ strength. Eventually, France and England 
ceased to provide the levels of financial and legal aid they once had, since they were 
advancing their interests in the Caribbean in other ways. The Dutch, represented in 
the Caribbean by the Dutch West India Company, in due course discouraged trade 
with the marauders as well.34 Moreover, starting in 1670, when Spain conceded 
the legality of England’s claim to Jamaica, England gradually outlawed its use as a 
Buccaneer safe haven. At the same time, European states—especially England—
were able to co-opt Buccaneers into their official imperial systems by conferring 
pardons, political and military positions, pecuniary rewards, and prestigious titles. 
In 1692, a devastating earthquake in Jamaica destroyed much of the infrastructure 
and personnel the Buccaneers had used to mount their campaigns and sustain their 
overall way of life. Ten years later, in 1702, when the War of the Spanish Succes-
sion erupted, Englishmen in Jamaica were freely given letters of marque to maraud 
legally as English privateers.35 Not only did this action serve to bring these surviv-
ing Buccaneers under English state control, but it reinforced their English national 
identity and pitted them against their erstwhile Buccaneer brothers, the French, 
since France was England’s primary adversary in the war. In combination, then, all 
of these factors eliminated the Buccaneers’ safe havens, slashed the pool of possible 
recruits, lessened the availability of supplies and materiel, and interfered with the 
unique Buccaneer organization and culture, diluting its beliefs and weakening its 
bonds of solidarity. 
As the world considers what to do about the increasingly problematic phenom-
enon of contemporary piracy, it would do well to think beyond superficial naval 
solutions on the high seas and consider also the six factors underlying the long 
and productive careers of the Caribbean buccaneers. Without a doubt, the key to 
eradicating Somali (and Nigerian) piracy is disrupting the larger, complex systems 
that support it. Yes, it is essential to protect maritime commerce in the region and 
to intercept the pirates in action on the high seas. In the case of Somali piracy, the 
multinational naval forces now on the scene in the Gulf of Aden should continue 
to meet this objective. However, Somali piracy is now deeply entrenched, and war-
ships at sea monitoring maritime trade are not enough to quell it definitively. In 
fact, it is unreasonable to expect that the navies alone, working in isolation, without 
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support, and charged with escort duties and patrols over a vast expanse of open sea, 
can eliminate Somali piracy. Although hardworking naval personnel may capture 
a pirate crew here or there or deter them from attacking, there are always more 
pirates waiting in the wings. And the longer the system supporting the piracy is 
permitted to stay in place and grow, the more intractable the problem will become. 
Above all, we must not underestimate contemporary piracy’s potential severity 
simply because we arrogantly assume that pirates in small speedboats (the Somalis’ 
preferred raiding craft) pose no “real” problem. This is the grave mistake that the 
Spanish of the seventeenth-century Caribbean made vis-à-vis the Buccaneers; such 
a misfit group with such makeshift means, they thought, was no threat to the power 
of the Spanish empire and its mighty military (pp. 68, 155–63). How very wrong 
they were. Indeed, this is one of the vital lessons that the history of the Golden Age 
of Piracy imparts, and along with our understanding of the six fundamental fac-
tors underlying the success of the Buccaneer enterprise, we would be most wise to 
remember it.
N O T E S 1 “U.S. Reports That Piracy off Africa Has Plunged,” 
New York Times, 29 August 2012, p. A4.
 2 For more information on CTF-151, see U.S. 5th 
Fleet: U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, www 
.cusnc.navy.mil/. For the most current statistics 
regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa, see the ICC 
Commercial Crime Services: IMB [International 
Maritime Bureau] Piracy Reporting Centre, www 
.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre. 
 3 Lauren Ploch et al., Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 
CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 27 April 2011), p. 1, 
available at fpc.state.gov/.
 4 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep 
Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-
American Maritime World, 1700–1750 (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 254–55.
 5 See Virginia Lunsford, “What Makes Piracy Work?,” 
Proceedings: The Independent Forum on National 
Defense (December 2008), pp. 28–33.
 6 A. O. Exquemelin, De Americaensche Zee-Roovers . . . 
(Amsterdam: Jan ten Hoorn, 1678). An incred-
ibly popular text, The Buccaneers of America went 
through any number of reprintings and translations 
during the early-modern period. This paper uses the 
most accurate modern edition in English, one that 
provides an exact translation from the seventeenth-
century Dutch: Alexander O. Exquemelin, The Buc-
caneers of America, trans. Alexis Brown (Mineola, 
N.Y.: Dover, 2000). 
 7 See, for example, David Cordingly, who writes of 
Exquemelin: “Careful comparison of his stories with 
the events described in Spanish documents of the 
period has shown that he gets most of the facts right 
but is often mistaken about place-names and dates. 
Some of his wilder stories appear to be secondhand 
accounts which he probably heard in taverns, but it 
is clear that he took part in a number of buccaneer 
expeditions. . . . Esquemelin’s book . . . has provided 
the basis for all serious histories of the buccaneers 
and, in spite of some inaccuracies, remains the stan-
dard work on the subject”; David Cordingly, Under 
the Black Flag: The Romance & Reality of Life among 
the Pirates (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 40. 
For another balanced appraisal of Exquemelin, see 
Peter Earle, The Sack of Panama: Sir Henry Morgan’s 
Adventures on the Spanish Main (London: Jill Nor-
man & Hobhouse, 1981), pp. 265–66.
 8 Jack Beeching, introduction to Exquemelin, Buc-
caneers of America, p. 13.
 9 See, for example, the report in the Ordinaire Leydse 
Courant, 29 August 1686, “Nederlanden” section, 
relating that the French had just sent four frigates to 
America “to suppress the pirates there.”
 10 For more on beleaguered Spanish outposts and 
the Crown’s attempts to protect them, see the fol-
lowing documents in the General Archive of the 
Indies, Seville, Spain: Panama 30, N. 68: Cartas y 
Expedientes de Cabildos Seculares: Panamá, 1616; 
Mexico 28, N. 28; Panama 95: Entrada de Piratas en 
Portobelo, Darien y Mar del Sur, 1679–1681; Panama 
96: Entrada de Piratas en Portobelo, Darien y Mar 
del Sur, 1682–1687; Indiferente 2578: Piratas en las 
Costas de Barlovento, 1681–1684; Santo Domingo 
856: Invasión de Piratas en la Florida, 1684–1702; 
NWC_HM23.indb   36 12/8/15   9:00 AM
 TOWARD A MODEL OF PIRACY 37 36 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
Guatemala 42, N. 77: Caratas de Cabildos Seculares, 
18 March 1671; Panama 81: Empréstito de 1000,000 
Pesos para Rescutar Portobelo, 1678; and Panama 
99: Resguardo del Darién y Tierra Firme contra la 
Pirateria, 1683–1694.
 11 For examples, Exquemelin, Buccaneers of America, 
pp. 147, 169, 226.
 12 Ibid., p. 150. In this torture, the victim’s hands are 
fastened behind his or her back. The arms are then 
pulled up by means of a rope attached at one end to 
the wrists and led through a pulley on the other. The 
pulley end of the rope is then jerked, causing pain 
and most likely dislocating both arms. Sometimes 
weights were added to the victim’s body to intensify 
the pain and physical damage.
 13 Ibid., passim. See, for example, p. 201.
 14 Ibid., pp. 106–107. It seems fitting that, according 
to Exquemelin, l’Ollonais met his own horrible end, 
imprisoned by native American peoples by whom 
he “was hacked to pieces and roasted limb by limb” 
(p. 117).
 15 Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, pp. 127, 129, 131–32.
 16 The Treaty of Tordesillas effectively declared that the 
entire New World belonged to Spain and Portugal.
 17 Paul Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense 
of the Caribbean, 1535–1585: Precedent,  
Patrimonialism, and Royal Parsimony (Baton Rouge, 
La.: LSU Press, 1999), p. 224.
 18 Ibid., passim.
 19 In 1628, a Dutch West India Company fleet led by 
Piet Heyn captured the treasure fleet in Cuba. 
 20 For example, see Exquemelin, Buccaneers of 
America, pp. 80, 93. Moreover, the English settle-
ment of Jamaica in 1655 was the result of a failed 
Cromwellian military invasion of Santo Domingo. 
Thus there were a plethora of soldiers among the 
colonial Jamaican population. For more about the 
character of the English military at this time, see 
Mark Kishlansky, “The Case of the Army Truly 
Stated: The Creation of the New Model Army,” Past 
and Present, no. 81 (November 1978), pp. 51–74.
 21 It was in 1655 that the English invaded and took 
over the island of Jamaica. 
 22 Exquemelin, Buccaneers of America, pp. 89, 119. 
Morgan himself disputed this claim and affirmed 
that he had never been an indentured servant. 
 23 For example, ibid., pp. 63, 89, 171; J. J. Baud, Proeve 
eener Geschiedenis der Strafwetgeving tegen de 
Zeerooverij (Utrecht: D. Post Uiterweer, 1854), p. 
106; Dionisius van der Sterre, Zeer aenmerkelij-
ke reysen gedaan door Jan Erasmus Reyning . . . 
(Amsterdam: Jan ten Hoorn, 1691), pp. 67–69. Also 
the following documents in the Dutch West India 
Company Archive in the Netherlands National 
Archive (Algemeen Rijksarchief), The Hague, Neth. 
In WIC #617: “Artijckelen aen Nicolaas van Li-
ebergen,” 2 March 1683, Secrete brieven en papieren 
van Curaçao, 1680–1689, fol. 324. In WIC #617: 
“Interrogatorien van Jan Elkis,” 27 February 1683, 
Secrete Brieven en Papieren van Curaçao, 1680–1689, 
fol. 245–47. In WIC #617: “Interrogatorien van 
Gerritt Slocker,” 1683, Secrete Brieven en Papieren 
van Curaçao, 1680–1689, fol. 249–50. In WIC #617: 
Article 13, “Pointen ende Articulen bij de Heeren 
Bewinthebberen vande WIC ter Vergaderinge Vande 
Thienen,” ca. 1683, Secrete brieven en papieren van 
Curaçao, 1680–1689, fol. 349. In WIC #617: Article 
1, “Artijckelen van beschuldinge ten laste van de ge-
weesene Director Nicolaes van Liebergen,” ca. 1683, 
Secrete brieven en papieren van Curaçao, 1680–1689, 
fol. 448. In WIC #468: “Brief aan Willem Kerckrink, 
Directeur van Curaçao,” 2 July 1688, Kopieboeken 
van brieven naar Amerika, 1684–1689, fol. 155vs–
56. See also the following document in the General 
Archive of the Indies in Seville, Spain: Escribania 
597A: Comisiones Gobernacion de Cartagena, 1684.
 24 See Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Soci-
ety, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Free Press, 1984).
 25 Exquemelin, Buccaneers of America, p. 70. He 
goes on to explain that the Buccaneers “use good 
weapons, such as muskets and pistols. . . . They 
use cartridges, and have a cartouche containing 
thirty, which they carry with them always, so they 
are never unprepared” (p. 75). They also carried 
cutlasses and knives and made use of rudimentary 
grenades.
 26 For a typical chasse partie, see ibid., p. 71.
 27 For references to the election of the captain, see 
ibid., pp. 80, 84, 119.
 28 See the case of François l’Ollonais, ibid., pp. 89, 93, 
105.
 29 Weber defines this form of authority in the fol-
lowing manner: “There is the authority of the 
extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), 
the absolutely personal devotion and personal 
confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities 
of individual leadership.” See Max Weber, “Politics 
as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociol-
ogy, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), p. 79.
 30 Ibid.
 31 See Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 
1560–1660,” in The Military Revolution Debate: Read-
ings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern 
Europe, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Oxford, U.K.: Westview, 
1995), pp. 13–35; Geoffrey Parker, The Military 
Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the 
West (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1988); and William McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: 
Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982).
 32 William McNeil, The Age of the Gunpowder Empires, 
1450–1800 (Washington, D.C.: American Historical 
Association, 1989), p. 23.
 33 Kishlansky, “Case of the Army Truly Stated,” pp. 
51–74.
 34 See the following document in the Dutch West India 
Company Archive: “Brief aan Willem Kerckrink, 
Directeur van Curaçao,” fol. 155vs–56.
 35 See, for example, Daniel Defoe, A General History 
of the Pyrates, ed. Manuel Schonhorn (Mineola, 
N.Y.: Dover, 1972), p. 71. This text was originally 
published as Captain Charles Johnson [pseud.], A 
General History of the Robberies and Murders of the 
Most Notorious Pyrates (London: 1724).
NWC_HM23.indb   37 12/8/15   9:00 AM
NWC_HM23.indb   38 12/8/15   9:00 AM
IV Intervention and Colonial Policy
The Flying Cruiser Squadron of the Imperial German Navy  
as an Instrument of German Foreign Policy Overseas, 1886–1893
HEIKO HEROLD
Although it had always been said in my childhood that the world is already taken, we now call an overseas possession our property that is more than five times bigger than our united motherland, and the history of the ac-
quisition of these wide areas of land will for certain honorably remember, besides 
the navy in general, the squadron of Admiral Knorr.”1 These lines were written by 
Vice Adm. Viktor Valois, who served in this squadron himself, in December 1909, 
exactly twenty-five years after the first German colonial war in Cameroon. But his 
prophecy was not fulfilled. The missions of that Flying Cruiser Squadron (1886–
93), first commanded by Rear Adm. Eduard Knorr, are often mentioned only in 
passing in contemporary colonial and naval literature. However, the missions of 
its successor units, the Cruiser Division in East Asia (1894–97) and the East Asian 
Cruiser Squadron (1897–1914), have found more recognition, especially the occu-
pation of Kiaochow Bay in November 1897 and the naval battles of Coronel and the 
Falkland Islands in November and December 1914. Until very recently, the Flying 
Cruiser Squadron has not been historically reviewed.2
The Organization of the Imperial German Navy’s Overseas Service and the  
Formation of the Flying Cruiser Squadron
Besides gunboats and “avisos,” the cruiser was the most commonly used type of 
navy vessel overseas.3 The cruiser also became the eponym of the Cruiser Squad-
ron. In times of peace, the mission of cruisers was “to observe the power and sea 
interests of their country of origin,” while in times of war “they were mainly used 
for reconnaissance, blockade duty, attacks on foreign commercial vessels and pro-
tection of own sea routes.”4 For the overseas service and consequently also for the 
Flying Cruiser Squadron, the German navy command almost always provided out-
of-date vessels that were no longer useful for coastal defense in the event of war. 
With few exceptions this would not change until the beginning of World War I.5
In the era of Albrecht von Stosch (first chief of the Imperial German Navy, 
1872–83), the brunt of operations abroad was borne mostly by smaller navy vessels 
that were permanently stationed overseas. Stosch’s organization of the naval over-
seas service was based on the British concept of naval stations, just as were those of 
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most other naval powers at this time.6 Naval stations were “definite sea areas abroad 
where the German Reich (or any other naval power) permanently represented its 
interests through navy vessels without permanent bases.”7 In the 1873 Fleet Founda-
tion Plan only two naval stations, the East Asian and the West Indian, were initially 
defined.8 But as a result of the permanently growing requirements for the Imperial 
German Navy regarding the representation and enforcement of German interests 
overseas, several further naval stations were established in the following years. By 
the mid-1880s a disposition had developed that continued to exist until the begin-
ning of World War I, even if not all naval stations were equipped with navy vessels 
continuously. Overall, the Admiralty divided the non-European sea areas into six 
zones: Asia, Australia, West America, East America, West Africa, and East Africa.9
When Lt. Gen. Georg Leo von Caprivi took office as the new head of the Ad-
miralty in March 1883 and the first German colonies were acquired a few months 
later, the mission priorities of the navy changed. Caprivi was convinced of the im-
minence of war on two fronts, against France and Russia. He defined the defense 
of the German coasts as the primary military-political goal of the navy in the case 
of such a war. But given the rapidly growing requirements for naval forces in the 
course of colonial policy, Caprivi was forced to dispatch more vessels overseas than 
before. Between 1884 and 1894 the overseas service, the so-called political ser-
vice of the Imperial German Navy, was dominated by the protection of the “de-
pendencies” (Schutzgebiete), as Chancellor Otto von Bismarck called them. At the 
beginning, Caprivi relied on ad hoc task forces like the West African Squadron 
(1884–85) and the East African Cruiser Squadron (1885–86).10 This strategy sig-
nificantly weakened the strike capability of the home fleet. Therefore he finally 
decided to establish, with the Flying Cruiser Squadron, under the command of an 
admiral, a mobile task force that would call, preferably in a regular cycle, on the 
German dependencies and all other overseas waters where German interests were 
to be represented, or, as the Handbook for Army and Navy precisely laid down, that 
“can be dispatched to different places as required to show the flag or to conduct 
special tasks without being allocated to a specific naval station.”11 From January 
1886 to April 1893, this unit was permanently on duty as “colonial police” and an 
“overseas fire department” on the coasts of Africa, Asia, South America, Australia, 
and the South Seas.
As early as the end of 1884, the Imperial German Government saw itself forced 
to quell a colonial rebellion in Cameroon. For this purpose, four navy vessels 
(two cruiser-frigates and two cruiser-corvettes) were dispatched to West Africa. 
With the dispatch of the West African Squadron under Rear Adm. Eduard Knorr, 
the military protection of the young German dependencies began. Bismarck and 
Caprivi realized that the German claim to power overseas was relatively easy to 
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impose on indigenous peoples, through use of navy vessels and landing forces, but 
not against the other European great powers, namely, Great Britain and France. In 
a European war, Bismarck stated, the colonies could be defended only at the gates 
of Metz.12 Even Bernhard von Bülow (who became foreign secretary in 1897) and 
Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz (named navy secretary the same year) did not disturb the 
cornerstone of this defense strategy when they took the political decision to di-
rect the battleship construction program against Great Britain and so initiated “the 
great departure of 1897.”13 In the case of war, they argued, the dependencies’ destiny 
would rest in the North Sea.14 In fact, before World War I, the Imperial German 
Government at no time seriously considered defending the colonies in a European 
war with overseas cruisers, and the navy was never seriously capable of such action, 
even in conjunction with the later colonial forces.15 The government never devel-
oped a concept for imperial defense, a practice the British had established in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.16
The establishment of the Flying Cruiser Squadron, consisting of Bismarck, 
Gneisenau, and Olga, in January 1886 off the coast of Zanzibar also seemed advan-
tageous from the Foreign Office’s point of view.17 In consideration of the German 
Reich’s maritime military resources, this was an adequate solution for the fulfill-
ment of the navy’s growing overseas tasks in the context of the nation’s new colonial 
and overseas policy. After all, the three vessels of the Cruiser Squadron represented 
nearly a fifth of the entire German overseas fleet.18 With the establishment of this 
unit, longer-term dispatches of further navy vessels from home waters to overseas 
naval stations could be avoided and the costs of these missions could be limited, 
both of which were fully consonant with the terms of Caprivi’s overall strategy.
The “Chivy” around Half the Globe
Between 1886 and 1890 the Flying Cruiser Squadron primarily discharged colo-
nial police tasks. The first two years were characterized by a continuous and rap-
id change of missions and places of action. In his memoirs Knorr stated that this 
“chivy” around half the globe “had exhausting and damaging effects on both hu-
man beings and vessels.”19 In the course of the year 1886, the Cruiser Squadron 
completed a first journey through the island world of the South Pacific. In addition 
to short stays in Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, and Samoa, Bismarck, Gneisenau, 
and Olga visited the young German colonies in the South Seas, namely, the Mar-
shall Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago. At this time there existed in these plac-
es neither a German colonial administration nor police force. In the Marshall Is-
lands there was only a consular administrator and in the Bismarck Archipelago an 
imperial inspector. In coordination with these two diplomatic representatives and 
the German vice-consul in Apia, who had embarked on board Bismarck in Samoa, 
Rear Admiral Knorr took over tasks of executive and judicial power. He settled 
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several criminal affairs (mainly thefts), and on Jaluit he oversaw the condemnation 
and execution of a murderer.20
In June 1886, Knorr ordered a large-scale punitive expedition on the Gazelle 
Peninsula against the Tolai, who had rebelled against German colonial rule. He 
wanted to make a bloody example of the tribe, but it avoided fighting. The larg-
est German punitive expedition in the South Seas until that point ended in fiasco, 
a fate that the British had already experienced many a time.21 The landing corps, 
with its modern equipment, was powerless against a militarily far inferior but tac-
tically clever opponent who did not wage a desperate battle but instead retreated 
in an orderly manner, skillfully taking advantage of the terrain to escape a pincer 
movement. In this manner, the Tolai clearly showed the Germans the limits of their 
display of power.22 
After this failed punitive expedition in the Bismarck Archipelago the Cruiser 
Squadron moved to North China, where its vessels conducted an impressive ma-
neuver for Governor General Li Hung-chang, one of the most influential Chinese 
reformist politicians. The objective was to support the lucrative arms deal with 
China. During the mission in East Asian waters, Gneisenau was replaced by its sis-
ter ship Carola. Then followed an interlude in East Africa, at the turn of 1886–87, 
to force the sultan of Zanzibar to acknowledge a treaty that defined the spheres of 
influence between Great Britain and the German Reich in East Africa. Further-
more, Knorr carried out the execution of a fifteen-year-old Somali who had killed 
an agent of the German East Africa Company (GEAC) in Kismayu at the end of 
1886. In the course of this mission, the Cruiser Squadron was reinforced with the 
deployment of an additional cruiser-frigate, SMS Sophie. From then on, until its 
dissolution in 1893, the strength of the Flying Cruiser Squadron was four warships. 
During the deployment in the East African waters, serious controversy and ques-
tions of authority between the commander of the Cruiser Squadron and the Ger-
man consul general to Zanzibar finally led to Rear Admiral Knorr’s relief and his 
replacement by Commo. Carl Eduard Heusner.23
After several weeks in the docks of Cape Town, the Flying Cruiser Squadron 
made its next major deployment, to Samoa, which had been the focal point of Ger-
man (primarily commercial) interests in the South Pacific for many years. Under 
the pretext of retribution for an attack on German citizens by indigenous people a 
few months before, the German consul general, Eduard Becker, with the assistance 
of a 220-strong landing corps, imposed a regime change:24 he desposed the Anglo-
Americanophile King Malietoa, arrested him, and replaced him with the Germano-
phile King Tamasese. Becker’s British and American counterparts protested this 
violent regime change, but in the end they acted passively, as neither of them had 
military instruments of power at their disposal. (Both learned afterward that their 
governments had approved the German military action several days before. At this 
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time, Samoa was not yet connected to the international telegraph network, and the 
only regular mail steamer between Apia and Sydney had left Samoan waters shortly 
before the action began.) Any resistance by the indigenous people was immediately 
quashed by the German marines, and recognition of Tamasese was, where neces-
sary, “enforced through dread before the squadron.”25 In the short term this inter-
vention was of particular benefit to German trade, but Commodore Heusner was 
not able to cut the Gordian knot of Samoan politics in this manner. The archipelago 
remained a pawn in the hands of the treaty powers, and the furor consularis contin-
ued unabated. Until the partition treaties of 1899 were signed, Samoa remained a 
permanent hot spot for, and bone of contention between, the great powers.26
The Suppression of the Arab Revolt in German East Africa
After the intervention in Samoa, the Cruiser Squadron was redeployed for several 
months to the East Asian station, where the vessels visited the German naval hos-
pital in Yokohama and several Chinese and Japanese harbors for trade and political 
interests. Then, in mid-1888, the squadron moved to East Africa. The flagship, Bis-
marck, was replaced by the cruiser-frigate Leipzig in Aden; the other vessels went 
straight to Zanzibar. With the deployment of Leipzig, the squadron was marginally 
upgraded. Leipzig was the longest-serving cruiser-frigate in the Imperial German 
Navy, having been constructed in 1875, two years before Bismarck. In addition, 
Leipzig was much bigger and better armed than Bismarck. However, from the Ad-
miralty’s point of view it “by no means” had “any value for battle” with the home 
fleet “any more.”27 Therefore, it had been assigned to the political service. Just a few 
weeks after the flagship change, the longest and most comprehensive mission of the 
Flying Cruiser Squadron began—its contribution to the suppression of the Arab 
Revolt in German East Africa from August 1888 to May 1890.
Initially, Bismarck refused permission for a comprehensive intervention by the 
navy. He relied on the sultan, whose authority should, he felt, be strengthened. He 
would rather “abandon all the colonial efforts,” he announced internally, “than ap-
prove military activities of the Reich in the interior of the country.”28 Bismarck’s atti-
tude to this question was consistent. From the beginning of his colonial policy, he had 
been strictly against establishing statist colonies, fearing that massive intervention 
in support of the GEAC would result in similar interventions in the interior of East 
Africa. However, there was another reason for his cautious position—his concern 
over the possibility of a military humiliation. The Reich had never before been con-
fronted with a colonial rebellion of such extent. There were neither existing colonial 
forces nor a rapid-deployment force for overseas expeditions. And the naval forces 
on site—the Cruiser Squadron and its subordinated East African station vessels 
—were unsuitable for combat missions in the hinterlands, where there would pos-
sibly be no contact between the landing forces and the vessels for days. This ap-
plied not only in regard to East Africa but in general for missions overseas. Finally, 
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Rear Adm. Karl August Deinhard, who had taken over command of the Cruiser 
Squadron in August 1888, was ordered to protect only the GEAC’s headquarters in 
Bagamoyo, to evacuate to Zanzibar all Germans who wanted to leave the mainland, 
and “to support the operations of the Sultan as much as possible without engaging 
too far.”29 Kaiser Wilhelm II also spoke with Bismarck against intervention on the 
East African mainland: “I would rather let the current rebellion cauterize and hold 
on Your Highness’ proposal that we do not engage militarily further than the reach 
of our ship guns.”30 
But soon the political climate in Berlin started to change, in view of the threat-
ening developments in East Africa. Although the chancellor of the Reich (publicly) 
continued to speak out against a punitive expedition in the hinterlands, he was 
determined not to abandon the dependency—the national and international loss 
of prestige would have been too severe. He had already explored through the Ad-
miralty the possibility of a naval blockade of the East African coast in conjunction 
with Great Britain, which operated the most powerful naval force in the Indian 
Ocean. The chancellor sought to determine whether such a blockade would be “re-
alizable and advisable” and finally began negotiations with the British government, 
after the Admiralty approved the proposal.31 The blockade, officially, aimed to re-
store the sultan’s authority on the East African mainland and, within the meaning 
of the Kongo Act, to combat the slave traders, whom Bismarck assumed to be the 
masterminds of the rebellion;32 British prime minister Lord Robert Salisbury had 
in principle no choice other than to cooperate, as Great Britain was considered to 
be the leading nation in combating the slave trade.33 Bismarck had no personal in-
terest in combating slavery or the slave trade. For him it was merely a means to an 
end—on the one hand to convince Great Britain, Portugal, France, Italy, the Kongo 
State, and the Christian churches to support the blockade, and on the other hand to 
manipulate (in secret cooperation with the influential author Friedrich Fabri) pub-
lic opinion in Germany and a majority in the Reichstag into supporting a colonial 
war in East Africa.34 
The international naval blockade of the East African coast started on the morn-
ing of 2 December 1888 and lasted until 1 October 1889. It was directed against 
the export of slaves and the import of war materiel and extended along the whole 
mainland coast of the sultanate from the Rovuma River to Lamu—that is, along the 
“coasts of the German and British spheres of interest.”35 German, British, and Ital-
ian navy vessels participated. Their political and military leaders had no illusions 
regarding the effectiveness of the blockade; the coastal area was much too exten-
sive and the number of available warships and smaller craft was much too small to 
stop the arms and slave trade. But this was no problem from the Imperial German 
Government’s point of view. For Bismarck the political signal of this action, the 
“closed union of the European powers,” was much more important than its military 
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effectiveness.36 Nevertheless, it became possible to strengthen the blockade slightly 
when, at the beginning of March 1889, the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, the cen-
ters of the East African arms and slave trade, were also included.37
Shortly after the blockade’s start, armed conflicts with the rebels occurred. The 
guns of ships offshore were not always enough to repel attacks, and landing par-
ties from the warships had to interfere repeatedly. Unlike the rebels, however, the 
Germans suffered only minor losses. Until the beginning of March 1889, combat 
operations concentrated on Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam. Both cities were largely 
destroyed in the process, and trade in those areas completely collapsed. At the end 
of March, Deinhard shelled Saadani and sent a landing party to burn Conduchi, 
where blockading craft had been fired at several times from the beach. However, 
military operations went only as far as the kaiser’s orders mandated—no farther 
than the reach of the ships’ guns, that is, a few miles into the hinterlands. They 
primarily focused on holding the GEAC’s two remaining stations on the mainland, 
Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, as ordered.38 The defeat of the Arab Revolt was pos-
sible only through the use of a colonial force under the command of Hermann von 
Wissmann.39
Dissolution of the Flying Cruiser Squadron, and Conclusion
In the years following the Arab Revolt, the Flying Cruiser Squadron rarely acted 
militarily. Noteworthy are its deployment in the second half of 1891 in the Chilean 
civil war, where it preserved German interests, and two naval demonstrations on 
the coast of German East Africa in 1892 and 1893.40 After Bismarck’s dismissal, Wil-
helm II tried unsuccessfully several times to instrumentalize the Cruiser Squadron 
for naval-political purposes, to bring about the construction of new cruisers. In 
the early summer of 1891, for example, he intentionally delayed the Flying Cruiser 
Squadron’s deployment to Chilean waters, and at the end of March 1893 he ordered 
its abolition, in both cases because he was angry that his cruiser construction plans 
had been rejected by the Reichstag once again.41 This dissolution order marked the 
end of the only mobile striking force of the Imperial German Navy during its exis-
tence, even though this effect was not intended by the Imperial German Govern-
ment at the time.42 All other German overseas squadrons established between 1871 
and 1914 had clearly limited operational areas.
With the deployment of the Flying Cruiser Squadron in January 1886, the Im-
perial German Government had for the first time a powerful instrument for rep-
resentation and enforcement of German interests overseas. The squadron was not 
militarily strong enough to press German interests on site against the other great 
powers, but the government at no time seriously considered that option. From the 
beginning, the Flying Cruiser Squadron consisted only of unarmored, out-of-date 
vessels—sailing ships equipped with steam propulsion—while by the 1880s the 
other naval powers had already stationed overseas at least some modern ironclad 
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vessels that were much superior in battle. As a general crisis-reaction force, the Fly-
ing Cruiser Squadron was always sent to overseas hot spots. It actually used force, 
however, almost without exception only against poorly armed indigenous peoples 
in Africa and the South Seas. Its commander in chief had a broad selection of mea-
sures of compulsion at his disposal, from demonstration to blockade to bombard-
ment of coastal towns, but in most cases he sent landing parties for punitive ex-
peditions ashore. These expeditions were intended to crush local, limited revolts 
against the German colonial rule and to make examples of the indigenous popula-
tions involved. But the successes achieved were minor, because the naval vessels 
and their landing parties could intervene only on an ad hoc basis and could not be 
permanently present at any given point. The same applied to the German vessels 
on African and Australian stations, mainly gunboats and small cruisers responsible 
for areas encompassing several thousand nautical miles and therefore often unable 
to cope with their tasks of colonial protection. Consequently, local revolts against 
the German colonial rulers often resurfaced as soon as the Cruiser Squadron or 
the station vessels had left local waters. Therefore, after the late 1880s the task of 
protection and enforcement of German colonial rule was gradually transferred to 
police units and colonial forces, which could operate in the interior.
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V Powering the U.S. Fleet
Propulsion Machinery Design and American Naval Engineering 
Culture, 1890–1945
WILLIAM M. MCBRIDE
In his summary of his travels in early-1830s America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that “European inventions are sagaciously applied in America, im-proved, and wonderfully adapted to the country’s needs.”1 One exception to 
this derivative relationship was American maritime technology. Tocqueville con-
sidered Robert Fulton and American steamships as representing a unique, pro-
gressive creation. He quoted an American sailor who said that Americans avoided 
building ships “to last long,” because American ship design made “such quick prog-
ress that even the best of boats would be almost useless if it lasted more than a few 
years.”2 Such an expression of continuing technological progress was not atypical in 
nineteenth-century America. John Gast’s popular 1872 painting “American Prog-
ress” is quite representative. It featured a classically dressed “America” floating 
westward, illuminating the darkness for pioneers, stage coaches, railroads, and 
ships, while carrying a telegraph wire and driving Native Americans before her.3 
The early-nineteenth-century U.S. Navy, for various reasons, did not match the 
constant progress of steamships in the private sector. Fulton’s Demologos, built dur-
ing the War of 1812 as a steam-propelled gun battery for harbor defense, was the 
first steam warship of the U.S. Navy. It was destroyed by an explosion in 1829 be-
fore Tocqueville came to America. The British Royal Navy, the nineteenth century’s 
predominant naval force, had been more active in pursuing steamship technology. 
This raises a question: In the case of naval technology, was the U.S. Navy dependent 
on European, specifically British, inventions, in keeping with Tocqueville’s general 
observation?
The U.S. Navy was initially derivative regarding its professional culture. In its 
formative years it drew on the heritage of the Royal Navy. An interesting example is 
the brass button still worn on American naval officers’ uniforms. The button con-
tains American icons—an eagle and thirteen stars to represent the original thirteen 
colonies/states—but also three cannonballs representing the victories of Horatio, 
Lord Nelson, at the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. However, in terms of ship 
design and engineering culture, American naval engineers and naval construc-
tors eschewed external influences. They pursued design paths aimed at outclassing 
NWC_HM23.indb   51 12/8/15   9:00 AM
 POWERING THE U.S. FLEET 53 52 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
corresponding European designs, especially during the wooden age.4 This became 
a bit more difficult to do with the advent of metal ships, given, as William Thiesen 
has pointed out, the initial dearth of a metal-material culture within the Ameri-
can shipbuilding industry.5 Yet soon, and bearing out Tocqueville’s perception that 
Americans regularly improved imported European technology, the American ship-
building industry had created for metal ships innovative manufacturing techniques 
that drew European shipbuilders to America to copy them.6 
U.S. Navy marine engineers (who designed ships’ propulsion and auxiliary ma-
chinery) had a more complicated relationship with the Royal Navy. Some British 
technologies, such as the steam turbine, were adopted and modified. However, U.S. 
Navy marine engineers routinely set their own courses. Two important expressions 
of this independent American design culture were the development and installa-
tion of a turboelectric propulsion system in the 1916-program capital ships and 
the development of efficient and standardized, high-pressure, high-temperature 
(HPHT) steam propulsion systems during the 1930s. These were preceded by a 
triple-screw design by George Melville, the U.S. Navy’s engineer in chief, for the 
Columbia class of commerce-raiding cruisers (1890). Melville considered his de-
sign superior in efficiency and tactical abilities to twin-screw ships and took British 
ship designers to task for ignoring the triple-screw approach. Melville, like other 
American naval constructors and marine engineers, perceived himself as part of 
a distinct American design tradition whose heritage included Benjamin Franklin 
Isherwood’s steam machinery for the high-speed commerce raider USS Wampa-
noag (1869) and extended back to the Humphreys frigates authorized in 1794.7 
The ultimate American technological “declaration of independence” was the 
pursuit, development, and manufacture of HPHT propulsion during the 1930s. 
HPHT was the final repudiation of British marine engineering influence and of any 
lingering sense of a derivative technological relationship with the Royal Navy. By 
1944, American marine engineering designs and technology were being exported 
to the Royal Navy.8 The evolution and nature of American naval engineering cul-
ture can best be understood within a historical context that includes the pursuit of 
a unique warship design philosophy dating from the early republic, the overriding 
Pacific component of American naval strategy, the varying relationships and tech-
nology transfers between the Navy and American industry, and, to a certain extent, 
American engineering culture in general.9
American Naval Engineering Culture
In a 1917 address before the annual meeting of the American Society of Naval En-
gineers, the head of the Division of Design of the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Steam En-
gineering, Capt. C. W. Dyson, emphasized one important difference between con-
temporary European and American warship design—the American focus on the 
Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Navy operated where “the areas to be cov ered are great and 
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the distances to bases and from base to base in some cases are magnificent.”10 This 
focus necessitated warships with efficient hull forms and propulsion machinery 
as well as sufficient fuel to operate across that vast expanse. Conversely, the Euro-
pean “nations were providing for operations in confined waters such as the North 
Sea and Mediterranean, where they never were far from their bases.”11 Additional, 
complicating factors for American warship designers were rooted in an American 
naval culture that had since its inception defined normalcy in terms of strong ships 
with large guns, such as the forty-four-gun “superfrigates”—Constitution, United 
States, and President—authorized in 1794. American ship designers were always 
conscious of European navies—especially the Royal Navy, the nineteenth century’s 
premier naval force—and the warships they designed and operated. Nevertheless, 
American naval architects and marine engineers consciously pursued exception-
alist designs as an expression of an American design culture and as a means to 
counter European power.12 
As the nineteenth century came to a close, this same pursuit of what Amer-
ican naval officers and engineers perceived to be unique designs shaped desires 
in warships for the post-1883 “New Navy.” The two Columbia-class cruisers (built 
in 1890–91) served the traditional American strategy of guerre de course and, 
like the earlier high-speed commerce raider Wampanoag, featured a propulsion- 
machinery design not found in the Royal Navy. The Columbias were designed for 
high speed (twenty-two knots) to overtake passenger liners and Melville’s novel, 
triple-screw drive was projected to allow them to cruise for 103 days at ten knots 
and to circle the earth without need for refueling or bases.13 In reality, Columbia and 
Minneapolis never lived up to their billing as globe-circling commerce raiders. The 
estimated endurance of 24,720 nautical miles at ten knots was reduced in service to 
7,083 nautical miles at 10.46 knots.14
The predreadnought battleships built after 1890 included such uniquely Ameri-
can design attributes as the superposed turrets—in the Kearsarge class (authorized 
1895) and repeated in the New Jersey class (authorized 1899)—meant to maximize 
armored strength, survivability, and gun power. The collective, professional iden-
tity of a navy historically built on the perceived exceptionalist character of its ships 
extended to the new all-big-gun battleship, by which early-twentieth-century naval 
power would be measured. In 1902, Lt. Homer Poundstone called for the “biggest” 
battleship possible and, in conjunction with future admiral William Sims, designed 
USS Scared-o’-Nothing, which paralleled HMS Dreadnought in name and function. 
In the U.S. Naval Institute’s 1905 prize essay, Cdr. Bradley Fiske argued for a class of 
large, powerful, high-speed “compromiseless” battleships to serve American long-
range strategic commitments in the Pacific.15
The differences in engineering cultures that have existed among Britain, conti-
nental Europe, and America have been addressed by historians, and recent works 
NWC_HM23.indb   53 12/8/15   9:00 AM
 POWERING THE U.S. FLEET 55 54 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
have treated similar differences in naval architecture and shipbuilding.16 The 
American geostrategic emphasis on the Pacific and on the long-range warships it 
required cast a long shadow across the twentieth century and was reinforced by 
the 1941–45 Pacific War. Until the design of the Arleigh Burke class of destroyers 
during the early 1980s, American naval architects continued to use hulls optimized 
for endurance rather than high speed or sea-keeping qualities.17
The exceptionalist nature of nineteenth-century American warship design—
with its historical emphasis on hull strength (including armor), gun power, and 
endurance—was acknowledged by one of the leading naval architects in Britain, 
Professor J. Harvard Biles of the University of Glasgow. In a 1901 paper presented 
to the Institution of Naval Architects on recent American warship designs, Biles 
reported that American battleships had “more powerful guns and more of them 
than in other battleships.”18 Biles was struck by the “enormous [gun] battery of 
these ships [Maine, 1898], and with the great [armored] protection it has.”19 The 
American emphasis on gun power and strength was exemplified by the Virginia 
class (authorized 1899), which had an “equivalent weight of armament of 400 tons 
more than our battleships”; further, “their armour protection is thicker and more 
extended.”20 The traditional American pursuit of superior gun power also extended 
to cruisers. Of the Pennsylvania class (1901) Biles observed that “the Americans 
seem to prefer a dominating armament to other qualities.”21
The shift the U.S. Navy undertook in 1890 toward a guerre d’escadre strategy 
marked a significant discontinuity within the intellectual history of the American 
naval profession. American naval officers and naval engineers (and to some ex-
tent, the U.S. shipbuilding industry) had to reinvent the technological basis of the 
Navy to function within a new strategic framework, different from that which had 
prevailed for most of the nineteenth century. This required the continued pursuit 
of exceptionalist warship designs, in keeping with the American naval tradition. 
However, now this tradition was influenced increasingly by engineering, techno-
logical, and scientific transfers from Europe, especially Britain.
The shift to metal warships removed Americans from their familiar wooden-
material culture and forced them, initially, to rely on ideas and methods from 
Britain. Similarly, the rise of scientifically influenced naval architecture rooted in 
a formal educational—rather than artisanal—setting forced American naval con-
structors to pursue British and French education in naval architecture.22 However, 
by the century’s end, America’s pursuit of a modern navy and the industrial base it 
required would foster innovation in metal ship construction that would rebound to 
Europe and change shipbuilding methods there.23 The ability to manufacture thick, 
homogeneous armor, thanks to the relationship between the Navy and Andrew 
Carnegie, was another practice developed in the United States and sent abroad.24 
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American naval constructors, influenced by their European educations (at the 
Royal Naval College, Greenwich; the École d’Application du Génie Maritime; and 
the University of Glasgow), would be led, partly forced by circumstance but partly 
in fulfillment of their own wishes, to create their own American school of naval 
architecture. This would continue the American navy on its trajectory of techno-
logical exceptionalism, both in warship design (large, strong, heavily gunned ships) 
and in the field of ship propulsion (extreme economies devised to deal with the 
vast Pacific) into the twentieth century. Emblematic of this new American school 
of naval architecture was David W. Taylor, who stood first in his class academically 
at the Naval Academy (1885) and first in his class in the naval constructor course 
at Royal Naval College, Greenwich (1888). Although educated in Britain, Taylor’s 
“routine work was characterized by a willingness to depart from the precedents 
established by European predecessors.” An example was his design of a tow tank 
in the Experimental Model Basin at the Washington Navy Yard to allow the use of 
twenty-foot models rather than the twelve-to-fourteen-foot models used in such 
tanks in Europe. The larger models allowed for much more accurate prediction of 
ship powering requirements (i.e., the horsepower needed), which refined the design 
in the areas most critical for American ships—economy and range of operations.25
From the very first warships designed and built in America during the Revolu-
tionary War to the superdreadnought battleships launched on the eve of World War 
I, American naval architects tended to build larger ships, within given ship types, 
than did European, especially British, designers. The first frigates of the Continen-
tal Navy were larger and faster than corresponding British ships. This trend contin-
ued with the forty-four-gun frigates designed by the Philadelphia constructor Josh-
ua Humphreys to form the core of the six frigates (the other three were rated for 
fewer guns) authorized by the 1794 Naval Act to deal with Algerian corsairs. These 
“44s” were longer and faster than British frigates and employed American live oak, 
a very dense wood weighing fifty-five to seventy-five pounds per cubic foot.26 The 
heavier scantlings of the Humphreys frigates enabled them to carry larger guns 
(typically twenty-four-pounders) and more of them, sometimes up to sixty; the 
nickname of “Old Ironsides” earned by USS Constitution was based in the material 
superiority of the live oak. After three American frigate victories over the Royal 
Navy in 1812, the Admiralty forbade its frigate captains from engaging Constitu-
tion, United States, or President in single-ship combat.27 The pursuit of exceptional-
ist design qualities of the Humphreys frigates continued in the seventy-four-gun 
ships of the line authorized in 1813 and 1816. For example, USS Ohio, laid down in 
1817, reflected wartime confirmation of the American criterion of giving “all ships 
the heaviest armament possible in a given rate.”28 According to Howard Chapelle, 
naval architect and maritime historian emeritus at the Smithsonian Institution, “it 
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was decided that all American naval vessels should be superior in size and arma-
ment to their European counterparts.”29
The exceptional nature of American sailing warships provided little guidance 
for the steam-powered, post-1883 “new” Navy that required propulsion efficiency 
for long-range Pacific operations. Interestingly, the roots for both the 1916 turbo-
electric drive and the HPHT propulsion that would power the newly constructed 
U.S. warships employed during World War II were in the private sector, specifi-
cally the electric-power-generation industry. In both cases, there was resistance 
within the Navy and in the private shipbuilding industry to these new, “outside” 
technologies.30
Technology Transfer from the Private Sector
Owing to its limited engineering bureaucracy, the late-nineteenth-century U.S. 
Navy relied on the private sector for the design and construction of the complex 
technological components of its modern ships. This left the Navy vulnerable to 
the unsubstantiated performance claims and vagaries of its industrial suppliers and 
private shipyards. Naval engineers were not comfortable relying on the goodwill 
of the private sector to supply quality machinery. The Navy had no machinery or 
material specifications, nor did it have viable means, save for noting failures and 
excluding vendors, to ensure quality control. The technologically complex mod-
ern Navy, unlike the antiquated force of the 1870s, needed a testing laboratory. 
Congress responded to naval engineers’ call for such a facility by authorizing the 
Engineering Experiment Station (EES) at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1903; it became 
operational in 1908.31
Although EES contributed to the increased material readiness of the Navy, the 
bulk of engineering innovation still came from the private sector. EES scanned this 
environment for useful technologies, instruments, and processes. This paralleled 
contemporary industrial practice, wherein nascent corporate research organiza-
tions did not invent new technologies but used the work of individual inventors, 
often in a creative synthesis.32 In 1915 Lt. Cdr. H. C. Dinger underscored this reli-
ance on the private sector:
The Navy relies on the commercial engineering field for the excellence of the products from 
which the material matters of our naval forces are constructed. It relies on it for the develop-
ment of tools, methods of work and the training of artisans by which our fighting weapons 
are produced in superior form and efficiency. Without a high state of engineering ability and 
progress in the country at large, the highest character of excellence in navy material can not 
be realized. The capacity of our commercial engineering plants is the principal asset of our 
naval engineering reserve of material.33
This “reserve of material” within commercial engineering plants, specifically the 
civilian electrical-power generating industries, would offer the U.S. Navy valuable 
developmental and operational experience with both the turboelectric drive and 
HPHT steam propulsion. 
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The introduction of the all-big-gun HMS Dreadnought in 1906 represented a 
quantum change in battleship technology. The Parsons marine steam turbines used 
in Dreadnought greatly reduced the internal hull volume required for propulsion 
machinery.34 However, because of its direct connection to the propeller, the marine 
turbine brought a decrease in propulsion efficiency and steaming radius.35 The first 
twenty-five U.S. battleships, all predreadnoughts and commissioned between 1895 
and 1908, were powered by large and relatively economical recip rocating steam 
engines. The U.S. Navy could not afford any de crease in propulsion economy, but 
the turbine was nevertheless attractive, because its compact size offered potential 
improvements in the fighting effi ciency of battleships—for instance, the installa-
tion of an improved armor design theretofore precluded by the size of reciprocating 
en gines. As a result, turbines were installed in one all-big-gun battleship (North 
Dakota) of the Delaware class.
Widespread acceptance of the marine turbine depended on the development of 
a means to optimize the turbine-propeller system—turbines develop little useful 
power at slow shaft speeds, and their maximum power at speeds so high that pro-
pellers, because of a phenomenon known as “cavitation,” cannot efficiently deliver 
thrust to the surrounding water. Until this mismatch could be resolved, the turbine 
would be limited to ships requiring high-speed operation—warships and passenger 
liners. In the U.S. Navy, where speed took second place to propulsion economy, 
high speed was not a primary design criterion for its battleships. As a result, the 
turbine’s position was precarious; traditional American naval engineering culture 
reasserted itself and excluded turbines from the battleships of the 1910 program. 
Meanwhile, hydrodynamic limitations on propeller design shifted the focus on im-
provement in propulsive efficiency to the turbine. To regain the U.S. naval market, 
in 1909–10 turbine manufacturers increased the diameter of their turbines, reduc-
ing their rotative speed while maintaining the same level of power output.36 Al-
though reduced to several hundred rotations per minute, the speed of the turbines 
was still too high for optimum propeller efficiency. The turbine’s overall propulsive 
efficiency, as translated into fuel economy and long-range operation, still remained 
less than that of a reciprocating steam-powered ship but was offset, to a point, by its 
compactness, which allowed for increased coal bunkerage and, as noted, improve-
ments in other ship systems. 
To solve the problems of low propulsive efficiency and propeller cavitation, 
marine engineers proposed to place a speed-reducing device between the high-
speed turbine and an optimized, low-speed propeller. They pursued three paths to 
develop such a device. The first option was the mechanical reduction gear, taken 
up in Britain and the United States. The second was turboelectric drive, an idea 
investigated in Britain, Germany, and the United States. The third was hydraulic 
speed reduction, by means of the Föttinger Transformer, developed in Germany.37 
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In 1904 Charles Parsons, George Westinghouse, former engineer in chief 
George Melville, and John MacAlpine, a marine engineer, formed a consortium to 
develop a suitable mechanical reduction gear. Metallurgical and machining diffi-
culties precluded producing geometrically accurate gear teeth able to withstand the 
tremendous pressure and torque involved in use with steam turbines. Melville and 
MacAlpine thought they could bypass this problem by designing a reduction gear 
that incorporated a “floating frame.” Refinement of the design was retarded by the 
adverse economic climate of 1907, which forced George Westinghouse to reduce 
his funding for the project.38 Working independently and drawing on British exper-
tise in metalworking, Parsons pursued a fixed-frame, high-tolerance mechanical-
reduction-gear assembly. This type of gearing required accurate machining tech-
nology, and it was not until 1910, almost thirteen years after the initial success of 
his Turbinia, the first turbine-powered steamship, that the Parsons Marine Steam 
Turbine Company was finally able to develop and test an experimental fixed-frame 
reduction gear in the thousand-horsepower propulsion plant of SS Vespasian.39 
Around the same time, Hermann Föttinger in Germany produced a hydrau-
lic speed-reduction device. Föttinger had originally developed an electromagnetic 
transmission system that provided an overall power-transmission efficiency of 87 
percent (compared with 60 percent in direct-drive turbines) but had abandoned it 
because of its complexity and expense. Föttinger had more success with his next 
design, the hydraulic transformer, in which the turbine shaft rotated a waterwheel 
that forced water through a set of guide blades onto a larger waterwheel attached to 
the propeller shaft. This Föttinger Transformer, coupled to an AEG-Curtis turbine, 
was tested at the Vulcan Shipbuilding Company power plant for fourteen months 
before being installed in a specially built test boat in 1910.40
While Westinghouse, Parsons, and Föttinger worked on mechanical and hy-
draulic methods of speed reduction, William Le Roy Emmet, a prominent General 
Electric (GE) Company engineer motivated by an idea advanced by the electrical 
inventor Reginald Fessenden, proposed a turboelectric ship-propulsion system to 
eliminate the inefficiency of the directly connected marine steam turbine.41 Emmet 
had been quite successful in the development and marketing of turbogenerator sys-
tems within the American electrical-power industry. However, industry could ab-
sorb only a limited number of turbogenerators. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, 
was a growing organization and a wealthy potential customer, and Emmet sought 
to extend General Electric’s entrepreneurial success to this new and lucrative mar-
ket.42 To break into the battleship propulsion market, however, GE had to compete 
against the Melville-MacAlpine gear of the Westinghouse Machine Company and 
overcome the strong influence of the private shipyards that were Parsons licensees 
and advocates of the directly connected turbine drive. 
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Emmet and General Electric had an uphill fight, since the Navy’s Board on Con-
struction had rejected Fessenden’s turboelectric-drive idea in 1908. Secretary of 
the Navy George von Lengerke Meyer, however, as a favor to Emmet’s brother-in-
law, used the conditional endorsement of Engineer in Chief Hutch Cone, chief of 
the Bureau of Steam Engineering, to bypass the Board on Construction and refer 
the question of turboelectric propulsion to the line officers on the Navy’s General 
Board. The General Board recommended installing the General Electric sys tem in 
one of three new colliers for evaluation.43
The 1911 collier program pitted Emmet’s GE turboelectric drive against a new 
Westinghouse-backed system with the Melville-MacAlpine reduction gear. The 
third collier authorized that year was equipped with a die sel submarine engine 
from the Electric Boat Company.44 The entire financial risk of the experiment was 
carried by the competing com panies.45 
The May 1914 report of the trial of the turboelectric drive in the collier Ju-
piter justified Emmet’s claims for the electric drive. Jupiter’s chief engi neer (and 
the future chief of the Bureau of Engineering), Lt. S. M. Robinson, reported that 
the turboelectric drive was easily operated by relatively unskilled sailors, provided 
accurate speed control, and, most important, exceeded GE’s guaranteed econo-
my predictions by a phenomenal 18 percent.46 The rival Westinghouse Melville- 
MacAlpine reduction gear system, in the collier Neptune, had failed its trial. The 
third collier, Maumee, did not perform anywhere near expectations, and the diesel 
engine was rejected. 
In 1915, the U.S. Navy was faced with a choice among the prov en success and 
economy of the turboelectric drive, the trouble-plag ued West inghouse Melville-
MacAlpine reduction gear, and a modification, first introduced in 1912, of the 
inefficient direct-drive arrangement by the addition of a small reduction gear–
equip ped cruising turbine. To the officers of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the 
geostrategic realities of the Pacific made the choice clear. In April 1915, Secretary 
Daniels an nounced the selection of the General Electric turboelectric system to 
power the new superdreadnought California.47 The following year the Navy an-
nounced that all sixteen capital ships of the massive 1916 program would be pow-
ered by turboelectric drive.48
The selection of so unconventional a propulsion system provoked a variety of 
responses. Published statements in favor of the electric drive by such notable elec-
trical experts as Nikola Tesla and Frank Sprague did much to sway public opinion 
in favor of the Navy.49 Even shipping-industry publications, such as Marine Engi-
neering and Shipping Illustrated, pointed out the financial motiva tion behind op-
position to electric drive. The latter, which held “no brief for the electric drive,” 
attributed the “incompetent criticism” the idea was receiving to the shipyards’ loss 
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of business as patent licensees of Curtis and Parsons turbines. When the electric 
drive moved from an experimental collier built in a government yard to battleships 
built under contract by private firms, “the shoe began to pinch.”50 
The dominance of turboelectric propulsion in the U.S. Navy was relatively 
short-lived, largely as a result of the weight restrictions placed on capital ships by 
the Five-Power Treaty that resulted from the 1921 Washington Naval Conference. 
The treaty, which measured naval power in terms of ship displacement (weight), 
restricted capital ships and aircraft carriers but placed no limits on other types of 
warships.51 Renewed naval competition was possible, especially in the unrestrict-
ed category of cruisers displacing up to ten thousand long tons. The Harding and 
Coolidge administrations were chary of renewed naval competition in cruisers, but 
when the 1927 Geneva Conference failed, the United States pursued cruiser con-
struction in earnest.52 
The Move toward HPHT Steam Propulsion
While turboelectric drive powered the latest American battleships and aircraft car-
riers in the 1920s, improvements in reduction-gear technology, coupled with the 
threat posed by higher-speed Japanese capital ships, such as those of the Kongo 
class, resurrected the geared-turbine propulsion system and added higher speed 
to the traditional Pacific-based requirement of endurance. Both General Electric 
and Westinghouse pursued reduction-gear technology, and the Navy installed it 
on smaller warships, such as destroyers. Reduction gears became more efficient, 
eventually transmitting 2 to 3 percent more power than electric drive. By 1931, 
machining and metallurgical processes could produce compact and lightweight 
reduction gears with which turboelectric drive could no longer compete. The first 
electrically propelled battleship, USS New Mexico (ex-California), had its electric 
motors replaced with a GE mechanical reduction gear in 1931.53
For both turboelectric and geared-turbine propulsion systems, high-pressure, 
high-temperature steam offered increased efficiency. In the development of cruiser 
designs displacing under ten thousand tons as required by the Five-Power Treaty, 
weight savings, always important, became even more critical. The Bureau of Steam 
Engineering and its Annapolis Engineering Experiment Station worked to develop 
more-efficient, lighter propulsion machinery both for new construction and for 
replacement of older machinery in existing ships. In 1925, the chief of the Bureau 
of Engineering reported that 
higher pressures and higher temperatures are constantly being advocated, which means that 
the metals must be subjected to stresses never before attempted. Before such new materials 
can be incorporated in the design of machinery a vast amount of research and experimental 
work must be performed. The bureau is constantly taking advantage of the facilities offered 
at the experiment station at Annapolis in the way of testing and developing engineering 
materials. . . . There is no substitute for the activities of . . . [EES] for investigation, test, 
development, and research work in naval engineering.54
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The claim that there “is no substitute for the activities” of EES reflects a Navy in-
ward focus similar to that found in the history of the turboelectric drive. The civil-
ian electrical-power industry was already utilizing HPHT machinery, made pos-
sible by the development of high-strength, heat-resistant alloys after World War I.55 
The U.S. Navy’s first foray into HPHT propulsion was in the 1926 design of the 
heavy cruiser Louisville. The Bureau of Engineering initially used 450 pounds per 
square inch (psi)—up from the existing 300 psi—as the design operating pressure of 
its steam propulsion machinery. In testimony before the General Board of the Navy 
in October 1938, S. M. Robinson, now a rear admiral and former chief of the Bureau 
of Engineering, would recall the case for HPHT steam propulsion in Louisville and 
the maelstrom of opposition this decision had engendered in the years since:
At the present time, most of the opposition to the use of higher pressures and tempera-
tures comes from the same people who about twelve years ago [for Louisville in 1926] were 
opposing just as strongly the use of 400 pounds of steam as compared to 300 pounds of 
steam. These same people, and they are the shipbuilders at the Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Co., Newport News Shipbuilding Co., and the New York Shipbuilding Co., opposed the use 
of 400 pounds as strenuously as they are now opposing 600 pounds. . . . There are several 
reasons, but the principal one is that they have not had any experience with such pressures 
and temperatures. . . . They have practically no research laboratories for developing turbines 
so they are not in the position to go ahead and advance the art as are the people who build 
for shore [power] plants.56
Louisville, part of the first real naval building program since the world war, was 
a much less capable ship than it could have been, because it had been completed 
with a 300 psi steam plant. The attempt by the Bureau of Engineering to raise the 
steam pressure to 450 psi was a “modest improvement in steam conditions, not 
anything like what was being done ashore [in electrical power plants].”57 According 
to Robinson, who had seen the turboelectric controversy at first hand as chief engi-
neer in USS Neptune, the shipbuilders’ opposition to abandoning the low-pressure 
machinery with which they were comfortable “was enormous” and was “put on 
the Secretary of the Navy, the General Board, the Chief of Naval Operations, and 
the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering. . . . Of course, the Design Division of the 
Bureau of Engineering were the only people on the other side because they were 
the only people who had studied this thing and the result of all this was . . . the 
shipbuilders were allowed to put in bids on 300 pounds of steam.”58 
The break for advocates of HPHT steam propulsion came as a result of actions 
taken against the shipyards under the Espionage Act. The “big three” American ship-
building corporations—Bethlehem, Newport News, and New York Shipbuilding 
—held turbine licenses from Parsons, Ltd., for the fabrication of turbines. In 1935 
the chief of the Bureau of Engineering, Rear Adm. Harold Bowen, pursued enforce-
ment of the Espionage Act against the shipyards, which forced them to sever their 
ties with Parsons, because using its turbines required the transmission of American 
warship-design details to Britain, which violated the law. The shipbuilders were 
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obliged to use domestic turbines.59 This, according to Bowen, was “a vital step in the 
development of American naval power.”60 
The American electric-power industry had pursued increasingly higher-pressure 
and higher-temperature steam until designs using steam at 650 psi and 850 degrees 
Fahrenheit were commonplace. The turbines and machinery for the electrical- 
power industry were manufactured by GE and Westinghouse, and their develop-
ment was supported by their large, generously funded research-and-development 
laboratories. As a result, the United States had “in operation in our central power 
stations the most modern and efficient turbine installations in the world.”61
Rear Admiral Bowen’s use of the Espionage Act marked the beginning of a long, 
difficult campaign to revolutionize and standardize U.S. warship propulsion by de-
signing and installing superheat-capable, high-pressure, high-temperature steam-
turbine propulsion systems.62 Robinson and Bowen had to overcome opposition 
from some engineer officers within the Bureau of Engineering, from the line ad-
mirals and staff of the General Board of the Navy, and the significant financial 
and political lobbying of major industrial interests who argued that HPHT steam 
propulsion posed significant manufacturing risks. By November 1938, however, 
Bowen had routed senior officers who were critical of HPHT steam propulsion.63 
The Quintessential Cultural Expression 
In 1967, the historian Lynn T. White argued that “engineers are the chief revolu-
tionaries of our time.”64 Although acting on a much smaller stage than White had 
envisioned, both Robinson and Bowen, in keeping with the exceptionalist culture 
of American naval engineering, successfully overthrew the low-pressure ancien re-
gime of British marine engineering. The new paradigm of efficient, high-pressure 
steam machinery standardized the propulsion technology of major U.S. combat-
ant ships on the eve of World War II, and its technological life lasted well into the 
Cold War. More important than standardization was the excellent fuel economy 
this system offered, which in turn translated into marked increases in the radius 
of fleet operations. Had the opponents of HPHT steam propulsion succeeded in 
maintaining the status quo, the U.S. Navy would have been hard pressed to conduct 
combat operations of adequate scope and duration, especially in the Pacific, during 
World War II. 
The vastness of the Pacific Ocean had driven U.S. warship design since the rise 
of the modern, steam-powered Navy during the 1880s. Propulsion-machinery effi-
ciency, coupled with fuel capacity, determined a ship’s radius of operations. Ameri-
can commercial interests in distant China and southeastern Asia, along with a lack 
of overseas bases, made propulsion efficiency much more imperative for the U.S. 
Navy than for the fleets of other maritime powers.65 During the early 1930s, using 
the civilian electrical-power industry as a model and benefiting from its technolog-
ical innovations, the U.S. Navy began serious development work on high-pressure, 
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high-temperature steam propulsion machinery. By the late 1930s it had designed 
and tested a standard suite that it installed in most of its warships that would be 
used during World War II. 
No other maritime power pursued this path. The Royal Navy, whose technical 
inquisitiveness and experimental expenditures had been praised by Rear Admiral 
Melville in 1902, by this time lacked the financial means and institutional energy to 
do so.66 Interestingly, the engineer in chief of the Royal Navy took a very conserva-
tive position regarding propulsion innovation during the 1930s: “Let the Ameri-
cans and Germans do it, and if it succeeds we will copy them.”67 Apparently, during 
the interwar years the British shipping industry in general was reluctant to embrace 
new technology, since it perceived that “marine engineering was changing in such 
a rapid and uncertain way.”68 However, as Nathan Rosenberg correctly observes, 
militaries do not delay in embracing new technologies within rapidly changing 
technological landscapes.69 The Royal Navy had certainly not delayed during the 
period of rapid technological change of the latter half of the nineteenth century. By 
the 1930s, this was no longer the case.
The new high-pressure, high-temperature propulsion machinery formed the 
“background of propulsion engineering during World War Two,” and its excellent 
fuel economy translated into a significant increase in the radius of fleet operations. 
To credit the U.S. Navy’s successful, long-range naval war against Japan to this in-
novative propulsion plant would not be hyperbole. According to Vice Adm. Earle 
W. Mills, later chief of the Bureau of Ships, U.S. naval operations in the Pacific 
“would not have been possible without it.”70
The superiority of American HPHT propulsion technology during World War 
II was noteworthy. For example, the North Carolina–class battleship Washington 
(a 1937 design), equipped with high-pressure, high-temperature steam propulsion 
machinery, burned 39 percent less fuel at low speeds and was 30 percent more fuel 
efficient overall than the British King George V class, designed in 1936.71 In fact, 
the cruising radius of the North Carolina class was nearly double that of the King 
George V class at lower speeds and 20 percent greater at higher speeds. The effect of 
high-pressure, high-temperature steam propulsion on other classes of warships was 
even greater. In April 1942, Cdr. Paul F. Lee, an assistant American naval attaché to 
the United Kingdom, reported that 
[the limited cruising radius of their ships] is a very serious question with the British and is 
having a marked effect on their naval operations. Even in their newest ships the fuel con-
sumption is at least 50% higher and in some cases almost 100% higher than we have in our 
modern designs. Due to war conditions the normal peacetime cruising radius of their ships 
has been reduced by as much as 50% in some classes. This latter, combined with the poor 
fuel economy, has given their ships a comparatively short cruising radius. They are now fully 
alive to the mistakes they made in their prewar designs.72 
The period of British maritime technological supremacy had ended, and the 
words of the prewar British engineer in chief now proved prophetic. The Royal 
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Navy copied the U.S. Navy’s high-pressure, high-temperature approach in the 
Daring-class destroyers for its 1944 program. Not only was the U.S. Navy eman-
cipated from Britain in its engineering but the historical flow of technological in-
novation had been reversed. By the end of World War II, the British were using 
pressurized-casing boilers produced by the American firms of Foster Wheeler and 
Babcock & Wilcox.73
Such disparities in propulsion efficiency were not limited to the Royal Navy. 
The North Carolina –class battleships used only 0.64 tons of fuel per nautical mile at 
twenty knots, but Germany’s Bismarck burned 0.83 tons of fuel per nautical mile at 
the same speed. This was a difference of approximately 30 percent. Japan’s Yamato 
(1937), with a propulsion plant along British low-pressure lines, used 0.88 tons of 
fuel per nautical mile at eighteen knots.74 Although exact figures are unavailable, 
Yamato would have used even more fuel at twenty knots, increasing its disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis the American design. 
High-pressure, high-temperature steam propulsion systems were the quintes-
sential expression of American naval engineering culture. HPHT propulsion did 
not have the visibility or the broad utilitarian postwar spillover that radar enjoyed. 
However, it was essential to the successful prosecution of the worldwide American 
war effort. Tocqueville wrote that in a democratic society, “men’s minds are uncon-
sciously led to neglect theory and devote an unparalleled amount of application 
to the applications of science, or at least to that aspect of theory which is useful 
in practice.”75 The HPHT design was certainly useful in the Navy’s prosecution of 
the war against the Axis. Its development was a combination of the visions of Ad-
mirals Robinson and Bowen of steam-turbine propulsion as a linear technological 
progression (more pressure, more temperature) arising from the technological tra-
jectory of the electrical-power generating industry. It also was the result of the abil-
ity of these two men, especially Bowen, to wage a successful social-constructivist 
campaign in support of HPHT systems.76 This campaign was successful, in large 
measure because of its consonance with a strong, deep-seated American naval en-
gineering culture that embraced a collective memory of exceptionalism and was 
always mindful of the strategic challenges of Pacific operations. 
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VI Theodore Roosevelt, Social Psychology, and Naval 
Public Relations
The 1906 John Paul Jones Reinterment Ceremony
LORI LYN BOGLE
Naval historians struggle to assess fairly Theodore Roosevelt’s impact on the U.S. Navy. They credit him for successfully using the Navy as his big stick in foreign policy, but they offer mixed evaluations of his overall con-
tribution to the service itself. While he oversaw a number of improvements in re-
cruitment, training, naval gunnery, and battleship design, his constant interference 
in the daily activities at the Navy Department caused considerable bureaucratic 
turmoil, especially because of his favoritism toward junior officers. Scholars gener-
ally agree that Roosevelt had considerable success during his first term in achieving 
his diplomatic and battleship-construction objectives but that after 1905 he mis-
handled the battle for appropriations that would have led to a more balanced fleet 
by the end of his presidency.1 There is little argument among scholars, however, 
over Roosevelt’s success in popularizing the service. Acting almost as a one-man 
public relations firm, Roosevelt, more than any president before or since, fired the 
national imagination regarding America’s potential for naval greatness.2 This pa-
per looks at how Roosevelt used social psychology to turn a relatively insignificant 
event—the 1905 discovery of the body of John Paul Jones—into an international 
naval extravaganza that brought his sea-power message directly to the American 
public. 
Theodore Roosevelt brought to the presidency two essential components for his 
naval publicity efforts: a great love for the Navy and a sophisticated understanding 
of how to influence public opinion. His love of the Navy had begun in childhood. 
“From my earliest recollection,” Roosevelt told one of his biographers, “I have been 
fed on tales of the sea and of ships. My mother’s . . . deep interest in the southern 
cause [her two brothers had served with the Confederate navy] . . . led her to talk 
to me as a little shaver about ships, ships, ships, and [the] fighting of ships, till they 
sank into the depths of my soul.”3 In 1882 he made a name for himself as an up-
and-coming young historian with the publication of a cautionary tale on the na-
tion’s lack of naval preparedness, The Naval War of 1812. The book’s critical success 
caught the attention of influential men who shared his belief that national prestige 
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and international power required a strong navy. Without one, Roosevelt, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Brooks Adams, John Hay, and other “Large Policy” men argued, the 
nation would not have the opportunity to fight wars against inferior races—wars 
needed to strengthen the American character with manly, fighting qualities. For 
nearly twenty years, Large Policy men encouraged one another’s naval publicity 
efforts and helped finance Roosevelt’s political career as he “rose like a rocket” into 
national prominence.4 
Whether as a state assemblyman working on civil service reform, a New York 
City police commissioner, or Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt was con-
sistent. He promoted a powerful offensive fleet of capital ships that, supported by 
adequate coaling stations, would project America’s power into areas of national 
interest. He may have micromanaged the service and alienated naval committees 
in the House and Senate, but he also energized all those around him by bypass-
ing Congress and speaking directly to the American people about the nation’s na-
val needs. In a well-publicized 1897 speech at the Naval War College in Newport, 
Rhode Island, “Washington’s Maxim,” Roosevelt reassured the nation that a large 
navy would not break with American traditional values or lead to war with a Eu-
ropean power. “Those who wish to see this country at peace,” Roosevelt argued, 
should “place [their] reliance upon a first-class fleet of first-class battleships rather 
than on any arbitration treaty which the wit of man can devise.”5 
Roosevelt’s populist appeal in his Naval War College appearance was in keeping 
with late nineteenth-century scholarship on how leaders could maintain order as 
America transformed itself into a democratic mass society. The American found-
ers generally defined “the public” as those with the education and financial means 
to participate in the free flow of ideas.6 The so-called penny press of the 1830s, 
however, began to challenge the political power of the governing elite by produc-
ing increasingly cheaper newspapers and magazines that by 1880 had put timely 
information and analysis in the hands of Americans of all classes. While many ap-
plauded the expansion of democracy through mass media, others worried about 
the new power of the self-conscious, politically active masses, which grew larger 
by the year because of the rapid influx of new immigrants. By the late nineteenth 
century an outbreak of strikes and labor violence, coupled with corrupt “boss rule” 
in the nation’s major urban centers, seemed to confirm elite fears that America was 
developing into a mobocracy. Educated members of the upper class turned to the 
new academic discipline of social psychology, popularly known as “crowd psychol-
ogy,” for solutions to the disruption of the social order (real or perceived) by the 
emergence of mass society.7 
In 1895 the French criminologist Gustave Le Bon popularized social psychology 
with his best-selling Psychology of Crowds (or The Crowd). Building on the work of 
earlier scholars and cutting-edge studies on hypnosis and the subconscious, Le Bon 
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argued that the masses (much like a crowd) possessed a highly suggestible “collec-
tive mind,” prone to hysteria and imitation (“mental contagion”). Leaders, espe-
cially those with charisma and powerful speaking skills, could manage the masses 
and change public opinion with “absolute, uncompromising, and simple” emo-
tional appeals and heroic imagery. The most effective leaders would demonstrate 
that they themselves were one of the crowd, physically able to hold their own with 
working-class men, before stepping forward as champions of the people. By begin-
ning with traditional ideals and then slowly planting heroic imagery into the mass 
subconscious, a leader could manipulate the public “little by little” to support his 
modern-day policy initiatives. The images used need not be accurate, the political 
psychologist claimed, for “appearances have always played a much more important 
part than reality in history. . . . It is only images that terrify or attract [the crowd] 
. . . and become motives of action.” In fact, “great power,” Le Bon declared, would 
be given to heads of state who understood these principles and propagated their 
ideas with rituals and ceremonies and by “affirmation, repetition, and contagion.”8 
Critics challenged Le Bon’s methodology. They also found simplistic his view of 
the masses behaving as a violent mob. More compelling was the work of social psy-
chologists who described the general public as comprising a number of subgroups, 
some more reasoned than others and able to set the tone for the whole. Roosevelt 
agreed that there were a variety of publics. He divided the masses into distinct “races,” 
or types (the race of hardworking farmers, the American race, or sometimes a par-
ticular ethnic group).9 Roosevelt also studied the American sociologist Edward A. 
Ross, who claimed in his 1901 Social Control that there were thirty-three different 
ways in which a society could effectively control its people. Like Le Bon before 
him, Ross stressed the role of the hero and of emotional imagery in shaping public 
opinion. In addition, he argued that government could effectively manage the na-
tional will by regulating the press. Apparently Roosevelt was in agreement with the 
renowned scholar, for in 1905 he wrote Ross a glowing letter regarding Ross’s work, 
prophesying that “public opinion if only sufficiently enlightened and aroused is 
equal to the necessary regenerative tasks and can yet dominate the future.”10
Despite clear differences regarding the makeup of the crowd, Roosevelt’s public-
relations efforts reflected Le Bon’s formula for governing a mass society with heroic 
imagery. Roosevelt established his credentials as a man of the people and as their 
heroic leader (an important step, according to Le Bon) by going to the West after a 
number of personal and political setbacks.11 On the Dakota frontier he dressed as 
and lived the life of a cowboy, captured boat thieves, built a photography lab un-
der his cabin (for publicity purposes), wrote of his heroic exploits in a number of 
hunting and wilderness books, and kept the New York papers apprised of his latest 
exploits.12 He carefully and effectively crafted his public image, much as William 
Cody had his own alter ego, Buffalo Bill. Some historians have ridiculed Roosevelt’s 
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actions as the products of an out-of-control ego and an adolescent personality. In-
stead, his heroic self-depictions as, according to political scientist Bruce Miroff, 
“the cowboy of the Dakotas, the police commissioner patrolling New York’s mean 
streets, the Rough Rider charging up San Juan Hill,” and so forth, were all concerted 
efforts to make him appear to be a worthy leader and “the first great American hero 
of a new age of mass media.”13 
Once president, Roosevelt worked to distance himself from his former cowboy 
image and to rely, as Le Bon recommended, on the prestige of his high office for 
his public-relations efforts.14 He quickly transformed himself into a mature states-
man and saved heroic imagery for naval expansion (and other proposed policy 
measures) rather than for self-promotion. Building on public enthusiasm for the 
heroic Navy following the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt relied on his political 
prestige to preach sea power at monument dedications and historical commemora-
tions, even events with little or no connection to the service, as well as at interna-
tional naval parades (including the departure of the Great White Fleet), a series of 
world’s fairs, and a number of other naval fêtes.15 
One of the clearest demonstrations of Roosevelt’s use of crowd psychology was 
the reinterment ceremony of John Paul Jones at the U.S. Naval Academy, in An-
napolis, Maryland, in 1906.16 The discovery of the Revolutionary War hero’s grave 
the year before had given Roosevelt an excellent opportunity for naval publicity. 
Following the war and the disbanding of the Continental Navy, Jones had trav-
eled abroad, hopeful that he could secure another naval commission at home once 
America re-formed its naval forces. In 1792, however, the forty-five-year-old hero 
died in Paris. A French official packed the corpse in alcohol, sealed it in a lead cof-
fin, and interred it in a cemetery for foreign Protestants to await transport back to 
the United States.17 America showed no serious interest in retrieving the body of 
John Paul Jones, however, until 1845, when a brief investigation seemed to prove 
that finding it would be impossible. Interest revived during the Spanish-American 
War, and several American research teams began searching for the grave. The am-
bassador to France, Gen. Horace Porter, and his investigators ultimately identified 
in archival records the correct tract of land. Porter was pained “beyond expression” 
to learn that this hero, whose “fame once covered two continents,” had lain for over 
a hundred years in “ground once consecrated, but since desecrated”; the site had 
served as both a cesspool and a dumping ground for dead animals, and it was now 
covered with buildings and a street.18 On learning of the discovery Roosevelt sent 
an urgent request to Congress for the thirty-five thousand dollars the ambassador 
needed to excavate. In 1905 Porter telegraphed the president that he had performed 
an autopsy on what had seemed the most likely corpse and had identified it with 
scientific certainty as the body of John Paul Jones.19 
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Roosevelt’s excitement over the discovery of John Paul Jones’s body could hardly 
be contained. Porter had delivered an extraordinary opportunity for the president 
to put Le Bon’s ideas into action.20 There was a problem, however. Prior to the turn 
of the century few in America had placed great importance on John Paul Jones, nor 
had Roosevelt been one of them. The public, of course, had admired Jones during 
and after the Revolution for his glorious, even audacious, victories over the British. 
The Navy, however, had not held him in very high esteem over the years. His exag-
gerated sense of personal honor, poor leadership skills, and questionable national 
loyalty while serving abroad prevented his being considered a model for profes-
sional officers to emulate.21 Among Roosevelt’s monographs on American history 
was one that dismissed Jones as merely a “daring corsair.”22 As Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Roosevelt had claimed that his exploits did not “size up big enough” 
to be included in an anthology of American heroes.23 Certainly, no one seriously 
considered Jones a contender for designation as “father of the Navy” until 1900, 
when a new, two-volume biography by Augustus C. Buell, Paul Jones: Founder of the 
American Navy, appeared. It would be revealed later that Buell, an engineer turned 
historian, had fabricated documents to provide seemingly irrefutable proof that 
Jones was the service’s “father.”24 
When Porter discovered the lost corpse, however, Roosevelt overcame his 
qualms and proclaimed an importance for the Revolutionary War hero over that 
of any other naval officer. Roosevelt was well aware that Buell was out of step 
with contemporary historical thinking (though not, at this point, that his claims 
were bogus), yet quoted him during the 1906 reinterment ceremony. By doing so 
he firmly, almost inextricably, planted Buell’s new interpretation in the national 
psyche. As Le Bon had written, appearances were more important than reality.25 
The crowd, the psychologist explained, responds best to “exaggeration in the sen-
timents of its heroes. Their apparent qualities and virtues must always be ampli-
fied.”26 Roosevelt was undoubtedly encouraged in this path by the near mass hys-
teria following the Spanish-American War surrounding the Navy’s first modern 
celebrities. “Dewey Mania” and a “Hobson Craze” swept the nation when Adm. 
George Dewey and Lt. Richmond Pearson Hobson triumphantly returned to the 
United States.27 
Public excitement surrounding the Jones discovery had been equally im-
passioned. Newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic described in graphic detail 
the opening of the casket and the process used to identify the remarkably well- 
preserved remains. To the disappointment of a number of cities vying for the hon-
or, the Navy had announced that the body, when retrieved from France, would 
be taken for reburial at the Arlington Cemetery, just outside Washington, D.C. 
Roosevelt, who micromanaged almost every detail, agreed with Ernest Flagg, the 
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architect in charge of the Naval Academy’s classical renovation then under way, that 
“the ashes of the founder of the American Navy should repose in the midst of the 
institution [underneath the chapel] which is the cradle . . . of the Navy.” By doing so, 
Flagg argued, “the Chapel will become what it ought to be, and what I have always 
hoped it would be, the Pantheon or Westminster Abbey of the Navy.”28 
John Paul Jones, who had once written that “my desire for fame is infinite,” 
would have been quite pleased to see how America now celebrated his life and 
death. First honored in an elaborate ceremony in France, then brought to America 
by a U.S. Navy squadron, his casket arrived at Annapolis for a brief but dignified 
military and religious service before French and American pallbearers placed it in 
a temporary brick vault to await the full international commemoration scheduled 
for the following spring.29 When Acting Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee heard 
that the Navy planned in the meantime to conduct a second autopsy, “he jumped 
from his chair and ran for the office of the Secretary of the Navy, where he burst 
in and bellowed that once America had accepted the body from France as Jones, it 
would forever remain Jones.”30 The Baltimore Sun agreed: “We refuse,” an editorial 
charged, “to have the authenticity of the body questioned. We claim the bones of 
Jones, which have been formally christened, so that any possible mistake would 
have no effect.”31
The president personally picked the anniversary of the naval hero’s capture of 
HMS Drake, 24 April, as the date of the reinterment. At first Roosevelt had hoped 
to keep the occasion primarily a naval spectacular, incorporating elements of both 
the American and French fleets into the pageantry and strictly limiting participa-
tion by other branches of the government. But as the date of the commemoration 
approached, the value of including congressmen—who were then in the midst of 
debates on naval appropriations—became evident. Seven thousand people attend-
ed the three-hour ceremony in Dahlgren Hall, which showcased the grandeur of 
the Naval Academy’s renovation and provided the president with a public ritual 
in which to sell the Navy to the American public.32 Journalists and photographers 
retold the event for a national audience. The Navy further publicized the occasion 
when Congress authorized eleven thousand copies of an elaborately decorated 210-
page commemorative volume, featuring details of the discovery (including graphic 
photographs of the decaying body) and the subsequent ceremonies, for distribu-
tion to the public.33
Roosevelt’s remarks at the reinterment ceremony closely followed Le Bon’s rec-
ommendations on how to craft speeches to change public opinion. Eschewing the 
example of muckrakers who exposed shortcomings and wrongdoing, Roosevelt 
included, per Le Bon, “energetic affirmations” and “impressive images” that were 
accompanied by only “summary arguments,” unburdened by evidence.34 
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The ceremony opened with the flag-draped coffin at center stage, in front of a 
towering platform and speaker’s podium and surrounded by midshipmen lining 
the walls of the Academy’s spacious armory building, Dahlgren Hall. But clearly 
Theodore Roosevelt was the main attraction: “All eyes were on him and cameras 
shot at him from every corner of the gallery in the Armory,” the Annapolis daily 
newspaper reported the next day. He first thanked the French nation for its help 
during the American Revolution, as well as General Porter for his “zealous devo-
tion” in bringing Jones back to the United States, before launching into his main 
message, applying the lessons of the past to the nation’s needs for the future, much 
as Le Bon had instructed.
Every officer in our Navy should know by heart the deeds of John Paul Jones . . . [and] 
should feel in each fiber of his being an eager desire to emulate the energy, the professional 
capacity, the indomitable determination and dauntless scorn of death which marked [him] 
above all his fellows. . . . Remember, you here who are listening to me, that to applaud 
patriotic sentiments and to turn out to do honor to the dead heroes who by land or by sea 
won honor for our flag is only worth while if we are prepared to show that our energies do 
not exhaust themselves in words. . . . [T]ake to heart the lessons of the past and make things 
ready so . . . fighting men on sea and ashore shall be able to rise to the standard established 
by their predecessors in our services of the past. 
Those of you who are in public life [directing his comments to congressmen in attendance] 
have a moral right to be here at this celebration to-day only if you are prepared to do your 
part in building up the Navy of the present; for otherwise you have no right to claim lot or 
part in the glory and honor and renown of the Navy’s past.35
Following other speakers, an international honor guard placed the naval hero’s 
body under the main staircase in the school’s dormitory, Bancroft Hall, to await the 
completion of its final resting place—an ornate marble sarcophagus reminiscent of 
Napoleon’s tomb in France. 
Roosevelt had not only produced a spectacle that demonstrated the tenets of Le 
Bon’s crowd psychology; he had conducted a ritual that fit well with modern so-
ciological principles. According to Joseph W. Bastien and David G. Bromley, ritu-
als and ceremonies create stability by performing at least one of three important 
functions. First, they can “provide either continuity or movement.”36 That is, they 
connect the present to the past, or, as in the case of rites of passage, they can provide 
a transition to the future. Second, they can “enhance communality and solidar-
ity within a group,” by expressing commitment to a set of “common values and 
beliefs.” Third, they often offer individuals involved opportunities to experience 
the “mystery and majesty” that “separate the ordinary from the extraordinary, the 
mundane from the important, the sacred from the profane. By so doing,” Bastien 
and Bromley conclude, “ritual helps to create social order, and to link an individ-
ual’s emotional life with collective experiences.” Roosevelt accomplished all three 
with the John Paul Jones commemoration. The mystery and majesty surrounding 
the Revolutionary War hero’s life and death and the later discovery of his remains 
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linked the twentieth-century Navy to its past and allowed the president to refashion 
traditional ideas regarding the military, in much the way Le Bon had suggested, to 
support his vision of the Navy as a professional, progressive service prepared for 
offensive fleet action.
Newspapers heralded the commemoration as a complete success, but the enthu-
siasm surrounding the Revolutionary War hero, like that for Dewey, soon faded. 
After Roosevelt left office, Jones’s body languished in its temporary tomb in Ban-
croft Hall, inspiring a reference in a somewhat impertinent ditty sung by midship-
men, “Everyone Works but John Paul”—who was, as the song had it, “pickled up in 
alcohol” and seemed to be “on a permanent jag.”37 In 1913 Congress finally appro-
priated the funds necessary to complete construction of a permanent resting place 
for the once-celebrated corpse. But the Academy chapel never became the West-
minster Abbey of the Navy that Ernest Flagg had envisioned.38 Even to this day, few 
visitors to the Yard are aware of where the body of the hero lies. Dark and eerie and 
with little interpretative information, the John Paul Jones crypt, seemingly hidden 
from tourists underneath the chapel, does virtually nothing to strengthen the na-
tion’s collective memory of its naval past. But in 1906 the myth of John Paul Jones 
as promoted by Theodore Roosevelt was considerably more powerful and helped 
the president secure his goal of popularizing the Navy. 
Other naval extravaganzas soon followed. Roosevelt transformed the James-
town world’s fair that commemorated the first successful English colony in the New 
World into an “international, naval, marine, and military celebration.”39 He also 
sent the Great White Fleet around the world. He did so for a number of diplomatic 
and military reasons, but there is no doubt the voyage was also a publicity event—a 
global maritime pageant that elevated the Navy’s officers, sailors, and even the bat-
tleships themselves to national heroes.40 A number of domestic and international 
factors played a role in modernizing the U.S. Navy before, during, and after his 
presidency. Credit for the service’s new popularity with the American masses, how-
ever, belongs to Theodore Roosevelt and his love of the Navy, his understanding of 
the psychology of the crowd, and his shrewd use of naval publicity to reach out to 
the masses. With or without congressional support, Theodore Roosevelt wisely and 
adeptly publicized an American fleet capable of offensive operations, as powerful 
nations jockeyed for position on the world’s ocean highways.
N O T E S
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VII “The Committee of Four” 
The “Blue Funk School,” the CID, and the Myth of the  
German Peril, 1906–1909
ANDREAS ROSE
In August 1908—as the Anglo-German naval race was just about to reach its peak—the small Hessian town of Cronberg witnessed a royal encounter be-tween Kaiser Wilhelm II and a representative of his uncle King Edward VII. 
Charles Hardinge, the British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, sit-
ting on the billiard table and enjoying his after-lunch cigar with the kaiser, did not 
mince any words. He told Wilhelm in no uncertain terms that he held the German 
High Seas Battle Fleet to be “the only disturbing factor in international politics” and 
thus the prime culprit in the worsening of Anglo-German relations. “In England,” 
Hardinge said, “it is perfectly clear that the German fleet will be in a few years’ time 
superior to the Royal Navy,” and would threaten the British Isles with the danger 
of invasion.1 
The orthodox view among historians generally tends to share Hardinge’s assess-
ment.2 His talks with Wilhelm II and the latter’s determined refusal to reduce the 
German shipbuilding program even at the cost of war are commonly taken as clear 
evidence for the existence of a blundering German foreign policy—a policy that 
supposedly missed every opportunity that arose to come to terms with the Unit-
ed Kingdom, let alone to ease international tensions. Jonathan Steinberg, Volker 
Berghahn, and Paul Kennedy in the wake of the so-called Fischer controversy (and 
many others since) have forcefully posited that “Admiral Tirpitz and his clique did 
indeed dream of challenging the Royal Navy,” resulting in a self-inflicted isolation 
of Germany.3 
The established pattern of interpretation, therefore, reads as follows. By the end 
of the 1890s, Germany had embarked on the construction of a battle fleet, as a 
result of which Great Britain had no choice but to react to this “unique German 
threat” right “at her own front door” by regrouping the fleets of the Royal Navy and 
starting a hitherto unprecedented shipbuilding program. By launching “all big gun” 
ships of the dreadnought type, Britain followed the assumption of the American 
naval theorist Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan that only capital ships counted in secur-
ing a state’s national security needs and would be decisive not only in home waters 
but also in achieving the vital “command of the sea” in general. Furthermore, the 
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supposed German peril at sea is said to have conveyed to London’s political and 
diplomatic elites the need to abandon its policy of “splendid isolation” altogether. 
In other words, as one eminent political historian has summarized the causal nexus 
between the naval race and prewar diplomacy, “it was without doubt the construc-
tion of the German battle fleet” that forced Britain’s hand and so “contributed sig-
nificantly to the revolution of the states system before 1914.”4
In recent years, however, naval historians in particular have challenged this or-
thodoxy. They have expressed their concern that the common notion of a German 
challenge triggering an inevitable British response is based on a rather too simplis-
tic and too one-sided model of interpretation. If we take Great Britain generally as 
the epitome of a complex parliamentary system before 1914, it seems remarkable 
that political and diplomatic historians especially still believe in high politics, the 
primacy of foreign politics, and the activity of British diplomats in a rather strange 
vacuum separated from the “world outside,” while recent naval historians have 
looked at the domestic realities behind London’s naval policy and decision making. 
Naval historians, therefore, have warned against focusing unduly on German poli-
cies when explaining Britain’s naval policy. Rather, they have identified a number of 
Anglo-centric explanations for Britain’s naval policy. They have highlighted various 
constraints within the British parliamentary and financial systems, as well as within 
the British defense structure, and thus have opened a new perspective leading to 
reinterpretation of prewar international relations. As a result of intriguing archival 
findings, Jon Sumida, Nicholas Lambert, and Rolf Hobson have been able to show 
persuasively that Britain’s naval policy can also be explained on its own terms, with-
out constant necessity to invoke a German threat.
According to Sumida’s and Lambert’s research, the concentration of the British 
fleet in home waters in early 1905—certainly one of the key arguments of the con-
ventional view—turns out to be far less a reaction to the German High Seas Battle 
Fleet than a result of technological developments, financial constraints, and indus-
trial interests. In fact, as one hitherto neglected memorandum of March 1904 by 
Lord Esher, one of the most influential politicians of the time, reveals, it was due to 
modern telegraphy that the Admiralty could afford to concentrate its fleets in home 
waters rather than having to deploy them constantly on all seven seas:
The Admiralty possess a well organized system of recording, in times of peace, the move-
ment of ships all over the world. At any hour during the day the sea Lords are enabled to 
locate the position of any British or foreign vessel, and to calculate the precise effect upon 
our fleets of the movements of foreign ships of war. The Naval Branch is thus able from day 
to day to amend and alter plans for the distribution of the Fleet, as well as schemes of naval 
defence, should the country be suddenly and unexpectedly plunged into war.5
Whereas new and faster communication made the concentration of forces pos-
sible, concentration was also desirable financially, especially after the costly South 
African War. Moreover, for example, in the decision to build a North Sea naval 
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base at Rosyth, a move that has long been taken as a clear countermeasure against 
the Kaiserreich, the German navy was not even mentioned.6 Rather, the naval base 
primarily served the stagnant Scottish shipbuilding industry.7 Considering the ris-
ing danger of torpedo attacks and the anticipated risks from rapidly improving 
submarines, the First Sea Lord, John A. Fisher, thought the harbor completely use-
less and declined to waste a penny on it.8 Fisher, who has always been described as a 
Mahanite and a key witness for the Anglo-German naval race, seemed to have been 
influenced less by the Anglo-German concerns than by the Jeune École and his 
own observations of the French navy’s testing of torpedoes and submarines during 
his time as chief of the Mediterranean station between 1899 and 1902.9 
Mahan’s views on the central importance of large battleships and decisive battles 
were certainly very popular in states that only recently had started building for-
midable fleets, such as the German empire, Japan, and the United States.10 Yet the 
fact that Mahan’s major work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, served as 
a kind of “naval Bible” for the kaiser does not allow the conclusion that Mahan 
was the “most influential prophet of the new navalism” in Britain as well.11 There 
his writings were often considered by naval experts like Julian Corbett or Richard 
Thursfield to be obsolete by modern standards, or, as in the case of Arthur Balfour, 
mere propaganda. Even Fisher held Mahan’s work in lower esteem than has hith-
erto been believed and occasionally called his theories “passé” or even “nonsense.”12
Another, and rather misleading, argument, which also stems in part from 
Mahan’s belief in big battleships and large tonnages, refers to the tables of displace-
ment repeatedly used in historical works. They are aimed at proving the dynamic 
effect of the prewar naval arms race, especially Germany’s challenge of the “two-
power standard.” But the mere addition of numbers essentially ignores the fact that 
the standard was neither a natural law nor understood as an adequate instrument 
for estimating the “real strength” of a navy.13 In fact, the standard represented rather 
a public instrument, an argument used by the Admiralty in public and parliamen-
tary discussions to justify the skyrocketing costs resulting from technological inno-
vations and new ship designs since the 1880s. Asked about the importance of dis-
placement, naval correspondents like Herbert W. Wilson or Archibald Hurd would 
reply that these statistics were not suitable indicators of naval strength.14 Captain 
Carlyon Bellairs, indeed, thought the tonnage theory outdated and absurd: “I know 
of no more foolish contention in our naval discussions than the plea that has been 
advanced by civilians like Lord Eversley, that tonnage is an accurate measure of 
fighting strength.”15 William White, one of the chief engineers of the Royal Navy, 
fully agreed.16 As early as 1903 he published an article in which he called the use of 
displacement as a measure of power a relic of the age of sail. In his Cantor Lecture 
in February 1906 he referred to the difficulty of estimating naval strength under 
modern circumstances and concluded that tonnage was no longer an adequate 
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indication of it. Instead, structural capacities like docking and coaling facilities, 
economies of scale, technological know-how, experience in the shipbuilding indus-
try, and the diversity of units within fleets were of far greater importance.17 Lord 
Selborne, a key witness to the conventional interpretation, thought tonnage data 
“completely worthless” for measuring the actual strength of a fleet. Nevertheless, 
in political and public discourse those data seemed indispensable.18 Not without 
reason did Lord Ellenborough, one of the leading scaremongers about a possible 
German invasion, emphasize in the House of Lords that the only value of displace-
ment tables was to persuade the people of an imminent German danger.19 
For historical research, therefore, it is important to look closer at the hidden 
contemporary motives for presenting certain pieces of evidence to the public. 
These are overlooked all too easily. Similar caution is required when dealing with 
Lord Selborne’s often-cited memorandum of December 1904 in which he justified 
the redeployment of fleets on grounds of a German danger. On closer scrutiny, 
however, it becomes obvious that he was less concerned about Germany than about 
foreign navies generally, especially the French and Russian navies, as well as the 
newly modernized U.S. Navy.20 Only a year earlier, in October 1903, Selborne had 
been “in despair about the financial outlook, because these cursed Russians are 
laying down one ship after the other.”21 In his memorandum of December 1904 he 
called the German navy one “of the most efficient types,” but the French stood “al-
ways in the forefront,” whereas the American potential appeared to him “limitless.” 
Matthew Seligmann has recently supported the conventional view that Selborne 
and the Royal Navy perceived Germany alone as the foremost danger. In citing “the 
first Progress Report on the Committee of the Redistribution of the Fleet in Com-
mission,” however, he unfortunately omits a very revealing annotation by Selborne 
dated 21 November 1904. In this the First Lord of the Admiralty stated, “The worst 
case which can befall us under present conditions is for Germany to throw her 
weight against us in a middle of a still undecided war between us and France and 
Russia in alliance.”22 The redistribution of the Royal Navy, therefore, was anything 
but solely aimed at Germany. Far more was it the beginning of a flexible defense 
strategy against all naval rivals.
Taken together, the so-called revisionists have identified four major forces as 
decisive for Britain’s naval policy, an insight that for the time being has fallen nearly 
entirely on deaf ears among political, particularly diplomatic, historians:23 The first 
was the heavily felt financial burden of naval armament in the aftermath of the 
South African War, which drove home the necessity to cut costs and improve effi-
ciency.24 The second was the technological revolution, marked by telegraphic com-
munication, higher speed, and inventions like the torpedo, the submarine, and the 
battle cruiser.25 Third, British grand strategy did not focus only on Germany or the 
historically overrated two-power standard—which was an instrument to placate 
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Parliament—but aimed at sustaining an overall supremacy, over all modern fleets, 
especially over the French and the U.S. navies, and not through numbers but by 
mobility and quality.26 The fourth was a more nuanced British vision of sea power, 
a view that—unlike those of new and rather inexperienced naval powers such as Ja-
pan, the United States, and Germany—was profoundly different from the popular 
writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.27 As noted, Mahan’s emphasis on capital ships, 
tonnage, command of the sea, and decisive battles was even criticized by First Sea 
Lord Fisher, Julian Corbett, and others.28
One may, of course, respond that however persuasive this argument may be, we 
are still left with the question of why prewar British public opinion on the German 
navy was so much more emotionally charged than on other foreign navies. Jan 
Rüger’s study of naval celebrations—work whose innovative integration of naval 
and cultural history allows him to demonstrate how sea power was constructed—
shows us a possible way to account for the obsession of public opinion with Ger-
man sea power. He sees the cult of the naval race as part of what can be called the 
theater of diplomatic relations before the First World War, a realm in which the 
demonstration of power and deterrence replaced actual facts.29 Another possibil-
ity for dealing with increasing public hysteria and its effects on political decision 
making is to combine naval history with modern media history and the study of 
party and propagandistic politics. Traditionally, the emotional buildups in Brit-
ish and German public opinion have been interpreted in opposite ways. German 
public opinion has always been explained in terms of cynical manipulation by the 
press bureau or dangerous self-mobilization;30 the influence of public opinion in 
England, in contrast, has usually been interpreted as positive and useful.31 How-
ever, recent research on the press as a rising political actor in both Germany and 
England has stressed that the “similarities between the two countries” are more 
striking than the differences and that “political and cultural liberalism” in prewar 
Britain has often been “overestimated.”32 The press, therefore, should not be used as 
an expression of unfiltered perception.33 
In any case, to reach analytically satisfying conclusions one needs to combine 
different approaches and identify an element that links the cultural sphere with 
decision-making processes. This could be done, for example, by contrasting the 
emotional public debate on science fiction, invasion and spy stories, plays, and 
press campaigns with the viewpoints of naval and military experts. Surprising 
differences are to be found between the expert risk assessments concerning the 
German battle fleet and public scares.34 Just how little public opinion and its lead-
ing voices were mere accelerators and transporters of facts and perceptions but 
were rather independent political players with manifold contacts and their own 
agendas and (immense) political influence has been demonstrated in particular by 
Dominik Geppert’s study of the “press wars” before 1914.35
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The following considerations are based on all this recent research. It builds on 
Sumida’s, Lambert’s, and Hobson’s results and combines them with findings of 
modern media and cultural history to draw attention away from the encounter at 
Cronberg toward the complex domestic background and in that way to provide 
further insight into Britain’s prewar foreign and naval policy.36
“The Committee of Four”
Just before Hardinge and Wilhelm II met at Cronberg, from November 1907 to July 
1908, a special subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) dealt 
extensively with the perceived German naval menace. Historians have tended to 
interpret the convening of this subcommittee as further evidence of how London 
responded to the fourth German Naval Bill of the Reichstag in November 1907.37 
In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth. Archival material confirms that 
the special investigation had been decided on many months before the Naval Bill 
passed in the Reichstag, in response to public outrage and hysteria in the wake of 
the publication in 1906 of William Le Queux’s science-fiction book The Invasion of 
1910.38 As for actual British naval opinion, however, men like Philipp Dumas, Adm. 
Louis Battenberg, and Lord Selborne saw no reason to investigate any further, be-
cause of the “overwhelming superiority” of the Royal Navy.39
At the end of 1906, Archibald Hurd, a freelance naval correspondent, also saw 
“absolutely no danger” coming from Germany.40 Hurd firmly believed that the Brit-
ish position diplomatically as well as navally had never been stronger, with the 
three-power standard (i.e., a Royal Navy stronger than any three possible adver-
saries combined) now in reach. Only days before the subcommittee met, Fisher— 
always described by historians as a notorious enemy of Germany—remarked to the 
king, “England has 7 Dreadnoughts and 3 Invincibles, in my opinion better than 
Dreadnoughts, built and building, while Germany had not begun one!”41
Why then another investigation, when nothing had changed since November 
1905, when, in the aftermath of the Norfolk Commission, Premier Arthur Balfour 
had declared Britain absolutely safe at home and abroad?42 How to deal with public 
scares, during which Balfour had been heavily attacked for a “soporific” attitude?43 
The answer is to be found first and foremost in Britain’s domestic politics, or, to 
be more precise, in the change of government in 1906 that followed the landslide 
Liberal victory in parliamentary elections. Archibald Hurd, John Fisher, and Hugh 
Arnold-Forster, former parliamentary Secretary for the Admiralty and Secretary 
of State for War in the Balfour government, now replaced by that of Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, all concurred that German policies had little, if anything, to 
do with the establishment of the subcommittee. They were in full agreement that 
rather than the sudden emergence of a German threat, “pure party politics stood 
behind the Sub-committee.”44
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The Liberals—in particular, their left-wing majority—had won the elections 
on a ticket of promising social reforms and cutting armament expenditures. Their 
winning slogan had been “Retrenchment and Reforms.” The smaller but more in-
fluential (owing to their dominance of key cabinet positions) Liberal imperialist 
faction around H. H. Asquith and Edward Grey fundamentally disagreed, on the 
basis of their concern for Britain’s international security and social reform. Un-
der such circumstances the traditionally strained relations between the service de-
partments became even worse. From now on, they degenerated into what Charles 
Ardagh as director of military intelligence once called “two rival syndicates” fight-
ing each other for tight budgets.45
The army, trying to improve its damaged reputation after the South African 
War, feared to lose its importance and social function within Britain and the em-
pire. Thus many army officers, backed by the National Service League and the Na-
tional Defence Association, fought for conscription.46 The navy, feeling rather self-
assured, popular, and never short of volunteers, was largely concerned with itself 
and Fisher’s internal reforms. Fisher himself, of course, did not want the money his 
painful structural reforms had just saved to go for social benefits, and certainly not 
for the land forces. For him personally, but certainly also for the navy, a renewed 
investigation into Britain’s security was not only a “waste of time” but a drain on 
scarce administrative resources.47 For Arnold-Forster, therefore, it was only too 
logical to presume that the main driving forces behind the demand for a new de-
bate came from the army camp, even more so because its traditional role had been 
defense of the British coastline.48 
Deeply disappointed in the results of the former investigation under Balfour 
and confronted with an even more pacifist approach by radical liberalism, Lord 
Roberts, Britain’s greatest war hero, and Charles Repington, a former army officer 
and military correspondent of the Times, with the support of the spectacularly rich 
Lord Lovat and Samuel Scott, founded a pressure group, known as the “Committee 
of Four,” that agitated for conscription and a Prussian-like “million-men standard.”49 
“The Nation,” as Repington explained the committee’s slogan at Aldershot, “must 
be a Nation in Arms or perish.”50 Acknowledging that tradition, political constella-
tions, and the fiscal situation militated against an army a million strong, he called 
for a smooth, concerted, well-regulated, and persistent propaganda campaign. The 
Committee of Four won powerful pens to its assistance: John Strachey of the Spec-
tator, himself a hobby soldier and high sheriff of a paramilitary unit in Surrey; 
the notorious anti-German Leo Maxse of the National Review; Arthur Gwynne of 
the Standard; and Cyril Pearson, proprietor of the Daily Express, the Stan dard, the 
Evening Standard, and Morning Herald, as well as the whole Northcliffe Press.51 They 
all agreed with Repington’s and Roberts’s demands: “The Blueprint for reducing the 
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value of the [Royal] Navy, is the bogey of invasion.” The most valued enemy for a 
truly national British army was the glorious Prussian army.52 If the prestige and 
budget of the army were to be increased, the British public had to be persuaded that 
the Royal Navy would no longer be capable of guaranteeing security. As Repington 
predicted to CID member and army reformer Lord Esher, “Until we have put an 
end to all that damned nonsense that is written about sea power, we shall never get 
our national army.”53
Repington was in close contact with the army’s leadership, but motives can also 
be found in his foreign-policy aims. As unofficial mediator in secret Anglo-French 
staff talks that had begun in early 1906, he strove for a foreign political security 
bloc with Paris, and if possible also with Saint Petersburg, to control the destinies of 
international relations. Russia, in contrast to his public utterances on Germany, he 
thought invincible, as he told his friend Colonel Raymond John Marker. Therefore 
he pleaded that the tsarist empire be co-opted and if necessary appeased, together 
with France, until Britain was militarily prepared for the worst or diplomatically safe-
guarded. In the meantime, the German empire served as a perfect bogeyman.54 To 
this end he did not hesitate to distort information. For example, upon learning that 
the French general staff was still working on plans to invade Britain despite the En-
tente Cordiale, he alleged instead that the Germans were doing so.55 In fact, the Kai-
serreich by then had long abandoned all plans to invade the British Isles as completely 
unrealistic.56
With this program Repington and his fellow conspirators stumped the country. 
In countless speeches and articles for the Times, the National Review, and other in-
fluential papers, they pressed the government for army reform and tried everything 
they could to undermine Fisher’s navy.57 Together with Lord Northcliffe and the 
National Service League they promoted and paid for invasion stories, such as Le 
Queux’s Invasion of 1910 or Guy du Maurier’s play An Englishman’s Home (1909), 
and countless others. They did not even bar fabricating sensational “revelations” 
about German spies and arsenals supposedly hidden beneath the streets of Lon-
don.58 Although their revelations were both fictitious and preposterous, the propa-
ganda and modern media manipulation through the tabloids worked.59 It was suffi-
cient simply to make countless unsubstantiated assertions, place them prominently 
in the press, and repeat them ad nauseam.60 Soon “the newspapers of the breakfast 
table, the reviews of the clubs, even the ‘society’ journals teem[ed] with articles of 
more or less interest on naval topics.”61 
Repington’s main forum for his blows against the so-called Blue Water School 
was the Times.62 In March it published a full-page prospective invasion map that it 
encouraged every household to keep for reference. In an influential August 1906 
article, “Moltke and Over-Sea Invasion,” Repington even claimed that the opera-
tion in 1864 of Helmuth von Moltke “the Elder” against the small island of Alsen 
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(or Als), separated from the mainland by the two-hundred-foot-wide Alsenfjord, 
had been a rehearsal for an invasion of the British Isles.63 This charge was meant 
to be a “nasty jar for the Blue Water fanatics. . . . The only way out for them will 
be to declare that Moltke was an ass.”64 What followed was a heated debate lasting 
months, from which “no periodical, great or small,” could escape and that provoked 
further invasion and spy stories.
While Repington lost no opportunity to stir up the people or to influence di-
rectly the Prince of Wales or the Secretary for War, Richard Haldane, to repeat an 
investigation of the German peril, his critics tried to deal with the allegations as 
objectively and coolheadedly as possible. The navy’s advocates preferred reason to 
passion. Arnold-Forster (the CID secretary), George Sydenham Clarke, the naval 
historian David Hannay, Julian Corbett, and Repington’s counterpart at the Times, 
the naval correspondent Richard Thursfield, argued in a very sophisticated man-
ner, referring to weather conditions, water depths, tides, and loading capacities, as 
well as the special naval problems of protecting convoys against torpedoes or sub-
marines and amphibious warfare.65 Although today’s reader would find that they 
succeeded in exposing the “Blue Funk School,” as they called the Committee of 
Four, their contemporary impact was limited.66 Their writings, it seemed, were sim-
ply too difficult for laymen, who were inclined to sensation. In fact, the more the 
“Blue Funk School’s” assertions were objected to, the longer and harder its views 
were discussed and the more supporters it gained.67 Repington rubbed his hands 
and made no secret of his wish that Thursfield and others would voice objections, 
by which he would gain more attention himself.68 
The decisive factor was the emotional appeal, which was not to be offset even 
by subsequent clarification, as can be seen in the cases of Foreign Office officials 
like Eyre Crowe, who were deeply convinced by Repington’s allegations.69 What is 
striking is the passivity of the government. Neither Asquith, Grey, nor Haldane 
dealt with naval or military questions in detail. Even Haldane—who was, after all, 
Secretary for War—apparently saw no reason to calm the public. To the contrary, 
he rather reckoned in terms more of benefits for his military reforms than of the 
reasonableness of the assertions. Among high-ranking politicians, Balfour, who re-
mained the leader of the Conservatives in the Commons, was the only one to rec-
ognize the propaganda coup being achieved by the Committee of Four.70 In general, 
and in contrast to the agitation of the “mischief-makers,” as Clarke called Reping-
ton and Roberts, objective arguments failed to excite the public.71
At the turn of 1906/1907, the debate gained momentum. Fisher and Clarke 
tried everything to contain the “Blue Funk School” and to prevent a further time-
consuming and (in their eyes) useless investigation of the German peril.72 Clarke 
had published his own series of articles, entitled “The Bolt from the Blue School,” 
which Fisher distributed as a sort of memorandum within the Admiralty.73 Fisher 
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also suspected his personal archenemy, Adm. Charles Beresford, of being behind 
the repeated attacks of the Committee of Four. As it turns out, this was not pure 
invention. In fact, Beresford fought Fisher on all fronts and did not stop even at 
treason. On his orders his chief of staff, Frederick Sturdee, provided the Committee 
of Four with secret information on the distribution of the British fleets, as well as 
the strengths and weaknesses of individual units.74 
Fisher strongly believed that all his critics, as well as Charles Hardinge—who, 
he knew, took the scaremongers at their word—were misguided: “The real truth is 
we have enormously increased both our readiness for war and our instant fighting 
strength.” The First Sea Lord even thought it would be safe to abandon the dread-
nought program for the current year: 
Again and this requires to be most prominently and emphatically reiterated, ad nauseam. We 
are not going to be frightened by foreign paper programmes (the bogey of agitators). . . . Our 
present margin of superiority over Germany (our only possible foe for years) is so great as to 
render it absurd in the extreme to talk of anything endangering our naval supremacy, even if 
we stopped all shipbuilding altogether!!!75
If he thought the German empire theoretically a “possible” foe, in practice he 
was sure this was an unrealistic scenario: “For years and years to come it is simply 
impossible for Germany to cope with us single handed and she has no naval ally.”76 
In other words, it was fortunate for the prospects of social reforms that Germany 
and not the rival sea power France was seen as a potential threat, because it meant 
that the British government could have it both ways, saving money and safeguard-
ing British supremacy at sea at the same time.77
According to Nicholas Lambert and Jon Sumida, Fisher always planned Britain’s 
supremacy at sea not only against Germany but against all naval powers. Moreover, 
to enforce his naval reforms he fought on several external and domestic fronts. 
This is why many older interpretations characterizing him primarily as a notorious 
anti-German focused on the High Seas Battle Fleet are somewhat hasty and unduly 
sweeping. Certainly he was full of doubts about the aims of the German navy, and, 
needless to say, from time to time he even had preventive strike in mind. But this 
mind-set affected not only Germany; he expressed similar thoughts about Russia 
and France as well.78 Of far greater importance from a diplomatic point of view was 
the fact that he took great care that Berlin learn of his ideas, so as to discourage it 
from risking any adventures.79 Any combined activity, however—for example, staff 
talks, or a landing operation with France—he strictly refused.80 In this respect, the 
differences between Fisher and Repington, and between Fisher and the new politi-
cal leadership, could not have been greater.81 Again and again he stressed that the 
Royal Navy was fully capable of guaranteeing Britain’s security.82 Of course, these 
assurances were aimed at saving his reform program and the prestige of the navy 
and his own, especially in comparison to the land forces. Nevertheless, the weight 
of security data speaks for itself. The superiority of the Royal Navy undercut the 
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unsustainable allegations of the scaremongers. For months Fisher, Julian Corbett, 
and Captains Ernest Slade and Charles Ottley from the Naval Intelligence branch 
tried everything “to smash the German bogey” and to prevent a further subcommittee 
—to them only a “master piece of funk.”83 Not only would its deliberations stir up 
the people, but its existence alone would certainly undermine the reputation of the 
navy, as the “1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th . . . ad infinitum Line of Defence!”84 Time and 
again they briefed Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty, journalists 
like Arnold White, and the king, as well as the crown prince, that Britain’s position 
was in “every little particular magnificently splendid.”85 
In the end, however, Fisher found himself in a dilemma among public policy, 
the aims of the navy, and Parliament. The more he was attacked, and the more he 
stressed Britain’s strength, the more the radicals demanded retrenchment. “We are 
so strong. It is quite true!” he admitted. But telling the truth could easily mean com-
mitting parliamentary suicide. “The real truth is, we don’t want anyone to know the 
truth.”86 Tirpitz and Wilhelm II would know it anyway, but “we don’t want to parade 
all this, because if so, we shall have parliamentary trouble.” Fisher was referring 
to 150 radical members who had signed “one of the best papers” he had ever read 
calling for a cut in expenditure due to the Royal Navy’s superiority.87 Ironically, the 
pacifist left-wing Liberals understood the real balance of power far better than the 
Liberal imperialists. Against the background of the crushing defeat of Russia at 
Tsushima, Germany was logically regarded as the only remaining potential threat 
but not as the greatest, let alone “unique,” danger. Therefore the Admiralty quite in-
evitably arrived at the “common sense conclusion that the outlying Fleets no longer 
require to be maintained at the strength that was admittedly necessary a year ago 
when France and Russia were our most probable opponents.”88
Conversely, the advocates of conscription and a million-man army used and 
needed the German peril to buttress their case and to justify an entente with former 
imperial rivals. The defense of the empire alone would not suffice to persuade the 
public of the necessity of compulsory service or of a rapprochement with Russian 
autocracy. As Arnold-Forster knew, the very existence of Britain itself had to be 
at stake.89 Nothing else would stir up the people to agree to such a sea change.90 
Repington himself admitted that the supposed German danger was a straw man: 
“The truth is . . . our superiority over Germany is so overwhelming, . . . that the 
Germans know it would be madness for them to provoke war.”91
The German peril, therefore, united army advocates and conscriptionists, sen-
sationalist journalists, writers of science fiction and spy novels, and younger diplo-
mats and politicians, especially from the Liberal imperialist faction. They were in 
favor of a new course of abandoning “splendid isolation” and approaching the old 
rivals France and Russia. George Clarke did not doubt for a second that the main 
reason for the existence of a subcommittee on the German peril was to be found 
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not in Wilhelmshaven, the home base of the German High Seas Battle Fleet, but 
among the “numerous writers in this country endeavouring for some time to create 
a German Scare.”92
The Subcommittee and Julian Corbett’s Expertise 
On 27 November Edward Grey, H. H. Asquith, and Richard Haldane opened the 
inaugural meeting of the subcommittee of the CID, and almost immediately it 
turned into a farce. While the Tory government had worked hand in hand with 
the naval experts in the 1905 investigation and ultimately had tried to calm public 
hysteria, the Liberal imperialist faction now adopted a free-rider position. Instead 
of contributing to the public debate, they simply let rumors about an imminent 
German threat run without restraint. They did not even protest when Fisher him-
self was publicly denounced by Leo Maxse as a “traitor” who ought to be “hung at 
his own yard arm.”93
The reason for the Liberal imperialists’ passivity was twofold. Since 1895—and 
thus before the well-known caesura of the famous Kruger telegram in January 1896 
and the first German Naval Law in 1898—Edward Grey had argued for a global 
alliance with Britain’s most dangerous rivals, Russia and France, and if possible also 
with the United States. He thus aimed at killing not just two but three birds with 
one stone. First, he wanted to relieve the security threat to the empire, particu-
larly on the northwestern frontier in Central Asia; second, he aimed at reducing 
defense budgets in favor of financing social reform; and third, he wanted to con-
trol global international relations in a shared hegemonic manner, without German 
hindrance.94
Germany—Grey was quite clear in this respect—seemed too dependent on Rus-
sia and thus too weak a potential partner to balance Russian aggressiveness.95 A 
major obstacle to this strategy change was the radicals’ refusal to cooperate with the 
Russian autocracy. “Painting the German devil on the wall,” as Cecil Spring-Rice 
and others, especially in the liberal paper The Nation, noted, seemed likely there-
fore to help overcome radical stubbornness on this point.96 One explicit power- 
political result was construction of a double standard concerning Russian and 
German, or Austrian, aggressiveness in the Balkans; the Foreign Office, manifestly 
behaving in a fashion “more Russian, than the Russians” brought international ten-
sion back to the continent.97
During sessions of the CID subcommittee, Lord Esher acted as the prime sup-
porter of the “Blue Funk School.”98 As a typical Edwardian, he was deeply convinced 
of the inevitability of war, sooner or later, though he did not think that it would 
necessarily come in the form of a war against Germany. He even thought the idea 
of a German danger “to be absurd.”99 However, as a military reformer, he saw his 
task as preparation of Britain for the worst. He deemed Germany the perfect enemy 
for propaganda reasons and welcomed any public scare as a useful instrument to 
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make the British people “warlike in spirit.” In other words, he judged that riding 
an anti-German scare was for political and tactical reasons the best thing to do 
and advised Fisher to do the same. For him, clearly, the end justified all means; 
if the German peril helped to prevent the radicals from further retrenchment of 
naval spending, so much the better.100 In October 1907, Esher wrote Fisher, “The 
German peril is a bogey. Granted. But it is a most useful one”—that is, for the army 
and the navy.101 The calming results of the Balfour committee in 1905 had proved 
counterproductive for the martial spirit of the nation; now Esher pleaded for the 
establishment of an organized propaganda machine:102 
If history has any teaching for us, it is that our day of trial must come, and that without 
adequate preparation we cannot avoid the fate of other nations, who have relied upon their 
ancient traditions. . . . We require writers and lecturers, not labelled as paid agents, but with 
an appearance of independence. These men have to be paid. . . . The work is one of convert-
ing the nation to an idea which it is anxious to put aside as long as possible.103
In the Committee of Four—journalists like John Strachey, Leo Maxse, and Louis 
Garvin or novelists like Erskine Childers, Guy du Maurier, and William Le Queux, 
to name but a few—Esher found his “agents” without even paying them. For their 
purposes, real wonders were attributed to the German military machine. Reping-
ton, Roberts, Lovat, and Scott seriously claimed to believe that Germany could se-
cretly load 150,000 soldiers, two hundred field guns, and seven thousand horses in a 
few hours and bring them to British shores, almost unnoticed and at a rate of twenty 
thousand soldiers per hour.104 In view of the general experience of deployment of 
land forces from the sea and the great difficulties the Japanese had encountered 
against Russia in 1905, this was a fantastic assumption.105 This was even more the 
case as the results from the maneuvers at Clacton upon Sea in 1904 spoke against 
it. At Clacton, under ideal conditions and against no resistance, British forces had 
needed at least thirty hours to get only twelve thousand soldiers ashore.106 George 
Clarke, Julian Corbett, and Admirals Slade, Battenberg, and Philip Howard Col omb 
were well aware of the logistic and meteorological obstacles of landing operations.107 
To cross the 360 miles from Hamburg to the British coast a transport needed at least 
thirty hours. Everything in such an enterprise depended on secrecy, but the smoke 
of an invasion convoy (in that era of largely coal-fired ships) would be seen from a 
distance of at least thirty miles and thus would provide ample warning. Moreover, it 
was impossible to confiscate a large merchant fleet secretly—in this case more than 
250,000 tons of shipping—for transport purposes. The loading of such a fleet would 
paralyze several harbors, international trade centers, for days.108
On 12 December 1907, Julian Corbett countered Repington’s assertions before 
the subcommittee. Disappointed at the lack of a worthy intellectual challenge by 
Repington, who seemed to “know less about naval matters, than a sheet of paper,” 
Corbett spread his superior knowledge before the committee.109 Backed by Rear 
Admiral Slade, he rebuked the evidence of the German peril in a most complex 
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manner, referring to all the modern aspects of naval warfare and the difficulties 
of amphibious operations. His verdict was devastating. Repington and his peers 
had neglected any difference between warfare by land and by sea, had evidently 
been not only influenced but misled by Mahan’s popular writings on the eighteenth 
century, and lacked understanding of modern naval conditions. The prospect that 
a whole division could be wiped out by a few torpedo hits would in itself deter any 
enemy from an amphibious operation.110 
How Mahan’s way of thinking dominated Repington and his supporters could 
be seen, Corbett pointed out, in exaggerations in the public debate and by politi-
cians alike on the issues of decisive battle, interior lines, battle fleets, capital ships 
and their tonnages, and command of the sea as the epitome of Britain’s naval su-
premacy. On all these Corbett took a different position: “The task of the great fleets 
is merely to keep the enemy at a distance. To prevent an invasion no battleships, 
but [a] few operating flotillas are crucial. As for the future of naval warfare, it would 
depend mainly on new technologies, such as speed, torpedoes and submarine and 
the advantages in information and communication.” A temporary loss of “com-
mand” did not automatically mean passing it over to the enemy; to the contrary, “in 
three of five major wars at sea,” Corbett reported, “Britain had lost the command 
altogether and still prevailed.” The assumption that Britain’s fate was tied to “com-
mand” ignored the power of the strategic defensive, which had increased at least 
tenfold with the new technological developments. Concerning a possible threat 
by a German navy, Corbett stated, one must not forget Germany’s geographical 
weaknesses. In contrast to Britain’s past enemies, Germany depended in all its na-
val operations on a single small exit, easily blocked; for protection against Germa-
ny “second line forces” were more than enough. Finally, Corbett poked fun at the 
“continental school,” mocking the claim that Germany could control the streets of 
Dover within forty-eight hours: “Splendid. That will end that [i.e., Germany’s fleet]. 
Head in lion’s mouth.”111
Though Corbett’s profound analysis was characterized by Haldane as “one of 
the most important state papers” he had ever seen, it failed to prevent the Liberal 
imperialists from adopting the Committee of Four’s line.112 Since then, and almost 
indiscriminately, many historians have tended to rely for these naval matters on 
statements of diplomats, politicians, journalists, and army officers. Even Repington 
and Roberts have not infrequently been treated as naval experts, for the simple rea-
son that they commented on naval affairs.113 However, historians more often than 
not have neglected to account for the professions of their witnesses or to examine 
their hidden motives and agendas. 
Ironically, naval experts thought the German navy apparently less dangerous 
than their peers from the army did. For both groups, the deep rivalry between the 
two military branches was decisive. At the same time, Corbett and Slade brought 
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forward plausible arguments, pointing to the fundamental differences between na-
val and land forces. Corbett’s complex analysis, which can be only touched on here, 
at least offered a political alternative to the arms race, as well as, for historians, 
to the widespread interpretation of militarism preventing rational politics before 
1914. Among contemporary politicians this alternative had been outlined only by 
Arthur Balfour, who, in contrast to his Liberal successors, had dealt extensively 
with naval and military matters. Therefore he was invited by the subcommittee 
to provide his insights from the first investigation of the German peril in 1905. 
The plenary session was visibly impressed by his statement, “lasting about an hour, 
quite perfect in form and language, and most closely reasoned.” Privately, Esher 
noted in his diary that “not a question [was] put to him. Asquith, Grey, Haldane, 
[Lord] Crewe, [David] Lloyd George. All were equally dumbfounded.”114 
The essence of Balfour’s remarks was that he stuck to his assessment of May 1905. 
British security, he concluded, would be ensured by the Royal Navy, and even the 
most recent inventions would benefit Great Britain more than any other nation.115 
Moreover, Balfour stressed that despite rapprochement with Saint Petersburg, he 
saw Russia as the most dangerous enemy of the empire.116 A German attack, on 
the contrary, he thought quite unlikely and conceivable only if the Germans stood 
with their backs to the wall and feared for their very existence.117 Admiral Slade 
described Balfour’s speech as “most excellent,” as one “in which he summed up 
the whole situation in a most remarkable manner.”118 Esher too could not help but 
underscore Balfour’s “masterly knowledge.”119 Given the overwhelming evidence, 
Esher and Haldane had finally to admit that England had nothing to fear even from 
a Franco-German alliance.120
Conclusion
The rather reassuring facts regarding Britain’s safety and supremacy led neither to 
a relaxation of the Anglo-German antagonism within the political arena nor to a 
naval agreement.121 Again and again, attempts to reach an understanding failed, be 
it before the second disarmament conferences at the Hague;122 in December 1907, 
when Germany, Britain, and France tried to conclude a North Sea Convention;123 
in the spring of 1908, when both Tirpitz and Wilhelm II refused to challenge Brit-
ain’s naval supremacy; or in summer 1908, when Hardinge and Edward VII went 
to Cronberg.124 According to conventional wisdom, it always was “Germany’s re-
fusal to limit shipbuilding, that ‘blocked’ any understanding.”125 As for Cronberg, 
however, where, as Wolfgang Mommsen posits, Wilhelm II supposedly missed “a 
great opportunity” to change the history of the world, at least three things become 
obvious.126 
First, Hardinge’s viewpoint was based on public stereotypes, not on sound in-
telligence; second, he, and even more the Liberal imperialists, totally lacked na-
val expertise; third and above all, there was no pressure on the British side for an 
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understanding with Germany. The allegedly “missed opportunity,” therefore, ap-
pears illusory. As if the CID’s expert testimony and even the reassuring reports of 
his own diplomats in Germany concerning the Kaiserreich’s devastating financial 
problems did not exist, Hardinge asserted that it was a “common notoriety, that 
in three or four years’ time Germany would have more dreadnoughts than Great 
Britain.”127 Thus, on this view, Germany alone was to blame for the worsening of 
Anglo-German relations. Hardinge even conveyed the impression to the kaiser that 
the British coastline stood open to invasion and sold that idea as the official belief 
and fear of the British Admiralty.128 He thus explicitly adopted the propaganda of 
the Committee of Four, which had already been proved wrong. Where a display of 
firm resolution, determination, and confidence might have deterred Wilhelm II, 
Hardinge thus inadvertently promoted the false impression in Berlin that Britain 
would sooner or later give way.
Without question, at Cronberg Wilhelm II once more behaved clumsily and 
foolishly. He even boasted that he had “given it properly” to Hardinge (although 
other witnesses of the interview described it as a “cozy” and “polite” conversa-
tion).129 Nevertheless, whatever the atmosphere of that conversation, for scholarly 
study it remains “one thing to show that Germany blundered and had dangerous 
aims, quite another however to prove that these really caused the outcome, or that, 
had Germany not made them, the overall outcome would have been drastically 
changed.”130 As Christopher Clark has remarked, much historiography “and . . . 
popular present day awareness” has been marked by a “perplexing tendency” to 
“accept implicitly the notion that British colonial expansion and British percep-
tions of British rights constituted a natural order, in the light of which German 
objections appeared to be wanton provocations.”131 
In any case, consideration of the domestic side of British foreign and naval affairs 
and the context of Britain’s parliamentary system seems to be a desideratum even 
today. Whereas the domestic side of the Kaiserreich has been well researched and 
in great detail, we still know surprisingly little about Edwardian Britain as concerns 
interservice rivalry, party politics, and, equally important, the media as power- 
political actors with an agenda of their own—but no responsibility. As concerns 
the construction of the German fleet, we have shown that there was neither any-
thing revolutionary about the building of a German battle fleet nor any inevitability 
of German action and British response. On one hand, this is because Germany’s 
navalism mainly followed the pattern of naval expansion by all the great powers. 
On the other hand, Britain’s Liberal leadership knew that German naval armament 
did not constitute an existential threat to British security—or at least it could have 
known, had it taken advantage of service expertise as Balfour had done before—
and it could have communicated the experts’ advice to calm the public.
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Against this background, the change of government in 1906 and the genera-
tional change within the Foreign Office appear with particular importance. The 
new diplomatic elite around Charles Hardinge, Arthur Nicolson, and Eyre Crowe 
no longer had the same relaxed attitude toward Germany that Thomas Sanderson 
or Frank Lascelles had taken; at the same time, the political leaders of the Liberal 
imperialists also had a different outlook from what the left-wing radicals or their 
conservative predecessors had. All in all, it can be said that diplomatic action was 
driven more by domestic and partisan interests than has hitherto been accepted 
and the reasons for the failure of détente politics were far more complex. 
Foreign and defense issues have to be taken into account, as well as the tradi-
tional rivalry of the service departments, the press as a political player in itself, 
and the rather complicated situation in partisan relations, especially as concerns 
radicalism and imperial liberalism. Not without reason did the left-wing periodical 
The Nation suspect partisan interests behind the anti-German hysteria, calling it 
the “great Grey bogey.” Not only journalists like James Garvin confirmed this straw 
man but also diplomats like Cecil Spring-Rice, Arthur Nicolson, and even Edward 
Grey himself, who repeatedly spoke of an imminent German danger.132 Therefore it 
seems that the magazine had more than adequate grounds for its eloquent conclu-
sion that “it is the writers, not the sailors, who have largely poisoned the Anglo-
German situation.”133
A new concentration on the domestic side and the public sphere in Britain 
would raise many new questions. For example, does Corbett’s rather relaxed inter-
pretation of the “command of the sea” and his precise analysis according to which 
Britain had nothing to fear even from a Franco-German alliance, and in fact en-
joyed a superior defensive position, mean that an important alternative for Britain’s 
crisis management in 1914 existed? Perhaps in these years the dominance of poli-
tics over the military or naval experts—usually seen as Britain’s particular advan-
tage in contrast to the continental powers—proved disadvantageous.
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There is no question whatever that the first desideratum in every type of fight-
ing vessel is speed. It is the weather gauge of the olden days. You then fight just 
when it suits you best. Some people don’t want it for Battleships, but they are 
wrong, because both strategy and tactics demand speed.
SIR JOHN FISHER, NAVAL NECESSITIES, 14 MAY 1904
We build mighty vessels at gigantic cost, which are obsolete almost before they 
leave the stocks, even if we can be sure, as we cannot always be, that they will 
float when they get to sea.
TIMES (LONDON), 31 AUGUST 1877
[W]hat probable advantage does a fleet obtain by arriving ten days sooner, if it 
must get behind batteries on coming of an opponent who has preferred offensive 
power to speed?
CAPT. ALFRED T. MAHAN, USN,  
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1906 
IVII
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IVII Differing Values? 
The Balance between Speed, Endurance, Firepower, and Protection 
in the Design of British and American Dreadnoughts
ANGUS ROSS
By the turn of the twentieth century, the larger navies of the world, all of which were in Europe, were facing an unprecedented dilemma. The main component of sea power, the battleship, was becoming increasingly costly to 
develop and maintain, with a seemingly exponential rise in the size and complex-
ity of each successive generation. As a consequence, these intricate machines were 
becoming far more dependent on dockyard resources and logistical support than 
ever before, the major costs being the large crews and the regular dockings required 
to keep their steel hulls and fittings in good condition. To make matters worse, the 
prevailing “Mahanian” naval doctrine of the day held that these ships should be 
kept together as a concentrated fleet, because it was the combined power of the 
whole fleet that maximized the probability of success in a decisive battle and there-
fore produced the deterrent value that was so prized by statesmen.1 The combina-
tion of these three factors led to a marked reluctance by most powers either to split 
their fleets or to allow them to stray too far from the likely field of battle, which in 
the British case, if history was anything to go by, would be in either the approaches 
to the English Channel or the Mediterranean. 
At the same time, however, the mercantile nature of the industrial age and its as-
sociated “scramble” for resources and possessions overseas had created an increas-
ing demand for naval imperial policing and diplomacy duties abroad. Support and 
defense of overseas possessions, not to mention the commerce that plied between 
them, were ill matched to the idea of battleship predominance. In fact, and as John 
Beeler has described, prior to the advent of the Royal Sovereign class in the 1890s, a 
true oceangoing capital ship was simply not feasible from a technological point of 
view, even assuming that sufficient funds were available.2 This constraint brought 
about an additional need for whole classes of “cruising ironclads”—or “cruisers,” as 
they became known—an essentially new type but one whose speed and endurance 
also put it in demand as a scouting vessel for the battle fleet. Essentially, these were 
the successors to the numerous frigates of Napoleonic times. Considerably cheaper 
at the outset than capital ships, these vessels were destined to grow in complexity 
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and size as their utility became evident. These classes would also be “over and 
above” any continuing need to meet obligations with regard to battle fleets. 
To offset the resultant fiscal pressures, there was a natural tendency to use ships 
of older, less sophisticated classes on the imperial beat as “station” cruisers. This fol-
lowed the rationale that a cruiser, obsolescent for a scouting commission in a fleet 
pitted against first-class European opposition, could still serve with credit abroad, 
where the likelihood of encountering sophisticated opponents was considerably 
reduced. For a while this policy worked well, but with the advent of faster, long-
range armored cruisers developed by France in the 1890s specifically for distant-
waters operations, the days of a ship living out its twilight years in glorious isola-
tion abroad looked to be numbered.3 Unfortunately too, for many of the colonialist 
nations, sharp growth in imperial responsibilities had led to many scores of these 
vessels being so employed, and the prospect of being forced to replace them all in 
short order with first-rate armored cruisers was daunting. This development more 
than any other had led to the massively increased financial draw on naval budgets 
and all the attendant political scrutiny that followed. 
In the case of Great Britain, with the world’s largest navy, there were some ad-
ditional slants on this problem. On the plus side, it had an unrivaled network of 
coaling stations and dockyards all around the world upon which it could draw. This 
gave it a degree of confidence in operations abroad that would have been difficult 
for an opponent to match. In terms of ship design, this network meant that the 
Royal Navy was less tied than other fleets to the constraints arising from building 
endurance and self-sufficiency into its warships. The downside, however, was that 
the sheer volume of the Royal Navy’s worldwide commitments was increasing at 
the fastest rate of any first-rate navy, and hence the problem of wholesale modern-
ization at increasingly frequent intervals was grossly exacerbated in its case. The 
historian Jon Sumida has eloquently captured the scale of the difficulties it faced 
by noting that the costs of running the Royal Navy increased 65 percent in the 
seven-year period from 1889 to 1896, while in the following seven-year period, 
from 1897–1904, the unit costs of capital ships doubled.4 Similarly, in each of the 
same two periods the costs of first-class cruisers quadrupled and those of dockyard 
facilities quintupled. Perhaps worse still, these statistics implied that to remain on 
the cutting edge, the entire battle fleet and the overseas cruiser complements of 
the Royal Navy effectively needed to be replaced every seven years. Small wonder 
that the chancellor of the exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, insisted to the cabinet 
in April 1904 that “however reluctant we may be to face the fact, the time has come 
when we must frankly admit that the financial resources of the United Kingdom 
are inadequate to do all that we should desire in the matter of Imperial defence.”5 
The First Sea Lord of the day, Adm. Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, had been thinking 
about these difficulties for many years.6 A fervent navalist with a strong sense of 
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patriotic duty, he differed from most of his naval colleagues in that he realized early 
on that the economies being demanded by the nation’s political leadership were 
necessary for the nation’s continuing health.7 In short, if maritime primacy was to 
be preserved, the only responsible way was to achieve these savings by adopting 
a radically different vision of future naval warfare—a vision he believed advances 
in technology were on the verge of delivering. Specifically, Fisher questioned the 
continuing soundness of all the accepted naval missions. Whether operating de-
fensively or offensively as a blockading force, the battle fleet looked to be increas-
ingly threatened in coastal waters by the torpedo, while, as discussed, the station 
cruiser and commerce protector abroad were similarly under threat from the sheer 
speed and operational agility of modern armored-cruiser squadrons. Worse still, 
however, was Britain’s manpower and training situation—because of the growth in 
the number of older cruisers scattered around the world, a large percentage of the 
navy’s crews were committed abroad on stations where they could learn little about 
the techniques and drills associated with modern warfare, or anything of fleet ma-
neuvers. To Fisher this was an unforgivable waste in an era where naval warfare 
was increasingly characterized by extreme suddenness.8 He believed that the Royal 
Navy simply could not afford to keep such a high percentage of its human capital 
essentially “untrained” in the art of modern naval warfare; besides, he needed these 
men at home to man the revolutionary new fleet he was about to develop.
For Fisher was working on a truly comprehensive reform program for the Royal 
Navy that sought to prepare it for the new era. Underpinning these reforms was 
the idea that Great Britain could no longer afford to provide a dedicated platform 
type for each of its naval missions, nor was doing so necessarily sound tactically. 
The speed and endurance of modern ships were opening the door to more versatile 
types. Furthermore, by the judicious use of the new technology and better training, 
he believed, it was possible to change radically the way in which these missions 
were addressed and still provide the savings demanded by the Treasury.9 
In facing these same difficulties, the United States entered with an entirely dif-
ferent perspective. For one thing, it possessed a much smaller navy, well behind 
those of the “big four” European powers, and it lacked the worldwide resources that 
allowed the British effectively to give things like endurance and reliability lower 
priority in their warships. For America, the key was building influence in propor-
tion to its steadily increasing status as a world power, and that meant battleships. 
But these battleships had to be affordable, preferably numerous, and, above all, able 
to support themselves overseas. Although the United States did not have world-
wide naval responsibilities of anything like the scope of Britain’s, its battle fleets 
were likely, thanks to quirks of geography and the sheer size of the Pacific Ocean, 
to have huge distances to travel to their operating areas.10 The formula in the case 
of the United States, therefore, was subtly different—yes, there were concerns over 
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increasing naval expenditure, but the development of its fleet had been effectively 
expansive from the start, and the issue was simply the management of a rate of 
naval expansion appropriate for the nation’s continuing fiscal health. Unburdened 
by rampant imperial expenditures or cruiser complications faced by their British 
counterparts, American naval planners also had the luxury of looking at the capital- 
ship problem in much more depth. 
Conventional wisdom has encapsulated these differences in the following way. 
The U.S. Navy, with its primarily defensive outlook, built its battle fleet to a fairly 
conservative pattern, to be employed in the defense of American interests primarily 
in the West Indies and the Atlantic but also to be sent across the Pacific in defense 
of the Philippines. The result was a slow transition into the dreadnought era, a tran-
sition during which numbers, overall firepower, armored protection of the main 
battery, and reliability and endurance of the propulsion plant remained the primary 
drivers in ship design. Implicit here is the belief among the Americans that they did 
not really need to think “outside the box.” This was in stark contrast to the situa-
tion in Great Britain, where increasing global responsibilities and the simultaneous 
need for savings encouraged enormous innovation in the fields of propulsion and 
tactics and gave the ascendancy to fast, turbine-driven capital ships armed with 
large guns and novel fire-control systems.
As a result historians have dismissed the American dreadnought debate as rather 
inconsequential: the Americans were slow into the game, did not understand the 
dynamics of running a first-class navy, were hampered by overly influential tech-
nical bureaus, or perhaps all three. Such opinions might seem logical interpreta-
tions were it not for the fact that in almost every case the U.S. Navy’s operators, 
engineers, and naval architects debated and discussed the very same innovations 
as their counterparts across the Atlantic and in parallel with them. That they sub-
sequently came to such different conclusions with regard to U.S. naval needs is 
therefore significant and worthy of comparative analysis. The aim of this paper is 
to examine the American decision making here more closely, looking for crucial 
differences in emphasis. In the interests of brevity, the survey of the British debate 
will generally assume knowledge of the extensive and mature scholarship available, 
elaborating only the appropriate high points.
The Fisher Revolution: Speed and Lethality in All Things
The British story is dominated by three factors, essentially interlinked. Absolutely 
paramount was the need to make economies in the running of the Royal Navy; this 
was nonnegotiable. As has already been mentioned, the chief instigator of the re-
forming movement, Admiral Fisher, saw that speed, or more specifically improved 
responsiveness, was the key to gaining greater utility from his major units. In es-
sence, by building a type of capital ship that was faster and had longer legs, he 
hoped that he could effectively replace both the large ships of the battle line and the 
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numerous station cruisers with power-projection platforms of a single class, able 
to be dispatched at will to trouble spots around the world. The advantages would 
be a smaller number of more-powerful ships, crewed by, overall, fewer but better-
trained personnel. In other words, he was aiming for a more multipurpose core 
for the Navy, a more efficient way of using his resources. Of course, a lot of other 
things had to fall into place—capable submarines for flotilla defense at home and 
the wireless communications necessary to direct these ships, to name but two—but 
it is important to grasp at the outset the sheer audacity of the idea. It was basically 
a complete reversal of the Mahanian concentration edict in response to new needs 
brought on by a changing, industrial-age naval situation.
Besides savings and speed, the next obvious quality needed was lethality. These 
new ships would have to deal with all comers in distant waters, even if that meant 
avoiding battle until the circumstances could be made favorable. There was no 
point in dispatching them, otherwise. Obviously speed was important, but an abil-
ity to engage and destroy an enemy at a range at which he would be unable to reply, 
or even threaten, was the other, vital part of the scheme. Only then could armor 
protection be reduced enough to make the desired speeds possible in a reasonably 
sized hull. To achieve this lethality therefore, the most powerful, long-range gun 
possible was needed, but not only this. There also had to be an associated fire-
control system to control these guns, so that effective hits could be made at extreme 
ranges. Fisher, with his knowledge of the gunnery world and his close association 
with inventors like Arthur Pollen, was confident that such a capability was an im-
minent probability in 1904.11 It also explains his desire for a uniform-caliber, all-
big-gun configuration. After all, if the tactics were based on engaging the enemy at 
extreme range, what was the point of a mixed battery, the bulk of which would be 
useless at such ranges? Besides, to save manpower and weight, the calibers had to 
be consolidated; there really was no other option. Thus, the key points here are that 
the British revolution was essentially driven by three main factors: savings, speed 
(reactivity), and lethality—in that order. This is stressed because, as we shall see, 
the situation was very different on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Although Fisher had long been outspoken on the subjects of speed and gun-
nery efficiency, it was the intricate combination of all these factors as a coherent 
whole, backed up by all the necessary material and managerial reforms, that was 
so stunning about the package presented to the Admiralty Board in October 1904. 
At a stroke, it made more sense of the manpower and officer-training adjustments 
that had already been started. Many would deplore the manner of its release as 
theatrics, and indeed there was a clear desire to shock and make an impact; nev-
ertheless, there was also a hard, businesslike practicality involved that needs to be 
understood. For one thing, the interconnected nature of the reforms required that 
the package be implemented as a whole; to release individual measures piecemeal 
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would have risked incoherence and worse. Second, Fisher clearly understood that 
he needed to be in a position of supreme power in the service before he could risk 
disclosure of his aims. Only in that way could he hope to control matters so as to 
ensure their safe passage. As he himself put it, “The new great scheme of reform 
which will emerge from the Admiralty like Minerva from the brain of Jupiter, full 
grown and armed against all objectors! Napoleonic in its audacity, Cromwellian in 
its thoroughness!”12 
All these points made the Royal Navy’s experience very different from the 
equivalent situation in America. Since the U.S. Navy was not facing such draconian 
economies as had necessitated the British comprehensive reforms, its naval hierar-
chy was able to devote far more attention to the minutiae of the capital-ship issue. 
Second, there was no position of supreme power in the naval hierarchy equivalent 
to that of the First Sea Lord. By design, that power was effectively shared by boards 
of experts in the technical bureaus, the Naval War College (which put forward and 
evaluated operational suggestions), and the senior officers on the General Board 
(who brought things together for the good of the Navy as a whole). Although Ad-
miral of the Navy (as he was styled in honor of his 1898 victory at Manila Bay) 
George Dewey might have had great influence within some quarters of the govern-
ment, it would have been inconceivable for him to have enjoyed the sort of indi-
vidual and direct influence that Fisher expected (and achieved) over the design and 
building of warships.13
Indeed, the responsibilities of the First Sea Lord, only recently upgraded, at 
Fisher’s insistence, by an order in council dated 10 August 1904, were a matter of 
controversy even within the Royal Navy. Specifically, the distribution of business 
within the Admiralty Board had been altered to give the First Sea Lord broad re-
sponsibilities for the “Preparation for War; all large questions of Naval Policy” and, 
second, “the Fighting and Sea-going Efficiency of the Fleet, to include the Distri-
bution and Movements of all Ships in Commission.”14 Many of Fisher’s opponents 
resented this as a brazen grab for power, arguing, not without reason, that the loose 
wording here effectively sidelined the well-proven Admiralty Board system. As 
Reginald Custance put it, “This is an entirely new departure, which virtually makes 
him supreme over all his colleagues, since those words cover everything.”15 In most 
cases, it was the abrasive and aggressive techniques that Fisher used to get things 
done that caused the backlash, almost more than his actions themselves. In the case 
of the fast, all-big-gun battleship, for example, opinions had already been polarized 
by earlier reforms in naval personnel and the Admiralty Board, to the extent that 
it was now difficult for any subsequent idea to be judged solely on its own merits. 
This has to be continually borne in mind when comparing the Fisher era in Great 
Britain with what was going on in other nations’ navies. 
Another factor that is pertinent while reading Fisher is the fact that his flam-
boyant and combative style tended to get the better of him on occasions. This led 
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him to some notable inconsistencies on even major issues where clarity should 
have been at a premium. For example, on the merits of the battleship, at one point 
he seems to be advocating their complete replacement by his “super cruisers” and 
submarines, blustering that 
the Battleship of olden days was necessary because it was the one and only vessel that noth-
ing could sink except another battleship. Now, every battleship is open to attack by fast 
torpedo craft and submarines. . . . ALL THIS HAS BEEN ABSOLUTELY ALTERED! . . . The 
battlefleet is no protection to anything or any operation during dark hours and, in certain 
waters is no protection in daytime, because of the submarine. Hence what is the use of 
Battleships as we have hitherto known them? NONE!16
It is therefore surprising that elsewhere in the very same document he insists that 
the “Battleship of 21 knots,” along with his cruisers, was one of the four “essential” 
vessels of the modern navy, whose building program in turn should be “absolutely 
restricted” to these four types.17 Why, given that his “super cruisers” were also to be 
built, did Fisher allow this compromise? Hints only come later, with the question, 
“Hence the history and the justification of the type of new battleship now pro-
posed: for what else is it but a glorified armored cruiser?”18 The full truth, however, 
requires some more detailed research, through which it is revealed that what Fisher 
really wanted was to combine the two types over time to produce a “fusion type,” or 
in modern parlance, a fast battleship.19 
Similarly, on the subject of the ideal gun he seems to vacillate between the mer-
its of the rate of fire of the medium-sized, quick-firing battery and the destructive 
power of the big gun. As late as 1902, for example, he is still extolling the virtues of 
the rate of fire of the battery as a whole, as compared with the destructive power 
of larger calibers: “The armament we require is the greatest number of the largest 
quick firing guns. . . . [T]hey call it secondary armament; it is really the primary 
armament!”20 Only a couple of years later, however, he takes an entirely contrary 
view: “To make good shooting at 6,000 yards and above, the guns must be fired 
slowly and deliberately. Hence the use of a large number of guns disappears, and 
the advantage of a few well-aimed guns with a large bursting charge is overwhelm-
ing.”21 Admittedly, ongoing developments in gunnery were changing the percep-
tions of a great many at the time, but this sort of thing is nonetheless confusing. The 
point to these examples is that to clarify things it is always worth trying to detect 
the longer-term trends beneath Fisher’s rhetoric or, better still, seeking corrobora-
tive evidence from some of the many experts he consulted, in order.
Since the British debate effectively begins with the release of Fisher’s “scheme” 
on his appointment as First Sea Lord in 1904, it is worth examining this source doc-
ument in some detail.22 On the subject of the first factor, savings, he was unequivo-
cal: “The British Empire floats on the Navy! So we must have no doubt whatever 
about its fighting efficiency and its instant readiness for war! To ensure this and at 
the same time to effect the economy which the finances of the country render impera-
tive there must be drastic changes!”23 Fisher had been explicitly chosen as First Sea 
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Lord for his ideas about how money could be saved, so the only arguments were 
about his chosen methodologies for doing so. In short, as already noted, he saw the 
multitudes of obsolete vessels then being used around the empire on detached du-
ties as a colossal waste of manpower and resources. These ships were unfit for fight-
ing and too slow to escape: “a single armored cruiser would overtake and gobble 
them up one after the other.”24 The real calamity, though, was “the deterioration of 
the officers and men who serve in these isolated vessels.”25 In proposing to with-
draw and scrap these vessels Fisher looked forward to releasing a large reserve of 
manpower for his nucleus crews and first-rate vessels—manpower that could then 
be trained and kept current with the ways of the modern fleet. Reducing the overall 
manpower required was also a key part of his savings strategy. 
The main objections were predictable—not so much concern on the part of the 
Admiralty at seeing its budget trimmed but fearfulness of the impact that a reduc-
tion in the overall number of hulls might have on British influence abroad. As this 
matter has a bearing on the argument used against proposals for a smaller number 
of larger battleships in the United States, it is worth examining the logic involved. 
For example, and in the same letter of protest quoted earlier, Custance made the 
point that many ships of types that would be considered “old” under Fisher’s crite-
ria had in fact given useful service to both sides in the recent Russo-Japanese War; 
furthermore, he argued, there was a whole range of secondary tasks in wartime 
to which such ships would be ideally suited, tasks that these reforms seemed to 
overlook.26 Implicit within this criticism was an imputation that the Admiralty was 
out of touch: “This is undoubtedly due to neglect of the study of war and to attach-
ing too much importance to materiel.”27 Custance reiterated the same objections a 
month later in more detail, reinforcing his arguments with the not-unreasonable 
point that since the newer armored cruisers were becoming so valuable in the over-
all naval strength, there would likely be a marked reluctance to allow them to fulfill 
the tawdry, if vital, tasks of the detached cruisers overseas.28 This was an argument 
that Fisher stubbornly refused to answer, insisting instead on the potential efficien-
cies of the nucleus-crew system should war come.29 
In an even more serious objection, Sir William White, a previous Constructor in 
Chief of the Navy and the architect of the first truly modern battleship, questioned 
the details of Fisher’s assumptions about savings.30 White’s objection hit hard at 
the basis of Fisher’s reforms, asserting that savings of the magnitude claimed were 
in fact possible only through accompanying measures that actually reduced the 
maintenance and support of the fleet and by taking which Fisher would be guilty, 
no matter what was claimed, of effectively “hollowing-out” the Royal Navy’s overall 
resilience.31 Furthermore, he pointed out that Fisher, as a longtime member of the 
Admiralty Board, was as guilty of waste as anyone, having been a willing party to 
refits and other expenditures on the very vessels that were now being discarded and 
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that now he apparently so vehemently derided as wasteful.32 Finally, he claimed, 
the low figures Fisher had cited for the Dreadnought estimates had in fact been ob-
tained by subterfuge—by the deliberate ordering of subassemblies in prior years as 
a way of concealing the true costs.33 White’s main point, however, was less personal 
and amounted to opposition to the dropping of the time-honored British strategy 
of “laissez faire” shipbuilding—that is, letting your opponent suffer the uncertain-
ties of innovation while you bide your time, confident in your overall ability to 
“outbuild” quickly any innovation that looks promising.34 There is no record of a 
specific response to these charges, but there is little doubt that they greatly reso-
nated among Fisher’s critics.
Finally, and as a way of firmly tying together the debates on the two sides of the 
Atlantic, mention must be made of Captain Mahan’s influential reflections on the 
Russo-Japanese naval events.35 Among his many points, Mahan came out strongly 
against the tendency toward larger and more-complex battleships, arguing, like 
many of his counterparts in Britain, that this “is . . . a mistake; for it means one of 
two things: fewer ships, or a larger national budget.”36 Since the latter was not an 
option, the inference to be drawn was obvious. Mahan goes on to explain that to 
afford the latest designs, nations are forced to “prematurely relegat[e] to the dump 
vessels good in themselves, but unable to keep up with the ones last built. . . . This 
wilful premature antiquating of good vessels is a growing and wanton evil.”37 Since 
this charge was aimed squarely at the heart of Fisher’s savings strategy and came 
from such a respected figure in naval circles, it was bound to enliven the debate. 
Lord Brassey, arguing in the Times from a similar standpoint, added yet another 
slant by reminding his readers of the inevitable risk of packing too much capability 
in a decreasing number of ships—that should one become disabled, its loss would 
be proportionately higher in terms of overall fleet capability.38 (While correct in 
principle, this argument does not, of course, address how far the opposite “larger 
number, less capable” idea ought to be taken and what the risks of that might be.) 
Fisher was dismissive but maddeningly vague in his own defense.39 
On the question of speed, the British debate became particularly acrimonious. 
Fisher, of course, was unequivocal. In his original proposals he advocates high 
speed for every type of fighting vessel, explaining that “strategy demands it—so 
as to get the deciding factor quickest to the decisive point; and tactics demands 
it, to afford choice of range at which action is to be fought.”40 For Fisher, it was all 
about providing more options. If you were faster, you could dictate the course of 
the action to suit your own particular capabilities. The slower fleet simply did not 
have this opportunity. There were, of course, other considerations—specifically, 
what should be sacrificed to gain this speed advantage. While Fisher was apt to 
dismiss this problem rather cavalierly, going so far as to advocate unarmored ships 
if necessary, a more considered position was put forward in a War Course lecture 
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by one of his “experts,” Capt. E. J. W. Slade.41 Slade made the point that each naval 
situation must be viewed on its own merits to come to the right decisions. Strong 
and slow ships were likely to be “overkill” if their strength were out of proportion 
to the threat that could be brought against them and nugatory if the enemy could 
evade them. Similarly, fast but weak ships were of no use against a powerful en-
emy. Speed therefore should not be bought at the expense of fighting strength but 
through the improvement of material and design, even if this were more costly.42 In 
essence Slade was explaining that the country had no choice but to afford ships of 
the Dreadnought and Invincible classes, because they represented the best compro-
mise that naval science had yet come up with to deal with Britain’s naval situation.
The opponents of large fast ships, however, argued that the price was indeed 
too high, that too many smaller vessels were being sacrificed to produce the new 
generation. Custance went farther, refuting the tactical advantages of speed and 
claiming that it was only an advantage in that it gave its possessor the option of 
running away.43 How much of this was intended as a personal slight against Fish-
er it is difficult to tell, because a seasoned sailor of his stature could hardly have 
failed to acknowledge some advantages. Custance later rethought his position, then 
claiming that since Fisher’s battle cruisers were too powerful to be detached, they 
basically represented battleships in which fighting strength had been sacrificed to 
speed.44 This turned out to be prophetic, although Fisher’s supporters would argue 
that under such circumstances the battle cruiser would be misemployed. What was 
clear, however, was that a possible ambiguity of the concentration doctrine as it 
might apply to these powerful new vessels existed and needed clarification. Finally, 
and after some analysis of the recent battle of Tsushima, Custance further refined 
his view that the battle cruisers were too much of a compromise and introduced 
the idea that ships should be armed to fight at all ranges. Speed, after all, was never 
a weapon, and the aim should always be to endow a fleet with superior offensive 
power.45 In this last point Custance basically talked past the Fisher camp, which 
would likely have agreed with him on the question of offensive power, pointing out 
that all along it had actually advocated speed and offensive power in equal measure. 
Mahan took a rather different stance. While endorsing the view that fighting 
power was paramount, he also contended that since battleships were designed to 
work together as fleets, the value of faster individual ships was somewhat academic, 
since their speed would have to be reduced to that of the slowest in the line.46 Ac-
cordingly, there should be no undue effort to make accommodations for greater 
speed. Although reasonable at first glance, this is a strangely misleading position, 
since on literal extrapolation it is clear that there could never be any naval progress 
at all if the qualities of the previous generation were always to be taken as given. 
How would advances ever be made unless successive generations began to move in 
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the right directions? That this problem was vexing to the British is illustrated by the 
fact that no less an authority than Brassey saw fit to devote an entire chapter of his 
1906 annual to a discussion of both positions.47
Extraordinarily, though, at no time did anyone question the type of propulsion 
needed to gain this extra speed. It would appear that, by the time Fisher’s design 
committee met, another group had already considered the results of the compara-
tive trials between HMS Amethyst and HMS Topaze and had all but recommended 
that all future Royal Navy warships be turbine powered.48 The full trials report has 
yet to be located, but an extract reproduced in a contemporary periodical reveals 
that at ten knots the reciprocating plant was the more economical, while at twenty 
the reverse was true; the crossover point appeared to be about fourteen knots.49 
On the basis of this finding and the facts that a turbine installation was smaller, 
smoother running, easier to maintain and operate, and less prone to failure, the 
committee reported that for wartime use the turbine plant was likely to be superior. 
Certainly by 1905 Fisher, along with the director of naval construction and the en-
gineer in chief, seemed completely convinced, mainly on account of the weight and 
manpower that would be saved, although they had reservations about the plant’s 
maneuvering abilities, particularly when operating astern.50 The perceived superi-
orities had also been endorsed by some remarks from the director of naval intel-
ligence and a further evaluation visit to the turbine steamer Queen.51
The other part of the speed equation—the impact that high-speed, powerful 
turbines might have on the endurance and radius of action of battleships—played 
no significant part in the discussion either, but it would be wrong to say that endur-
ance did not feature in the deliberations or that the British built their ships primar-
ily for the short ranges of the European theater.52 Fisher, after all, had designed his 
ships to travel over great distances at high speed to bring decisive naval power to 
bear anywhere in the world. The advantage he had was the most extensive coaling-
station network in the world, support that no other naval planner could take for 
granted. As a result, endurance took a position of lesser prominence than reactiv-
ity. This priority, as well as the desire to save on operating costs by a reduction in 
engine-room crews, greatly strengthened the case for turbines in Britain. 
Julian Corbett, however, added another twist to the argument, one that, given 
his unique perspective and access to Fisher, may be the most accurate.53 Recogniz-
ing the dilemma above, Corbett invited his readers to consider the impact that 
British moves might have on potential opponents. 
By a policy of high speed we involve them in a strategical dilemma. They must either 
increase their speed so as to equal us in the vital area of our home waters, and so render our 
Imperial defense easy by reducing their Radius of action; or they must sacrifice their posi-
tion at home and contend with us in the oceanic areas, where we are particularly strong in 
coal supply, and able thereby to neutralize their assumed superiority in radius of action.54
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The implication here is obvious: by utilizing their superior strategic position, the 
British could force any potential competitors to make choices that were unfavor-
able to their own programs—provided, of course, that Britain was able to maintain 
its shipbuilding advantages. 
The third factor, that of the right combination of guns on these ships, was almost 
as contentious as speed. As already explained, Fisher was inconsistent here; in fact, 
there is evidence that he had long vacillated between the need for true armored 
cruisers, specialized for long-range commerce raiding and speed of response, on 
one hand, and an all-medium-caliber battleship, on the other.55 This latter type of 
vessel was one in which a speed advantage would be generated by reductions in the 
main armament, on the assumption that it was the powerful, secondary battery of 
quick-firers that really counted. Prior to developments in gunnery and armor that 
improved the prospects for heavy guns, such a ship seemed a viable compromise. 
Employing a more numerous quick-firing battery in lieu of the slow-firing main 
armament of the battleship would save weight that could be translated directly into 
more speed or better protection.56 The problem, after all, with the traditional battle-
ship was that its very slow rate of fire from its few large guns made it vital that 
every shot count—something that was simply not possible at the time. In contrast, 
the strengths of the medium-caliber battleship or armored cruiser were tied to the 
“shredding effects” possible with their preponderance of quick-firing guns. These 
guns had a vastly superior rate of fire, which happily also made them more accurate 
to aim and hence, potentially more likely to hit the enemy.57 Best of all, though, this 
could likely be achieved without any real advances in gunnery techniques being 
necessary.
Given that the medium-caliber battleship could be expected to enjoy at least 
a small advantage in speed and handiness over a conventional predreadnought, 
coupling this with the rate-of-fire advantage might offer possibilities. In Fisher’s 
mind, it might have enabled these vessels, even with only a slim margin of speed, to 
dictate the pace of the engagement. At the same time, the fact that such ships were 
less expensive and handier might enable them to be built in sufficient numbers to 
undertake some imperial duties as well. They would certainly be quite sufficient 
to overcome all but the fastest armored cruisers afloat. Thus, although different in 
origins, both the large armored cruiser and this sort of battleship actually offered 
similar strategic advantages. 
By 1905, however, the calculus had changed completely. In the face of the de-
pressing fact that medium-caliber guns were simply not strong enough to penetrate 
battleship armor at the longer battle ranges expected, attention had returned to the 
heavy gun and the rationale for a medium-caliber battleship had fallen away. If the 
heavy gun could be made superior on all counts (accuracy, hitting power, and rate 
of fire), it would probably be a logical extrapolation of Fisher’s ideas to merge the 
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versatility (and savings potential) of a uniform-caliber platform with the hitting 
power of the heavy gun.58 All Fisher would need was a reasonable assurance from 
his colleagues that no insuperable obstacles existed to the solution of the problems 
of accuracy and rate of fire for the heavy gun, an assurance that seems to have been 
provided by his design committee at the time.59 This confidence probably explains 
his uncharacteristically clear stipulations in Naval Necessities. On the uniform- 
caliber idea he cites the advantages of a smaller quantity of a single type of ammu-
nition and the need to stock spare parts and equipment (not to mention the man-
power and training savings) for only a single type of gun.60 As for the rationale for 
the heavy gun, it seems to have been that to hit at long range, a slow and deliberate 
fire was necessary, which was by nature better suited to the heavy battery, provided 
sufficient guns could be carried.61 Suddenly the uniform-caliber all-big-gun ship 
looked the obvious candidate.
Although Fisher does not explicitly mention it, another major driver toward a 
uniform-caliber armament was the problem of spotting. When the secondary ar-
mament was wholly distinct from the main battery, such issues did not arise—that 
is, the hits and misses (or, explosions and splashes) of the two could be readily dis-
tinguished from a distance. However, with the tendency in the years immediately 
prior to Dreadnought to increase the caliber of the quick-firing secondary battery 
in response to the expected increase in battle ranges and improvements in protec-
tive armor, this problem became acute. The British King Edward class, for example, 
mounted no fewer than three types of medium-to-heavy gun (twelve-inch, 9.2-
inch, and six-inch), all of which, through quirks of muzzle velocity and design, 
were perfectly capable of long ranges. They were, however, quite different guns 
and required correspondingly different ballistic corrections. Yet if they were firing 
simultaneously, it would be almost impossible for a spotter in the heat of battle to 
identify the fall of shot of each caliber and thereby apply the right corrections. A 
committee specifically convened to investigate this problem confirmed “the im-
possibility of controlling two natures of guns as they require different ranges and 
deflections.”62 To minimize the effects of this problem, the doctrinal guidance was 
issued to suppress fire from the secondary battery when the main guns were firing. 
So now not only was the secondary battery unlikely to be effective at battle ranges, 
but it was likely not to be firing at all. Small wonder then that Fisher felt that it 
could be omitted entirely.
Others, however, had different views. Both Custance and Mahan criticized the 
move to all big guns because of the consequent loss of the “hail” of projectiles from 
secondary quick-firers. The latter echoed an early Fisher view by contending that 
the secondary battery “is really entitled to the name primary because its effect is 
exerted mainly on the personnel.”63 This view, though no doubt true only a few 
years earlier, had been made outdated by dramatic improvements in armor plate. 
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Perhaps the most authoritative word on the matter came from an Admiralty pam-
phlet, The One Calibre Big Gun Armament for Ships.64 Although written later by 
the director of naval ordnance, Capt. John Jellicoe, to explain to doubters why the 
Admiralty was pressing ahead with follow-on Dreadnoughts, it makes clear that the 
information had been largely available to the Committee on Designs back in 1905 
but had been kept secret at that time.65 In this pamphlet Jellicoe made the following 
claims for the superiority of the twelve-inch gun: 
• That a twelve-inch shell could penetrate Krupp nine-inch armor at nine 
thousand yards, whereas the figure for the six-inch was a mere six hundred 
yards. 
• That improved hydraulics had made the twelve-inch as easy to operate as 
the smaller weapon. 
• That those navies expressing a preference for mixed batteries had done so 
only because they lacked effective fire control. 
• That a “hail” of hits was not much use against a modern, well-protected ship.
• That a mixed-caliber battery greatly impaired the efficient firing of the main 
battery.
• That since the early hits would all be twelve-inch (i.e., the main battery), 
that battery would dominate the course of the engagement and therefore its 
capability should be maximized. 
As if that were not sufficient, Jellicoe endorsed a uniform-caliber arrangement 
for the planned Indefatigable class, citing the shell-splash problem and the needed 
reduction or simplification of requirements for manpower, ammunition, and train-
ing.66 It is little wonder that Fisher felt reassured.
To sum up, the British debate was rancorous and personal, and the fact that it 
became so polarized at an early stage arguably prevented a more measured and 
dispassionate discussion of the truly important issues at stake. There was no doubt 
that Fisher enjoyed immense power—or at least that the system in Britain was 
susceptible to domination by strong personalities. Some have said that this was a 
great advantage in terms of innovation, in that contentious reforms could be driven 
through to a point where educated choices could be made. An almost equal weight 
of opinion, however, would dissent, pointing to the fact that in this case, absent a 
pause to gather the majority opinion, the seeds of failure were sown early. After all, 
resentment and bitterness at being ignored caused the detractors to dismiss out of 
hand even the better parts of the scheme. As for its methodology, to achieve savings 
was the indisputable driving factor, with speed and lethality adjusted to accom-
modate a more “general purpose” design. Protection was an order of magnitude in 
importance below these three—whatever could be afforded once speed and lethal-
ity had been satisfied. Fisher, after all, believed that speed was protection in and of 
itself.
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For America, the Key Was Combat Power
If the need for savings and the desire for speed bounded and characterized the 
British capital-ship debate, the same could not be said of its American counterpart. 
The strategic circumstances were so markedly different in the United States that a 
completely new set of priorities came to the fore. The first and most obvious dif-
ference was the size and status of the U.S. Navy at the time. Unlike its counterpart 
in Britain, it was not all-powerful or beloved by the nation it served. The United 
States was a newly rising power on the international stage, only recently convinced 
of the need for sea power in the pursuit of its national goals. As such, its navy had 
some way to go to attain the same degree of domestic recognition—a situation that 
manifested itself as a mixed blessing. While naval spending was not automatically 
the focus of attention from Congress and the Treasury whenever the need for sav-
ings arose, naval officers were constantly in the business of selling the naval case. 
That said, there seemed to be an understanding everywhere that the Navy ought to 
expand; the only issue was ensuring that this expansion took place in such a way as 
to make the most efficient use of every dollar.
Thus, even though Congress felt bound to impose fairly stringent fiscal limita-
tions on what was possible, these limitations were perceived far more positively in 
America, as a set of choices and not as an onerous contraction on capabilities and 
activities. The differences that this made in institutional terms were enormous and 
cannot be overemphasized. While the Royal Navy was constantly on the defensive, 
closing ranks to protect capabilities that seemed under threat and inclining to the 
worst in parochialism and brooding introspection, the U.S. Navy’s decision makers 
were under no such pressure. Their sole aim throughout this period was to ensure 
that what money did become available produced the best possible naval capability. 
For them, frank and open discussions of options were the norm, and for as long as 
it took to gather the necessary facts. They were not constantly looking over their 
shoulders to see what their competitors were doing. While there were moments of 
frustration and disagreement along the way, the mood overall was more optimistic. 
Politically, this state of affairs was undeniably assisted by having a strong ally in the 
White House, in the person of Theodore Roosevelt.67
In terms of strategy, the problems facing American naval planners at the time 
can be seen from an examination of some of the many “Summer Problems” posed 
to the students of the Naval War College course in Newport, Rhode Island. In the 
1901 academic year, for instance, the notional enemy power from Europe was Ger-
many (referred to as “Black”), which was depicted as intent on moving against the 
Panama Canal area after attaining a lodgment in the Caribbean.68 Since such an 
attempt was likely to constitute a casus belli, the American fleet strategy recom-
mended by the students was to force battle early, even if the fleet were unready, so 
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as to prevent Germany from attaining that lodgment. The students recognized that 
the outcome was likely to be poor if Germany were able to muster the bulk of its 
fleet and so further recommended that, first, the U.S. Navy be sized to be at least a 
match for Germany, which meant a considerable expansion; and second, that the 
battle fleet consist of powerful, modern battleships with sufficient speed and stra-
tegic mobility to concentrate efficiently.69 Numbers, battleship strength, and mobil-
ity looked to be at a premium. So while the need for strategic speed was arguably 
similar to the British situation just described, almost everything else was markedly 
different. 
In addition, and given the position of inferiority of the United States with re-
spect to its likely competitors, at least for the time being, it was also important that 
such units as the United States had should be made to count. In fleet terms, this 
meant a rigid adherence to the edicts of concentration, and in naval construction 
terms the procurement of resilient and powerful ships that could stand, unit for 
unit, against the best that the European navies could offer. Everything else had to 
be secondary to that aim. This meant, paradoxically, that qualities like speed, while 
desirable, tended to be viewed as things that should not be bought at the expense 
of gun power or protection. For the smaller navy, the issue was the chance of sur-
vival in battle, not the speed with which the enemy could be brought to the point 
of decision. 
Similarly, long-range gunnery, while much more important to the Americans 
than speed, was viewed as something that should be pursued only to the point at 
which it impinged on either survivability or the delivery of sufficient units to the 
fleet. Unlike the British, the Americans did not anticipate the luxury of decisively 
outranging their opponents—they fully expected to take and inflict hits at what-
ever ranges were doctrinaire for the times. On a more positive note, however, the 
Americans, not having to rationalize ship types to replace scores of outdated cruis-
ers, were at liberty to look searchingly at the theoretical qualities desired of the 
major ship types. This included their own examination of the four types deemed 
indispensable in Fisher’s Naval Necessities. In the end, though, the American debate 
would be framed first and foremost by combat power, both offensive and defensive, 
followed by numbers, with everything else a distant third. These boundaries made 
these years a very different experience for them than for the British. 
Against this backdrop appeared one of the earliest attempts to upgrade the of-
fensive combat power of American battleships, an article in the U.S. Naval Insti-
tute’s journal Proceedings by Lt. Matt Signor in 1902.70 In a very clearly constructed 
piece of reasoning, Signor described a potential battleship armed with just four 
large, triple turrets and a series of three- and five-inch torpedo-defense guns. Two 
of the turrets were mounted in the traditional way, fore and aft, while the other two 
were “wing,” or beam turrets, on either side of the superstructure—an arrangement 
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not dissimilar to the later British Dreadnought and Invincible classes. As for the cali-
ber of the guns to be mounted, Signor discussed an all-twelve-inch layout, although 
by virtue of the improved availability of the end turrets—that is, they could more 
likely be brought to bear in most tactical situations—Signor argued for thirteen- 
inch guns fore and aft and ten-inch on the wings, for the same displacement as an 
all-twelve-inch ship. 
He explained the overall advantage of such an arrangement as simply the im-
proved availability of armor-piercing guns—that is, guns large enough to penetrate 
armor—when compared with the conventional, predreadnought arrangement. Its 
six- and eight-inch guns being only marginally effective at battle ranges, the pre-
dreadnought really only had four effective “ship-killing” guns in a fleet action. His 
arrangement, however, would “contain twelve armor piercing guns, of which in 
squadron action nine will almost always be available.”71 Furthermore, guns concen-
trated in turrets, he maintained, could be better protected with less overall armor 
than could the broadside batteries of the predreadnought, thus saving weight. In 
all but name, therefore, he was arguing for a dreadnought-type ship. Surprisingly, 
though, he did not emphasize the advantages of uniform-caliber firing with respect 
to spotting, a point that had been convincingly argued by his British counterparts.
Although Signor was at pains to point out that he was no authority on ship 
design but simply laying out certain salient “features,” or themes, his proposal at-
tracted comment from readers who were qualified.72 Later the same year, Profes-
sor P. R. Alger, a leading gunnery expert and regular contributor to the technical 
columns in Proceedings, cast doubt on whether so heavy a battery could be carried 
by so small a ship and also on the efficacy of the triple-gun-turret arrangement; 
however, he came out broadly in favor of the overall arrangement of the battery, 
albeit with twin twelve-inch turrets all around.73 More significantly perhaps, a fu-
ture Chief Constructor of the Navy, David Taylor, while reiterating Alger’s concerns 
about displacement, came out in favor of the turret arrangement as the most ef-
ficient way of protecting the main battery. Further, he promoted the variable-pitch 
propeller as a simple “fix” to allow the high-revolution steam turbine to be adopted 
for these battleships.74 One by one the relevant pieces were falling into place and, at 
this point, faster than they were for the British; alas, that was not to continue. 
At the same time, however, Mahan was advising the new president of his views 
on the qualities to be insisted on in any battleship buildup.75 Here, well ahead of 
his more famous remarks after Tsushima, he used the same arguments against size 
and speed—specifically that since battleships were designed to operate with others 
of their kind, the aim should be homogeneity of capabilities across the fleet, and 
so any large “step” increases in size and speed would be unwise. The flaws in this 
argument have already been pointed out, but absent any particular reason to strive 
for higher speed (as was the case in Britain) and in a navy anxious to expand its size 
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and influence, it may have been persuasive.76 It is not clear what prompted Mahan’s 
letter to Roosevelt in the first place, although discussion resulting from the Signor 
article cannot be ruled out. It is also significant that the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair (BuC&R) did not entirely agree. Its chief expressed the opinion that 
since warships had been steadily increasing in size and capability in all the major 
navies, it would probably be unwise for America not to follow suit.77 
By the time of the 1903 Summer Problem, the Naval War College had other 
concerns that were causing a reexamination of the importance of speed. The Navy’s 
torpedo school, the College’s analysis of the Summer Problem noted, had report-
ed successful runs of 4,200 yards, with Whitehead torpedoes traveling at eighteen 
knots. Reports such as these led to two main tactical concerns.78 First, it was clear 
that the torpedo was fast becoming a powerful naval weapon, one that might soon 
offer ship-killing capabilities at a potentially greater range than the heavy gun. In 
light of the primacy of the battle line as the offensive element of most navies, one 
of the early lines of thinking was simply to adapt torpedoes for launch by battle-
ships, as an adjunct to the main battery, and adjusting fleet tactics accordingly. This 
new task, however, would produce new design pressures on capital ships. For one 
thing, the need for precise positioning to guarantee a hit while remaining outside 
the gunnery range of the enemy would likely put speed and maneuverability at a 
premium in any torpedo-wielding battleship. In the words of the report, “If the 
fleet possessing them [torpedoes] has superior speed, it will decide the battle.”79 
Elsewhere in the same document, however, the Naval War College assessed the 
American battle fleet, with its average of fifteen knots, as a full three knots slower 
than its Black counterpart.80 It was clear therefore that before mounting torpedo 
tubes on U.S. battleships it would be most desirable, from a tactical standpoint, to 
increase their speed. 
At the same time, the prospect of being forced to fight at longer ranges to avoid 
these torpedoes was causing more discussion on the accepted way of arming battle-
ships. Up to this point, shortcomings in the rate of fire of the main battery had been 
compensated for by mounting a battery of increasingly powerful quick-firing guns 
on the broadside. This was fine when the battle ranges were expected to be short, 
in which case the relative lack of penetrating power of quick-firers would not be 
exposed. If, however, the decisive ranges were going to be longer, this secondary 
battery, as Signor had pointed out, would need reevaluation. In short, would a sec-
ondary battery be the best use of the available displacement, or could the weight it 
represented be more profitably employed to increase endurance, speed, or protection 
—or all three? Anticipating these dilemmas, the students in the 1903 problem were 
invited to consider a paper, “Considerations as to the Advisability of Suppressing 
the Secondary Battery in Battleships,” that addressed all these options.81 Noting that 
the move toward an all-big-gun ship was gaining traction overseas, the Summer 
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Problem participants endorsed this sentiment and proposed that future U.S. battle-
ships be “armed with as many heavy guns as possible, relying solely on the 3ʺ for 
torpedo-boat defense.”82 
It comes to light in later correspondence that the students at the 1903 problem 
thoroughly discussed a fairly detailed proposal for an all-big-gun battleship on the 
lines of the Signor vessel, and most of them were in favor.83 The architect of the 
proposal, Lt. Cdr. Washington I. Chambers, added the following endorsements: 
that the modern twelve-inch gun had to be considered to be as rapid and accurate 
in fire as the lesser calibers, that the best way to protect guns was the turret, and 
that a profusion of intermediate calibers firing simultaneously would interfere with 
the accuracy and control of the main battery.84 Chambers’s design featured three 
twin twelve-inch turrets in a triangular arrangement at either end of the ship. In 
war-gaming tests comparing it with the predreadnought Connecticut class, the new 
vessel came out as superior, so much so that the General Board recommended to 
the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) in October of the same year that the all-big-gun 
proposals be studied.85 The board stopped short, however, of an outright endorse-
ment of “such a new and untried type.”86 But by January 1904 it was officially urging 
SecNav to direct BuC&R to produce a tentative design for “a battleship with twelve 
heavy turret guns, none of which shall be less than 10ʺ . . . the secondary battery be-
ing not above 3ʺ.” The aim would be to “show the practicability of the idea” so that 
“a more accurate opinion can be formed of the tactical qualities of such a ship.”87
Another study, by Lt. Homer C. Poundstone, was coming to the same conclu-
sion as were Chambers and the Naval War College, that the utility of the intermedi-
ate battery was becoming questionable. The paper was originally sent directly to 
President Roosevelt in December 1902, in protest at the continuing displacement 
limitations being imposed on battleships; a modified version was published in the 
June and September 1903 editions of Proceedings.88 It must therefore have been 
taken into account in the College’s discussion of the Chambers design and probably 
added weight to a later observation by Admiral Dewey that “some officers regard 
it as the Battleship of the future.”89 Significantly, in the first version of his paper, 
Poundstone insisted that to have “better speed and good coal endurance,” as well 
as an “effective battery and its protection,” battleships had to have large displace-
ments—in excess of eighteen thousand tons. Small battleships would involve “seri-
ous sacrifices” in one or all of these desiderata, because the building of a battleship 
was always a compromise.90 This view, clearly aimed at the congressionally imposed 
limits on battleship displacement, was diametrically opposed to Mahan’s on the bal-
ance between numbers and size that the president had received only weeks earlier.91 
On the question of armament, Poundstone opened by “failing to see the logic, 
necessity or practical use in carrying a mixed battery of pieces so nearly the same 
caliber.” On the question of the seven-inch, he contended that it would be unable to 
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penetrate even intermediate armor at anything more than the closest battle ranges; 
the eight-inch gun, although it had performed well in the Spanish-American War, 
was similarly afflicted. In fact, the only possible reason for the inclusion of the 
eight-inch weapon would seem to have been that “we doubt whether it [the seven-
inch gun] will really do what we designed it for.”92 Poundstone therefore proposed 
the adoption of an all-quick-firing battery of eleven- and nine-inch guns (though 
in a later paper prepared soon afterward, probably with the help of Cdr. William 
S. Sims [who had a reputation as a gunnery expert and reformer], he came out in 
favor of a solely eleven-inch battery).93 At the end of the Proceedings version of 
the paper, he makes reference to events in England (specifically the design of the 
Lord Nelson class, with its intermediate battery of turreted 9.2-inch guns) as greatly 
reinforcing his case.94 Although he arguably only “nips” at the problem by simply 
increasing the caliber of the intermediate battery toward that of the main one, with-
out being as decisive as Chambers and Signor, his reasoning—the increasing range 
of torpedoes and the improved lethality of the modern quick firing gun absolutely 
necessitating longer-range combat—mirrors their thinking completely.95
The Americans, then, were coming to the same realizations as their British 
counterparts about the relative uselessness of the secondary battery in a modern 
engagement. Both were concerned about the increasing range of torpedoes, and 
both realized the value of longer-range engagements, but whereas the British had 
become acutely aware of the problem of long-range hitting and had emphasized 
effective fire control at an early stage, in the American debate this appeared to be 
less of an issue. The emphasis there seemed to be on simply increasing the power of 
the battery such that whatever hits were achieved would penetrate and tell. On the 
subject of speed too the positions were subtly different, although it would be wrong 
to say that the Americans did not desire higher speeds. If for Britain the force of 
Fisher’s personality almost guaranteed the official adoption of speedy vessels, in 
America opinion was divided. The innovators (Chambers, Poundstone, and the 
Naval War College) seemed to want to use the weight saved by the uniform-caliber 
battery for better speed and endurance; the strategist (Mahan) and the General 
Board were more cautious.96 Most significant of all, perhaps, was the fact that all 
these detailed discussions took place in the United States well ahead, up to two 
years ahead, of the convening of Fisher’s design committee. The U.S. Navy cannot 
therefore be characterized as being slow into the game. 
Unfortunately, however, the reformers lacked anyone with the tenacity and sense 
of urgency of Jackie Fisher and who, also like Fisher, possessed the executive au-
thority necessary to make things happen. For example, although Admiral Dewey 
had urged SecNav in January 1904 to have BuC&R draw up plans for an all-big-gun 
ship, this did not actually happen for another eighteen months, despite frequent 
reminders.97 Ostensibly this delay was owing to the heavy workload being placed 
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on the naval architects by the expanding fleet, but reading between the lines of one 
of the replies from Rear Adm. Washington Capps (Chief Constructor, BuC&R) to 
SecNav in September of that year gives one the feeling that this work had been 
done before (in the design stages of the Connecticut class). As the approach had 
been rejected at that point in favor of a more conventional design, there might have 
understandably been reluctance to, in effect, do this work again.98 It is difficult to 
imagine Admiral Fisher either contenting himself with this explanation or being 
invited to wait for so long. 
Whatever the reason, the first set of plans was received by the General Board 
only in July 1905, which gave it no choice but to recommend “repeat” battleships 
of the Connecticut class for the 1904/1905 program, although it clearly expressed a 
preference for an all-big-gun arrangement.99 Citing the Russo-Japanese experience 
and acknowledging the improvements in the rate of fire of heavy guns, the General 
Board declared that “we should not defer making this change in the armament of 
battleships” and recommended that “the battleship be given a battery of heavy turret 
guns, none of which shall be less than 10ʺ, and at least 4 of which shall be 12ʺ, with-
out intermediate battery.”100 Unfortunately, between this letter and the final receipt 
of the plans, Congress had renewed the sixteen-thousand-ton displacement limit 
for the next year’s ships, against the urging of the Navy, a development that no doubt 
contributed to delay by grossly complicating BuC&R’s problem.101 Capps, however, 
got around this restriction masterfully by pioneering a “superfiring” arrangement 
for a four-turret, all-twelve-inch main battery for the 1905/1906 ships, with no in-
termediate battery, in what was effectively little more than a Connecticut hull.102
This eighteen-month hiatus, though it delayed the ships, did nothing to stem 
the debate. In the 1904 Summer Problem at Newport, the Naval War College stu-
dents looked again at the issues of torpedoes, speed, and all-big-gun armament. 
Like their counterparts in Fisher’s team, they began to discuss the divergent func-
tions of battleships and armored cruisers, although their conclusions were quite 
different. While they favored the development of an armored cruiser that “would 
be a battleship without an intermediate battery,” armed solely with four turreted 
twelve-inch guns and an offensive battery of torpedoes, they envisaged that these 
ships would operate as adjuncts to a conventional battle line, not as speedy replace-
ments for it. In other words such ships would be primarily torpedo carriers, using 
their speed to keep out of harm’s way while positioning for a torpedo attack against 
the enemy fleet.103 This was completely the opposite of Fisher’s conclusion that such 
ships could best meet the British strategic dilemma by replacing both battleships 
and cruisers completely, leading smaller, power-projection fleets about the empire.
On the subject of battleships, the 1904 course endorsed the previous year’s all-
big-gun proposal but further noted that a reduction in the numbers of calibers car-
ried would greatly simplify the internal organization of a ship and make gunnery 
NWC_HM23.indb   125 12/8/15   9:00 AM
 DIFFERING VALUES? 127 126 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
spotting easier. Overall armor protection could also likely be reduced, since there 
would be no broadside battery to protect, just the four or five large turrets and 
the conning position.104 So, in some aspects they were converging on the British 
position, but not with respect to speed. They thought it “doubtful that a speed of 
more than eighteen knots was desirable in battleships,” while in terms of priorities, 
protection was of the first importance, followed by a “fair speed.”105 As explained 
above, however, this more conservative viewpoint has to be understood against a 
probability of fast divisions of torpedo-carrying armored cruisers operating with 
future battle fleets.
The year 1905 marked something of a landmark on both sides of the Atlantic 
—and in fact of the globe. For the British, the Dreadnought and Invincible plans 
would be approved and the former ship laid down, to be complete and running 
trials eleven months later. Meanwhile, in the Far East, the decisive battle of Tsushi-
ma would be fought, from which would come all sorts of stimuli for almost every 
conceivable naval controversy, the speed and all-big-gun debates not excepted. In 
America, the year began with another move in the battleship-size debate, this time 
from a new source. Perhaps in response to Poundstone’s earlier pleas for policy 
guidance, Cdr. Bradley A. Fiske, in a prize-winning essay entitled “American Naval 
Policy,” ventured the opinion that the ships of the U.S. battle fleet were incorrectly 
designed.106 The problem was more fundamental than simply the size of their guns, 
the scope of their protection, or the speed at which they moved, although these all 
had parts to play. Unlike the British, Fiske believed that U.S. Navy ships were more 
likely to be engaged in fights with other navies in fleet engagements. America was 
largely self-sufficient in materiel and hence seaborne trade did not have the same 
strategic value in Washington as it did in London.107 At the same time, the coun-
try’s policies, generally hostile to colonialism—notably the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, 
warning European states against colonialization or interference in the Western 
Hemisphere—were likely to be antagonistic to many of the colonial powers and 
could therefore act as a catalyst for foreign naval interventions in support of rival 
policies. This situation threw up different necessities in terms of design and put a 
premium on strength. Essentially echoing Poundstone, Fiske argued that American 
warships would need speed and offensive power in equal measure and that their 
displacement would have to be increased accordingly.108 
Fiske thus accepted the need for large ships; furthermore, he argued, they would 
be more economical in the long run than they appeared on paper. Homogeneity 
within a fleet was unattainable, owing to rapid advances in technology; beyond 
the common sense of grouping ships of similar performance in squadrons, striv-
ing for homogeneity should not be allowed to restrain overall progress.109 In this 
he was in stark disagreement with Mahan. There was no doubt that the article 
struck a chord, enough to encourage him to supply some specifics in a later article, 
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“Compromiseless Ships.”110 Here, in another pointed attack on Mahan on the ques-
tions of numbers and size, he settled on a displacement of around twenty thousand 
tons, a figure later given technical endorsement by a naval architect.111 
In retrospect, an implication of all this would seem to have been that the usual 
process—Congress setting moderate (but arbitrary) size limits and naval architects 
struggling to shoehorn in all the other parameters—would have to be reversed. 
But Fiske now asserted that it should not be the responsibility of naval officers to 
second-guess Congress on which ships it was likely to authorize. Naval officers 
should simply recommend, he held, the best possible combination of dimensions 
and power according to their professional instincts and leave it to others to deter-
mine what was affordable. 
The Naval War College’s students evidently agreed. At the 1905 Summer Prob-
lem, they compared the likely performance of the Connecticut and South Carolina 
classes with the 1903 “all-big-gun” ship, concluding that “the [1903] design supplies 
the best battery, and with the simplification of calibers and the attendant advan-
tages of ammunition stowage and supply, better fire control and more concentrated 
all round fire, is much superior. Such battleships should be built and the displace-
ment [limits] increased to allow it.”112 In a letter to SecNav in September, the Gener-
al Board attempted to prioritize the various demands on the battleship, stating that 
the “battery is the all important element” in these ships’ design. That issue settled, 
“the best possible speed should be achieved on a given displacement.”113 This is a 
significant statement, as it is one of the only instances where the Navy’s thinking 
on the relative priorities among these various commodities is expressed. The same 
letter reiterated that “the board has resisted an increase in size for speed alone, but, 
if the uniform big gun battery is accepted then an increase in size is justified.” Fi-
nally and more specifically: “Therefore irresistibly drawn by the example of other 
navies, our experience and conclusive evidence that battleships need a uniform 12ʺ 
battery, to gain sufficient [room] we need 18,000 tons.”114 
Interestingly, BuC&R felt that the General Board had not gone far enough, 
claiming that eighteen thousand tons was an insufficient increase in size. On the 
basis of their experience with the design of South Carolina, its analysts maintained 
that fitting more than four twin twelve-inch turrets would involve a very large in-
crease in displacement, which in their opinion would not be worth pursuing at 
the time.115 A few months later, however, and presumably based on more unfavor-
able comparisons with Dreadnought, the General Board was pressing for a twenty- 
thousand-ton ship, turbine driven and with a secondary battery increased to six-
inch guns.116 Fiske’s “compromiseless” ship was fast becoming a reality.117 
There is no doubt, however, that one of the more important differences in a 
practical sense between the British and American programs was the slow prog-
ress of the latter. The British and American all-big-gun ships were authorized 
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by their respective governments within days of one another, but the building of 
the American vessel took far longer.118 The British had a “demonstrator” to play 
with, in the form of HMS Dreadnought, from the fall of 1906 and were thus able to 
start answering comparative questions on the efficacies of the all-big-gun battery 
and turbine propulsion by early 1907; the same was not true in America until late 
1909 at the earliest.119 In reality, moreover, no useful comparisons could be made 
for another year, when the large, turbine-driven North Dakota joined the fleet— 
effectively a full four years behind the British. By that time the Royal Navy already 
had seven dreadnought battleships and three battle cruisers in commission. Of 
course, this was exactly the benefit that Fisher had originally anticipated by his 
forcing the pace with Dreadnought.120
The upshot of this was that only in one year, 1906/1907, did the British have to 
order ships on blind faith. In America this “speculative period,” without a ship to 
provide some answers, went on for considerably longer, which in practice meant 
that the next three classes (six ships in all) had to proceed to building without the 
benefit of practical experience. It really was not until the tendering for the New 
York class (BBs 34 and 35) in 1910–11 that the characteristics of the design could 
be directly influenced by firsthand, seagoing knowledge. The effect on the overall 
process was dramatic, in that any changes that were then felt necessary were imme-
diately questioned on the basis of a lack of precedent in the intervening years; a case 
in point was the reversion to reciprocating engines for the two New Yorks, making 
the U.S. Navy appear far more conservative than it actually was. 
In that intervening period the debate continued. In 1907, another prominent 
reformer, Commander Sims, publicly joined the chorus for the larger, all-big-gun 
ships, specifically targeting Mahan’s recommendations as being in error.121 In a 
journal article Sims reinforced the “Fisherite” belief that a faster fleet would always 
be able to dictate the course of the battle, and he reasonably asked what possible 
reason the United States could have, while all other important navies were build-
ing large, twenty-knot battleships, for knowingly placing its future fleet at a disad-
vantage by building sixteen-knot ships with about half the heavy-gun power.122 He 
explained that by concentrating the same gun power in a much shorter battle line, 
the larger ship made tactical sense in terms of ease of handling in battle. He refuted 
Mahan’s concerns over the alleged effects of the loss of funnels and uptakes, a major 
factor in the latter’s support for massed small-caliber fire (as presumably allowing 
more deck space for routing smoke exhaust, a major factor in boiler efficiency). 
He rejoined with the gunnery specialist’s plea for a uniform-caliber battery so as 
to ease handling and spotting problems. Given the weight of evidence now accu-
mulating that the large caliber gun was superior, a well-written article by so widely 
recognized an expert in the field of gunnery as Sims was bound to be influential. It 
was therefore no surprise that by the beginning of 1907 Mahan had acknowledged 
that the president’s mind was made up.123 
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Significantly, though, it was not on the issue of speed that the decision was 
made. While Sims had extolled the virtues of greater speed as he had gone along, 
his article particularly emphasized the superior fighting power of the large, all-big-
gun ship and the possibility that its superior capability could be had for an initial 
expense equivalent to that of the alternative, cost less to run, and require fewer 
men. The implication was that the impact on fleet numbers might not be as crip-
pling as Mahan had suggested.124 These points were picked up by the General Board 
in its recommendations to SecNav on the subject of all-big-gun ships, adding that 
although the Louisiana and South Carolina classes would form a good squadron, 
the time was ripe to make the next advances in protection and gun power, which 
would mean larger ships.125 
Equally, it was the issue of protection rather than a lack of any wider 
“dreadnought-like” qualities that brought about the extended 1908 Summer Prob-
lem at Newport, later to be called the “Battleship Conference.” Having been passed 
a letter sent to SecNav by Cdr. Albert Key that pointed out numerous shortcom-
ings in the design of the North Dakota, the president instructed both the General 
Board and the College to comment.126 The Navy Department, however, saw an op-
portunity for a wider discussion and promptly convened a conference to be held 
at the War College over the summer season, so as to benefit from student input. 
Key’s most serious allegations were all in the field of gunnery and protection: first, 
that the armor protecting the class’s secondary battery was inadequate; second, that 
turret guns would have offered superior protection; and third, that the main armor 
belt on the hull was of the incorrect size and in the wrong place, making the ship 
vulnerable, particularly in a seaway. For these reasons it was ill suited, in his opin-
ion, for its primary mission, which was to fight other battleships.127
The conference’s work was divided into three broad sets of committees: those 
looking at the North Dakota design; those considering the next class, comprising 
Florida and Utah (BBs 30 and 31); and those considering future classes. In some-
thing of a Pyrrhic victory for the Sims and Key camps, most of the charges against 
the North Dakota design were upheld but were deemed relatively minor and not 
worth the extra time and expense to remedy. The conference largely endorsed the 
design as it stood, recommending no substantive changes, even though its partici-
pants acknowledged that the secondary battery was insufficiently protected and too 
low in the ship to be fought in all weathers.128 They cautioned, however, that “there 
is no absolute protection,” although most committees did endorse studies aimed 
at increasing the thickness and coverage of the casemate armor in future classes 
(from five to eight inches), even suggesting “a reduction in speed to accept armor 
improvements—but not below 18 knots.”129 On the subject of speed, Adm. Caspar 
F. Goodrich (then commandant of the Washington Navy Yard but previously com-
mander of the Pacific Squadron) was of the opinion that in the North Dakota armor 
had been sacrificed for speed. He believed this a bad idea for battleships and one 
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that ought not to be repeated. In fact, he went as far as maintaining that the builders 
had simply wanted to “best” the British Dreadnought, an inappropriate objective.130 
It would seem therefore that whatever Sims might have wanted, speed was near the 
bottom of the priorities in most naval minds when it came to battleships.131
In its recommendations to the Navy Department for the battleships of the 1909–
10 program (the Wyoming class), the General Board reiterated the conference’s rec-
ommendations that the battery and its protection were all important and that dis-
placement should be allowed to increase to accommodate these needs. Specifically, 
it recommended a twenty-five-thousand-ton ship with ten twelve- or fourteen-inch 
twin turrets.132 At this point the era of restrictive displacements was effectively at 
an end and the age of American battleships stronger and bigger than anyone else’s 
was about to begin. Of course, perhaps the most important change to come out of 
the conference was an institutional one—future designs would be submitted to a 
board of officers considered best qualified to criticize and modify them before ac-
ceptance. In practice the General Board assumed this responsibility, from 1909 on. 
(The effects of this, which were not to be felt for some years, are largely outside the 
remit of this work and will not be discussed further.) 
The final major distinction between the American debate and what took place 
in Britain was the significance of endurance as a desired quality in battleships—or 
more specifically, the power plant required to gain endurance and performance in 
an adequate balance. The early turbines were “high revving” and notoriously inef-
ficient in terms of fuel consumption at slower speeds. This created a problem in 
marine applications where cruising and maneuvering at moderate speed for a high 
percentage of the running time was envisaged. It was not a concern for commercial 
operators of fast mail steamers, where almost continuous high speed was the norm. 
For them the turbines looked the perfect answer—providing higher speeds, less 
vibration, and lower maintenance requirements than reciprocating plants. Naval 
applications, however, were problematic: the highest possible speed was desirable 
for the odd occasions in which ships were required to pursue enemies, but most 
classes operated at a whole range of speeds, with perhaps a preponderance of mod-
erate to slow speeds for cruising or patrolling. For this, the early steam turbines 
were a poor choice, particularly if endurance and self-sufficiency were prized by 
the navy in question. 
As has already been discussed, for the British, with their predominant desire to 
save on running costs and their perceived strategic need to project power quickly 
in response to situations abroad, the turbine looked a workable answer, particularly 
given their numerous coaling stations and bases abroad. For them, endurance was 
of less concern, and there was even the prospect of using speed to force reduc-
tions in the available endurance of less-well-supported competitors.133 This may 
be the reason that when Fisher recommended turbine propulsion for all classes of 
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warship, it passed with almost no dissent. The Americans, however, coming late 
onto the naval stage and without a large spread of colonial possessions and bases, 
had to look very critically at anything that seemed likely to reduce the radius of ac-
tion of their units and make them more dependent on base support.
The first mention of this as a potential concern comes in the 1906 Summer 
Problem at Newport, where the students were grappling with the huge distances 
involved in countering a Japanese move against the Philippines. Some of the ques-
tions asked of them by the organizers reflected the American strategic dilemmas: 
“What speed should be ordered for the voyage from the Atlantic to the Philippines, 
via the Panama canal?” “How should the battlefleet and the 12ʺ Armored cruis-
ers be used?”134 The outcome, however, was uncharacteristically noncommittal; the 
participants concluded that they had insufficient knowledge of turbines to make 
a decision. They noted that the British were developing turbine-powered capital 
ships, but they also noted the poor cruise economy of such a plant.135 By the fall of 
that year, however, the matter had been somewhat taken out of their hands, in that 
the General Board, no doubt feeling pressure from observers comparing the U.S. 
battleships with the Dreadnought, recommended that the 1906 ships were to “have 
the latest type of engines adopted by any power for a battleship and to attain a trial 
speed of 21 knots. The armament, fuel endurance and armor protection to be equal 
to that of any battleship of similar size now built or building.”136 In practice, and in 
lieu of any definitive experience, this meant turbines—and so it was that the second 
Delaware-class vessel, North Dakota, received Curtis turbines, while the follow-on 
class, the Floridas, were specifically designed to receive Parsons units.137 This would 
give the U.S. Navy an unrivaled opportunity to compare both turbines and recipro-
cating plants in similarly sized vessels.
Unfortunately, the very slow rate of shipbuilding in the United States meant 
that the first two ships did not run trials until 1909–10, by which time three more 
classes had been authorized and designed without benefit of experience to guide 
the Navy in its choices of machinery.138 This sort of thing was evidently a source of 
great frustration to Admiral Dewey.139 In the meantime, however, the claims for the 
superiority of turbines were becoming more strident. There is evidence that the 
Royal Navy’s Amethyst trials were widely reported in the United States, as was the 
German experience with Lübeck, fitted with Curtis turbines.140 Both sets of trials 
indicated that higher speed and lower overall coal consumption could be expect-
ed from turbine-driven vessels, and other benefits as well, even though at slower 
speeds the turbine ships were clearly less economical to operate. Another report, 
comparing the dimensions and weight of the turbine plant of the scout cruiser Sa-
lem with those of the reciprocating plant of the battleship Vermont, with similar 
shaft horsepower, came out heavily in favor of the turbine installation.141 A much 
more influential piece of evidence, however, was a report filed by Commander Sims 
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after visiting Dreadnought in Portsmouth, England.142 Sims recounted that his host, 
the commanding officer, Reginald Bacon, had maintained that the turbine decision 
had been made in May 1905, to achieve the advantages of a smaller, simpler plant 
(fewer moving parts); less propulsion-plant weight overall, and concentrated lower 
in the ship; lower coal consumption at higher speeds; and ease of operation, with 
accordingly a smaller complement of engineers.143 It was small wonder then that the 
General Board, in developing recommendations for the 1907 ships, specified that 
bidders were to provide data for both turbines and reciprocating plant over a whole 
range of speeds.144 
Meanwhile the engineer’s viewpoint, in the absence of definitive battleship tri-
als, was perhaps typified by a short article for the American Society of Naval En-
gineers by Lt. W. G. Diman comparing the utility of the two installations for naval 
purposes.145 Diman pointed out that much of the simplicity of early turbine instal-
lations would be lost if they were made practical for the wide range of naval speeds. 
As a result, and given that the turbine failures were likely to require dockyard sup-
port, he concluded that “at the present time it has not shown a great enough advan-
tage in all round work to warrant its taking the place of the reciprocating engine.”146 
Unfortunately for the turbine enthusiasts, the early trials with North Dakota in 1909 
tended to confirm these thoughts. Comparative trials with its reciprocating sister 
Delaware bore out the predicted 30 percent drop in endurance. In a rather blunt 
summation, a Lieutenant Commander Price maintained that “15–30% fuel con-
sumption at 12–15 knots above [the] consumption in a sister ship in the same fleet 
at the same speed is too dear a price to pay for a possible ¼ knot more top speed.”147 
Both BuC&R and the Bureau of Engineering (BuEng) agreed. In a letter of 
recommendation for the power plants of the next class after the six ships already 
mentioned—that is, the New York class, BBs 34 and 35—the two bureau chiefs, 
writing jointly and quoting exhaustively from the trial results, demonstrated that 
a turbine-powered battleship could not get from the West Coast to the Philippines 
without refueling, whereas a reciprocating ship could, with ease.148 For these rea-
sons and others similar to those cited by Diman, they recommended that the Navy 
award the contract for BB 35 (Texas) to the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry-
dock Company, which had tendered a reciprocating-plant bid. There is no doubt 
that this letter had the intended impact. In its recommendations to SecNav the 
General Board had originally, on 14 December, recommended the adoption of tur-
bines for Texas, on the basis of improved reliability at high speed. This document 
was summarily withdrawn, however, and replaced by a counter-recommendation 
for a reciprocating plant, quoting information in the chiefs’ letter.149 
The potential of the turbine plant still attracted supporters, but the fears over 
endurance at moderate speeds had won through for the time being.150 In the words 
of a future chief of BuEng, “A careful study of the performance of the North Dakota 
NWC_HM23.indb   132 12/8/15   9:00 AM
 DIFFERING VALUES? 133 132 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
. . . had assured the Bureau that no great economy of propulsion could be expected 
so long as the turbine builders adhered to what was at that time current turbine 
practice . . . sacrificing propeller efficiency in order to obtain a high turbine ef-
ficiency and so as to be able to hold down weight and space.”151 The answer was an 
efficient form of reduction gearing, but this would take years to develop. To force 
the turbine companies in this direction the bureau took the decision to support 
bids with reciprocating engines until the companies responded. 
In sum, the American preference for a powerful offensive battery, in well- 
protected positions on ships of adequate dimensions, made a good deal of sense 
against the background of Fiske’s strategic assumptions. Fiske made the case that 
whereas Britain, with its huge imperial responsibilities, had an urgent need to pro-
tect its global trade on a diminishing naval budget, the United States needed a navy 
prepared for very different eventualities. Uninterrupted trade was likely to be less of 
a factor in its own national survival, while, conversely, its own national policies were 
likely to be more antagonistic to the established powers. As a rule therefore, the 
U.S. Navy could expect to have to face other navies directly, not just their cruisers 
abroad. This meant that a powerful battleship fleet, stressing offensive power and 
sound protection, would likely be at a premium. As a result, these two qualities were 
never to be compromised, whereas everything else was negotiable. Speed, while 
certainly desirable, was not the “first desideratum,” as it had been for Fisher. Endur-
ance and self-sufficiency, however, were deemed much more important in a navy 
without a global support system than they had been for Fisher. These factors led to 
a far more critical assessment of the benefits and limitations of turbine propulsion. 
Finally, while the U.S. Navy certainly discussed the intended characteristics of its 
ships in great detail, in the end the slowness of its shipbuilding hampered the ac-
cumulation of practical experience and hence prevented more-educated decisions. 
So, what conclusions can we draw from these two stories? The first, interestingly 
enough, reinforces the significance of strategy. While similar in many respects, 
these two cases were actually driven by very different strategic needs. This meant 
that the qualities sought from the emerging technologies were correspondingly dif-
ferent in each case. Great Britain had long been the world’s largest maritime power 
and owned the most extensive array of colonial possessions ever amassed. As a re-
sult, it had dockyard facilities and coaling stations in all the important areas of the 
globe. The British were aiming to use the new technology as a way to make needed 
savings in their naval budget while still retaining overall naval primacy. Their plan 
was to develop an improved responsiveness in a few large and powerful ships that, 
if correctly placed in key locations, might obviate the need for large numbers of 
isolated “station” cruisers positioned everywhere that a British presence might be 
needed. In so doing, they hoped to gain fleet efficiencies by training their crews in 
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groups of modern vessels, while achieving substantial savings in ships and man-
power overall. At the same time, this reversal of the Mahanian edict to concentrate 
the fleet dealt conveniently with another of the exclusively naval problems of the 
day, that of the troubling vulnerability of battleships to low-cost torpedo craft in 
coastal waters. By taking the big ships out of dangerous waters altogether and using 
them instead on the deep oceans, the torpedo threat could be effectively neutral-
ized, at least for the time being. 
To do this, the Royal Navy had to meet some very specific technological needs. 
To gain the necessary responsiveness, it needed sustained high speed and proven 
hitting power over immense ranges—and it had to have both! Either alone was 
insufficient. The demand for high speed would necessitate a reduction in weight, 
which, if the offensive power was also to be optimized, had to come at the expense 
of the ship’s protection (armor). If the ship’s protection were reduced, the resulting 
vulnerability would have to be offset, and that is where the drive for long-range hit-
ting came from. The theory went that if you could effectively hit your opponent at 
a range where he could not reply and keep out of his range (and so out of trouble) 
with superior speed, then you really did not need any armor at all. In essence the 
British aimed to use speed strategically to shrink the world, and tactically (com-
bined with very big guns) to dictate how engagements would be fought. For this 
they needed turbine propulsion, a proven long-range gunnery fire-control system, 
and a method of controlling these ships on a global basis; these three things became 
the prerequisites for the proposed Fisher sea-control revolution. Given their pri-
macy, geostrategic position, and, as noted, available facilities worldwide, endurance 
was much less of a concern for them. The other part of the puzzle was an effective 
flotilla-defense system in home waters to replace the departed battle fleet, and for 
this Fisher envisaged a network of interconnected submarines. Global sea control 
with battle cruisers and anti-invasion defense with submarines were thus the two 
vital pillars of his naval strategy.
By contrast, the United States was building a first-rate navy from a position of 
inferiority; it had no infrastructure around the world to support fleets away from 
home and no economies to be achieved by decommissioning older ships. Strategi-
cally speaking, its overseas trade was a relatively unimportant driver in sizing its 
fleet, since, and unlike Great Britain, it was largely self-sufficient in resources. As a 
result, and in view of the nation’s anticolonialist policies, its naval leaders believed 
that their main fighting ships were much more likely to have to fight others of 
their kind in fleet actions, in response to challenges to the Monroe Doctrine. They 
also expected that such battles would come down to short-range slugging matches 
in which gun power and protection would be at a premium. Since the U.S. Navy 
was likely to be smaller than its opponent, it would have to remain concentrated, 
comprise powerful, well-built battleships, and be much more self-sufficient than 
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the British when deployed. As a result, it stressed the qualities of good protection, 
offensive power, and endurance over everything else. Speed was much less a factor. 
Although officers like Sims, in particular, shared the British views on large, fast, 
all-big-gun ships, their recommendations tended to go unheeded, simply because 
this British vision of ocean protectors did not fit the American strategic circum-
stances. What was important for the fleet was to keep concentrated and to survive 
in battle; thus the sacrifices in speed and responsiveness necessary to achieve these 
ends were made. 
The second great difference between the two cases related to the impact of 
personalities and institutional structures on the actual progress of naval reform. 
When we look at the British situation, it is difficult not to see a dominant reformer 
(Fisher) completely taking over the system and driving it to his own personal beat. 
Some would say that this was a strength in terms of innovation, and certainly it al-
lowed one set of reforms to gain traction quickly, but because the changes were so 
quick and necessarily forced, great segments of the service population were simply 
bypassed or remained unconvinced.
Equally, programs like Fisher’s require meticulous long-range planning and a 
degree of consistency in execution that were simply lacking. While Fisher started 
in the right way, with his personnel and fleet-disposition reforms in his run-up to 
1904, once he was ensconced as the First Sea Lord his inconsistencies came to the 
fore, particularly in the more technical arguments. As a result, the many potential 
allies who had been overlooked or browbeaten were determined, and eventually 
able, to muster a credible opposition that, although unsuccessful while he was in 
office, slowed things down once he had left. The battle cruiser was a case in point. 
Devoid of its champion and with its strategic rationale diminished by external fac-
tors by the time it finally emerged, this class of ship would be misemployed as an 
adjunct to the battle line, a role for which it was simply unsuited.152 In short, the 
Royal Navy was poorly prepared as an institution to deal with a volcanic person-
ality like Fisher, who managed to polarize opinions to an unhealthy degree. The 
ultimate result was that his promising reforms fell short in a number of key areas. 
By contrast, in the American case there was no single, dominant personality 
(although some, like Sims, shared many of the traits that had brought Fisher to 
prominence in Great Britain). In fact, the American institutional system, a network 
of powerful bureaus and boards, each controlling a different aspect of the naval 
procurement process, was specifically designed to ensure that this could not hap-
pen. The result was a far more considered, albeit slower, process that took equal 
account of all the necessary angles. No one aspect was allowed to predominate 
through force of advocacy alone. While the system had its faults, it arguably gave its 
navy a better-researched product at the end of the day. It would certainly be wrong 
to claim that the Americans were slow and unresponsive to the dreadnought-era 
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innovations. As this article perhaps has shown, there was in the United States no 
shortage of pioneering brilliance, as seen in Washington Capps’s innovative use of 
superfiring turrets to get around displacement limitations—a move that created a 
fashion that was to endure for decades. Nor was there any shortage of moral cour-
age, as evidenced by the Bureau of Engineering’s persistence in achieving the best 
power plant for the U.S. Navy, even to the point of forcing turbine manufacturers to 
consider its unique needs or face rejection. In every area, American naval architects 
analyzed key developments carefully and with extraordinary foresight, fitting them 
around their own strategic needs and looking for valid improvements. When such 
improvements were found, they were pursued with vigor. 
The problem, though, was in the time that it took for the system as a whole to 
respond. Without an enormous military-industrial complex behind it, the multi-
faceted approval process was simply unable to capitalize on its superior analysis in 
a timely and positive way, once the path became clear. The result was a much slower 
transformation overall, which caused the operators to claim that the ship-design 
system was unresponsive to their needs. In truth, however, the design analysis in 
this case was ultimately correct—the British battle-cruiser revolution would not 
have been a good fit for the American strategic situation, and it is to the Americans’ 
credit that they were not swept along by it, as the Germans were. Far from stifling 
innovation, therefore, the exacting American process was actually more searching 
than that of the British. It effectively ensured that, before proceeding, any proposed 
innovations were sound, having been properly analyzed and deemed unlikely to 
lead into strategic “blind alleys.” Each system had its strengths, but the American 
process deserves more credit than it has received for ultimately leading to a broadly 
durable vehicle for the support of its navy in the remainder of the twentieth century. 
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IX Innovation for Its Own Sake
The Type XXI U-boat
MARCUS O. JONES
The origins of this article lie in a new study of the Nazi German economy by Adam Tooze, a fragment of which argues that the need to overcome the technological deficit built by the Western Allies in antisubmarine warfare 
from 1939 triggered a major shift in U-boat design and production after 1943.1 
Tooze points out that an emphasis on technological solutions to strategic and oper-
ational problems had by that point become a hallmark of the Nazis’, and especially 
Hitler’s, thinking. (Other examples were the Tiger and Panther tanks at Kursk, both 
of which types proved dysfunctional as platforms, and neither of which proved 
decisive to the outcome.) So interpreted, the Nazi penchant for imputing to innova-
tion the means to solve a whole class of operational and strategic problems seems 
to resemble “technological fixes” in other fields of innovation.2 In so arguing Tooze 
writes off the findings of Richard Overy, who points to the failure of the regime to 
develop positive relationships between industry and the war effort as reflecting a 
“peculiar irrationality of the ‘Nazi social system.’” Tooze highlights the research of 
Ralf Schabel on jet-engine development in the aircraft industry, research assert-
ing that exaggerated technological expectations resulted from Germany’s hopeless 
strategic dilemma and that the systems themselves, while quite promising, were 
rushed into mass production and combat without adequate testing or develop-
ment. Interestingly, he then characterizes Adm. Karl Dönitz’s decision to embrace 
the Type XXI submarine in 1943, under the technocratic direction of Albert Speer’s 
ministry, as reflecting both the increasing unreality of German armaments propa-
ganda and a progressively more authoritarian cast of the German war economy.
While agreeing entirely with Tooze’s identification of a strong relationship be-
tween Nazi Germany’s broad strategic and economic problems and the technologi-
cal innovations seen as panaceas for them, this paper argues that the U-boat Type 
XXI was nonetheless not nearly so unrealistic a solution as his account suggests, 
nor as reflective of a grossly dysfunctional culture of innovation as other common-
ly cited cases may be. If one assumes Nazi Germany’s essentially flawed strategic 
decision to interdict the Allies’ commerce traffic in the Atlantic, then the German 
navy, under the technological and operational constraints then prevailing, had no 
better option than to develop a platform that accomplished what the Type XXI 
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promised. This revision of Tooze’s case arises from the assumption that the culture 
of naval architecture and engineering before 1943, organized around largely tradi-
tional methods of design and construction, was wholly inadequate to Germany’s 
strategic problems. In the absence of more promising alternatives, the decision to 
subordinate the shipbuilding industry ruthlessly to innovative technocratic priori-
ties appears more rational than otherwise. It may also serve as a cautionary example 
of the extent to which social explanations of technological adaptation must include 
appreciation of the iron operational constraints on military effectiveness.
Naval warfare is arguably more revealing of the intimate connections among 
technological trends and broader political, economic, and military circumstances 
than is warfare of nearly any other kind. As Karl Lautenschläger has argued, “naval 
warfare in general is sensitive to changes in technology, because it is platforms as 
well as weapons that are necessary for combat at sea. Whereas armies have histori-
cally armed and supported the man, navies have essentially manned and supported 
the arm.”3 Determination of the reasons for the paths of innovation taken, as well as 
the pace and character of innovation itself, has bedeviled historians of technology 
for generations. Every military technological innovation is shaped by a complex of 
influences, but most notably by some conception, however well or poorly under-
stood, of the operational scheme within which it is intended to fit.
The technologies that defined Germany’s Atlantic campaigns had their roots in 
expectations about future conflict that seemed entirely reasonable in the 1930s but 
proved woefully misguided when the full implications of Hitler’s strategic ambi-
tions became apparent by 1942. In the decade before the war, the nascent Kriegs-
marine envisioned a limited naval war primarily against France, and after 1938, 
England. The prevailing operational scheme, which found its strongest exponent in 
Adm. Erich Raeder, then commander in chief of the navy, emphasized a balanced 
fleet comprising heavy and light elements to threaten enemy naval and commercial 
interests in a dispersed manner. The primary role of submarines in this concept 
was twofold: to serve in a fleet-support and screening capacity, for which a limited 
number of larger, longer-range, and faster submarines would be required; and to 
conduct a commerce war of limited range and intensity against French, and later 
English, maritime assets in the eastern Atlantic, for which a large number of small-
er, cheaper, and easily produced boats was necessary. Although some elements 
within the German naval command in the mid-1930s, notably Admiral Dönitz, 
envisioned a strategy of commerce interdiction that emphasized an autonomous 
role for U-boats, the then-prevailing doctrine saw the U-boat as but one of a broad 
mix of assets in a balanced fleet. Most importantly, and to the extent that the anti-
commerce strategy of Dönitz could be said to have shaped procurement decisions 
in the late 1930s and early phases of the Second World War, the notion of wolf-pack 
NWC_HM23.indb   146 12/8/15   9:00 AM
 INNOVATION FOR ITS OWN SAKE 147 146 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
tactics against convoys made the acquisition of as large a number as possible of 
comparatively simple, inexpensive, medium-sized submarines a priority in naval 
planning. However, at no point before 1942/43 could the German navy be said to 
have enjoyed a substantial priority in German armaments production. As a result, 
the German navy began the war with scarcely more than two dozen oceangoing 
submarines, and not before 1942, arguably past the critical point of balance in its 
commerce war against Britain, did it have a number sufficient to mount consistent 
group operations.
As those familiar with the course of the Atlantic war until May 1943 understand, 
initial German success was gradually eclipsed by superior Allied technology, code 
breaking, organization, and especially shipbuilding capacity—arguably the most 
decisive single element in determining the outcome of the naval war. On the tacti-
cal level, where the platforms themselves were decisive, the increasing number and 
effectiveness of Allied convoy escorts and countermeasures, especially electronic 
means of detection, led to unacceptably high losses of the Types VII and IX U-
boats that made up the bulk of the German fleet. According to the commander of 
the U-boat force, Dönitz, losses to mid-1943 amounted at most to 13 percent of the 
deployed boats. The severe setbacks that the fleet suffered in early 1943 amounted 
to some 30 to 50 percent of the deployed force, with losses in May 1943 of forty-
three boats, or more than a boat a day on average.4 The limited utility of conven-
tional diesel submarines had become irrefutably obvious. If defensive tactics could 
deny the submarine surface mobility and compel it to rely on its subsurface capa-
bility for survival, then it became nearly useless as an offensive weapon. Defensive 
platforms detected U-boats with radar, sonar, high-frequency direction finding 
(“Huff Duff ”), and—most effectively—roving aircraft, which became increasingly 
common by late 1943. Aircraft or surface ships could then prosecute the contact, 
compelling the boat to dive and holding it down long enough for a convoy to lum-
ber away. With its slow surface and even slower submerged speed, a conventional 
Type VII or IX U-boat was hard pressed to develop a second attack angle, and then 
only if antisubmarine units were not hounding it. 
In a draft assessment of the naval strategic situation in September 1942, the 
Kriegsmarine High Command starkly expressed its first noteworthy reservations 
about whether the U-boat campaign could have the desired decisive effect on the 
Allies’ capacity to sustain their war effort, a finding based as much on the vulner-
ability of existing platforms to Allied countermeasures as on anything else.5 Al-
though the finding was stricken, the final report acknowledged that “not one war 
in history was won by the use of a single weapon,” a caution reflecting the simple 
fact that Germany could not sink enough tonnage fast enough to overcome the 
enormous American shipbuilding capacity.6 Although Hitler had declared on many 
occasions that he considered U-boat warfare crucial for the overall war effort, not 
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until after the surrender of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad did he seize on it as the sole 
remaining offensive potential available to the Third Reich and accord it a meaning-
ful priority in war production.
These circumstances lay behind the radical shift in platform design and produc-
tion priorities after 1943. The essential question facing the strategic leadership after 
the midyear debacle was whether to abandon the Atlantic—which would amount 
to an almost inconceivable admission by professional officers of the strategic bank-
ruptcy of their service—or to redouble the effort and shift the terms on which com-
merce warfare was waged through evolutionary advances in platform survivability 
and effectiveness.7 Dönitz, commander in chief of the German navy as of January 
1943, opted for the latter, with the full backing of Hitler. The platform that would 
bring about this transformation was the Type XXI submarine.
Historians have generally thought of the Type XXI—along with other systems 
like the Me 262, V-1 and V-2 rockets, and the Tiger tank—as an example of Wun-
derwaffen, wonder weapons. Since 1945 many have fixated on the revolutionary 
military technologies that the Third Reich developed in the last two years of the 
war.8 The cultural impetus behind the concept, as implicitly or explicitly acknowl-
edged by historians in the uneven and largely enthusiastic literature on the sub-
ject, was an irrational faith in technology to prevail in operationally or strategically 
complex and desperate situations—a conviction amounting to a disease, to which 
many in the Third Reich were prone in the latter years of the Second World War.9 
To the extent that it shaped decision making, faith in the Wunderwaffen was a spe-
cial, superficial kind of technological determinism, a confidence in the power of 
technology to prevail over the country’s strategic, operational, and doctrinal short-
comings. To the extent that leaders, officers, engineers, and scientists after 1943 be-
lieved innovation to be the answer to Germany’s strategic dilemmas, they displayed 
a naive ignorance of how technology interacts with cultural and other factors to 
influence the course of events. In particular, they reflected a willful ignorance of the 
extent to which even substantial technological superiority has proved indecisive in 
human conflict throughout history.10
The origins of the Type XXI program lay in a test platform built in 1939–40 by a 
brilliant propulsion engineer, Helmuth Walter, who intended it to serve as a proto-
type of a genuine submarine weapon.11 Submarines to that point, their name not-
withstanding, had actually been little more than extremely slow, vulnerable, largely 
helpless torpedo boats capable of brief submergence. The underwater speed and 
endurance of standard U-boat types were insufficient to stalk and close on typical 
convoys, though they traveled at speeds of only eight knots or less, and were barely 
adequate against slower formations; U-boats were forced to spend the bulk of their 
time on the surface, vulnerable to all manner of countermeasures. Walter’s test 
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bed, designated V80, achieved an impressive twenty-eight knots submerged and 
seemed to address the need for a genuine high-speed underwater platform. The 
boat suffered from a range of thorny technical problems, however, most notably 
the type and quantity of fuel required by the closed-cycle Walter engine—highly 
volatile Perhydrol, or hydrogen peroxide. To power the boat the Perhydrol was re-
duced by chemical processes, generating extremely high-pressure gases that spun 
a propeller-geared turbine at nearly twenty thousand revolutions per minute. A 
submarine operating such a closed-cycle system could remain submerged as long 
as its fuel supply permitted. However, the Walter turbine required colossal amounts 
of fuel to meet even modest performance parameters, far outstripping the bunker-
age capacity of existing U-boat designs. Walter, ever inventive, therefore conceived 
of a U-boat with a pressure hull of a figure-eight form: the top half would house 
the machinery, weapons, and the crew, while the bottom would contain the large 
amount of fuel necessary to power the turbine. The design draft was designated the 
Type XVIII.
In a November 1942 meeting on U-boat design projects, the director of naval 
construction, Heinrich Ölfken, along with a pair of engineers, Friedrich Schürer 
and Klaus Bröking, happened on the idea of utilizing the Walter architecture to 
house a conventional electric propulsion system able to drive the boat at under-
water speeds higher than those attained by existing designs.12 The lower loop of 
the figure eight, where Perhydrol would have been stored, afforded space for an 
enormous increase in battery capacity, effectively triple that of a conventional Type 
IX U-boat.13 The massive battery plant would run a powerful electric-drive sys-
tem, necessitating diesel power to charge the batteries much less often than current 
boats required. Preliminary testing revealed that the performance of the hybrid 
design, although it fell far short of the prototype Walter boat, far exceeded that 
of existing platforms, especially underwater. Admiral Dönitz, still commander of 
the submarine force, agreed that the concept merited further development and ap-
proved additional design work and testing. Theoretical calculations and modeling 
were complete by January 1943; five months later, the naval staff was provided with 
a preliminary design draft.
The resulting boat, designated Type XXI, displaced some 1,620 tons and was 
capable of a submerged sprint of eighteen knots sustained for an hour and a half, a 
moderate speed of from twelve to fourteen knots for ten hours, and silent running 
at five knots for sixty hours. Most importantly, it was designed from the outset to 
incorporate the sensors, countermeasures, and other devices understood by that 
point to be indispensable in the commerce war: water-pressure-controlled auto-
matic depth-keeping equipment, an improved passive listening array, active sonar, 
a radar-search receiver, effective active radar, and a snorkel. Dönitz presented the 
Type XXI design to Hitler at a conference on 8 July 1943 to win his approval for 
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the additional allocations of resources and labor required to realize a production 
program. Having persuaded Hitler, Dönitz issued an order on 13 August for the 
full-scale transition to building “Elektroboots.” Initially, he had intended the Type 
XXI to replace the outmoded Type IX, but after the catastrophic performance of 
his boats in May 1943 he determined that it should take the place of the Type VII 
convoy-attack boat as well.
One cannot exaggerate the importance of the experience of the U-boat service 
in May 1943 to Dönitz’s decision to shift production to an entirely new platform 
in wartime. As the officers and sailors who manned the U-boat fleet, and who had 
fought so doggedly, now found, no amount of willpower or doctrinal ingenuity on 
the basis of existing boat types could overcome the collective effects of the coun-
termeasures the Allies employed so well by 1943. The obsolescence of the German 
navy’s U-boats, which in the early years of the war had been the scourge of the 
British war effort, had come about so quickly and completely that Germany was 
compelled in the circumstances of a failing war to attempt a leap in submarine 
capability simply to have any hope of affecting the Battle of the Atlantic. In other 
words, Dönitz argued, his submariners had no choice but to innovate further, on 
the basis of their disadvantage. Thus understood, the capabilities of conventional 
U-boats by 1943 represented a “reverse salient” in a technological system (in this 
case, the interlocking network of technologies and practices of a maritime com-
merce war as a whole)—that is, “components in the system that have fallen behind 
or are out of phase with the others.”14 In technological terms, the reverse salient is 
the weak link that impedes progress. The concept has its origins in descriptions of 
warfare, where it refers to a section of an advancing military front that has fallen 
behind the rest, typically becoming the point of weakness in an attack and a zone, a 
sack, of vulnerability in defense, a lagging element that prevents the rest of the force 
from fulfilling its objective. Until the reverse salient is corrected, an army’s progress 
comes to a halt. “When a reverse salient cannot be corrected within the context of 
an existing system, the problem becomes a radical one, the solution of which may 
bring a new and competing system.”15
Even had Germany produced a large number of Type XXI boats in time to field 
them during the war, or brought forth any at an earlier date, it is doubtful wheth-
er they could have corrected the salient and fulfilled the promise of the Wunder-
waffen. Historians have spilled much ink to argue how revolutionary a technology 
the Type XXI was and how qualitatively different would have been the terms on 
which the Battle of the Atlantic was fought had Nazi Germany sent substantial 
numbers of these high-performance platforms to sea. But a sober consideration of 
the new boat’s capabilities in the context of existing Allied countermeasures makes 
plain that it would not have shifted the terms as much as Dönitz and the rest of 
the German leadership hoped. The Type XXI offered no expansion of missions 
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beyond the three basic ones performed by submarines between the outbreak of the 
First World War and the launch of nuclear-powered USS Nautilus in 1954: coastal 
defense, naval attrition, and commerce warfare. 
To be sure, the class certainly stood to enhance the ability of the German sub-
marine force to fulfill its missions more effectively. But it could not have enabled 
the force to perform the other three significant roles of submarines that arose later 
in the twentieth century: projection of power ashore, fleet engagement, and assured 
destruction. Only the nuclear submarine, with its ability to remain submerged as 
long as the crew could feed itself and remain sane, offered navies the means of 
fulfilling those tasks, and then only in conjunction with technologies as yet unde-
veloped during the war. Most importantly, the Type XXI would have done noth-
ing to solve the target-acquisition problem, arguably the single greatest obstacle to 
success in the U-boat campaign against Allied shipping. Without long-range patrol 
aircraft to detect convoys and fix their positions, submarine commanders had to 
rely on what could be glimpsed from atop the conning towers of their tiny craft. 
Limiting the effective range of observation was not only the submarine’s low free-
board but the generally miserable weather of the North Atlantic Ocean. Even patrol 
lines of U-boats strung out across large areas frequently missed sizable convoys, 
and the vast majority lumbered by anyway. Only the Luftwaffe, which Hermann 
Göring guarded with jealousy and bile, could address that deficiency. For these rea-
sons, it is important to understand the Type XXI as an evolutionary technological 
development of existing undersea warfare technologies, as opposed to a platform of 
the kind that changes entirely the nature of naval power altogether.16
However, in the design and production of the Type XXI lay evidence of innova-
tion greater than that represented by the platform itself. The two principal shortcom-
ings in the German navy’s approach to commerce interdiction in the Atlantic lay, 
first, in its resource disadvantage in the war economy relative to the other services 
—an inferiority that was itself a function of the lesser strategic significance of the 
Atlantic war for the Nazi regime—and second, in the capacity constraints of the 
German shipbuilding industry. The former shortcoming was addressed to some 
extent on a political level in mid-1943, when Dönitz secured Hitler’s acknowledg-
ment of the importance of the U-boat war and approval for the Type XXI program, 
along with his promise, however nebulous, to resource it adequately. Dönitz dealt 
with the latter in a more radical manner. No amount of political capital could ex-
tract a higher unit productivity from the already-stretched shipbuilding industry, 
which was understood by that point to be essential to turning the tide of the At-
lantic war. Certainly, one could not reasonably expect Type XXI submarines to be 
produced at the same rate as earlier types, or anything like it, as the new design was 
far larger, more complex, expensive, and resource and manpower intensive than its 
predecessors. A transformation of shipbuilding itself was essential.
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In 1942, German U-boat construction, which by this point accounted for the 
bulk of total shipbuilding capacity, was organized around largely traditional meth-
ods of design, engineering, and production. The navy enjoyed a preeminent posi-
tion in defining standards and regulating construction processes, as well as gener-
ally warm relations with the traditional shipyards, all of which guaranteed a high 
level of quality but did not meet the demands of mass production in a materiel-
intensive war effort. That unsuitability was apparent as early as 1941, when the 
minister for munitions, Fritz Todt, broached the possibility of setting up a “Main 
Committee” for shipbuilding, based on the promise of industrial self-regulation, to 
centralize and make more efficient U-boat production. Rudolf Blohm, head of the 
enormous Blohm und Voss shipyards and an archreactionary capitalist, chaired the 
new organization, along with Ernst Cords of Krupp Germaniawerft. A key obstacle 
to higher rates of production at acceptable cost was the navy’s custom of ordering 
boats on a quarterly basis; true mass production of the requisite components, large 
and small, required larger orders over lengthier periods of time, for which manu-
facturers could plan and invest on an appropriate scale.17 
The committee quickly brought about a partial and largely successful reorien-
tation of production of the conventional Type VIIC, the standard U-boat class of 
the war. Noteworthy in these early reforms were the establishment of long-series 
production and the subcontracting of major-component manufacture on a provi-
sional basis to inland steel-construction firms—the latter being a critical, often-
overlooked precedent of the Type XXI program. Moving production of major 
subcomponents to inland subcontractors permitted the specialization of manufac-
turing processes and reduced the time a U-boat spent in the slips during assembly, 
important for increasing shipyard throughput and for reducing the yards’ vulner-
ability to Allied strategic bombing.
As already described, with Dönitz’s appointment as commander in chief of the 
German navy in January 1943, just prior to the disastrous convoy battles of May, 
came a major shift in the orientation of the U-boat fleet. Dönitz was persuaded that 
nothing short of an industrial miracle would supply enough Type XXI boats to tip 
the balance of the Atlantic war. In a devil’s bargain, therefore, he relinquished the 
navy’s traditional strict control over ship design, engineering, and construction to 
Albert Speer’s armaments ministry, which at that point was expanding its control 
into every corner of the German war economy. Speer’s price for the manpower and 
raw materials to mass-produce the new class of submarine was the subordination 
of the dockyards to his ministry. Even with the backing of his powerful organiza-
tion, however, the best initial estimates for an accelerated development program 
foresaw the arrival of the first boats only in late 1944, with series production begin-
ning in March 1945.18 Conventional U-boats had generally required between two 
and two and a half years to mature from concept to serial production; assuming 
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that a conventional development curve applied as well to the Type XXI—an op-
timistic assumption, since it was a far larger and more complex boat—the earliest 
the new class could join the fleet would be 1946. A breathing space for the Allies of 
more than two years would presumably mean the loss of the Atlantic entirely.
To close the time gap, Speer resolved to break the conservative engineering and 
construction culture of the established dockyards with a radical program of modu-
lar construction and dispersed, serialized component manufacturing. In July 1943 
he appointed Otto Merker, an impetuous forty-year-old industrial engineer with 
extensive experience in automobile and fire-engine manufacturing, to head the 
Main Committee for Ship Construction. Merker proposed that the new class of 
U-boats be assembled from eight large, prefabricated sections weighing between 
seventy and 130 tons apiece, assembled inland by firms that had been to that point, 
in most cases, rolling and shaping plate steel for pressure hulls. The advanced de-
sign and engineering work for the new class and the detailed planning for its pro-
duction were assigned to a new, centralized organization called the Ingenieurbüro 
Glückauf, established in Blankenburg/Halberstadt to take over tasks traditionally 
handled by the yards of individual shipbuilders. Intense Allied bombing and com-
munication difficulties drove the decision both to centralize the Ingenieurbüro and 
to situate it far from the waterfront. Nearly 50 percent of all German steel firms 
were to be involved to varying extents in manufacturing and assembling the hull 
sections and machinery for the new boats; many of the vendors had never before 
performed high-precision finished work and would require substantial technical 
direction to meet the exacting standards of pressure-hull construction. The pre-
fabricated sections were to be transported by barge on inland waterways to three 
final assembly points: Blohm und Voss in Hamburg, Deschimag in Bremen, and 
Schicau in Elbing, east of Danzig. Utilizing such methods, Merker claimed, the first 
Type XXI could be launched by 1 April 1944, with production rising to thirty boats 
per month by autumn of that year. In fact, with the entire organization leaning 
ruthlessly toward the lofty production targets, the first copy was launched—amid 
great fanfare—less than three weeks late, on 19 April 1944, the day before Hitler’s 
birthday. 
Nonetheless, the Type XXI U-boats had almost no impact on the outcome of 
the Second World War, save perhaps to absorb large amounts of manpower and 
resources that might have been devoted more wisely to the manufacture of aircraft, 
armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions. Indeed, a senior engineer in the naval 
shipbuilding program estimated that a single Type XXI submarine consumed a vol-
ume of armaments-grade steel equivalent to some thirty tanks, a meaningful offset 
for the war in light of the much shorter production time for an armored vehicle.19 
By that logic, the program cost the war effort some five thousand tanks, a very con-
sequential figure, and could be said to have hastened the defeat of Germany on the 
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Eastern Front. The new class hardly seemed a formidable prospect at the outset, at 
any rate. The first copy, assembled hastily as a showpiece for the führer’s birthday, 
leaked so badly upon launching that it required pontoons to remain afloat; follow-
ing the ceremony, it was towed immediately to dry dock for extensive repair. 
The extraordinary complexity of the new boats, the novelty of the tactical con-
cepts they made possible, and the difficulties of training new crews to man them 
in the mine-infested waters of the Baltic—to say nothing of the vagaries of produc-
ing them as the Western Allies relentlessly bombed German production centers 
—ensured that none of the roughly eighty produced by the end of 1944 was fit 
for action on delivery. Only two sallied forth on war patrols before the end of 
hostilities; neither sank an enemy vessel. Early Type XXI hulls suffered from de-
fective diesel-engine superchargers, faulty hydraulic torpedo-loading systems, 
trouble-prone steering systems, and countless other deficiencies, making them 
decidedly less of a threat than originally foreseen. The improvised character of 
the boats’ production made addressing these early shortcomings daunting. Basic 
to modern naval shipbuilding—and among the greatest challenges to effective 
platform development throughout the history of modern military procurement 
—is the feedback loop from the fleet back to the design bureau and shipyard about 
the actual operation of a vessel on patrol and in combat. Almost no early iteration 
of a ship class emerges from the slipways in a form optimized for its mission, and 
countless changes, large and small, factor into subsequent iterations.20 The very 
processes that ensure the efficiency of serial production make such loops challeng-
ing, if not impossible, to establish. It had been this concern that lay at the core 
of navy objections to the abdication of authority over shipbuilding to the Speer 
organization, and it proved a major reason for the checkered early history of the 
program.
Certainly, the authors of the production concept had enormous obstacles to sur-
mount to realize its potential.21 As has been noted, few of the inland firms tasked 
with constructing the hull segments and machinery could initially meet the stan-
dards required, at least under the fraught circumstances of a failing war and the 
ruthless timetables established by Speer’s organization. The tolerances involved in 
submarine construction were and remain extremely exacting. Type XXI hull sec-
tions were initially delivered to the shipyards with deviations of up to three centi-
meters in some cases and had to be torn apart and reconstructed properly—with 
massive outlays of time and effort—in the ways. Pressure testing revealed poten-
tially lethal defects in the welding of the first boats, a result of poorly fitting com-
ponents, new inspection standards, and construction methods unfamiliar to the 
facilities performing them. But the design agency, engineering staff, and shipyards 
addressed and overcame these problems by autumn 1944. 
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However, easily the greatest impediment to full realization of the serial produc-
tion process, as postwar assessments make clear, was the intense and devastating 
Allied bombing campaign against its key components, especially the shipyards and 
installations at the waterfront.22 The increasing vulnerability of the shipbuilding 
industry to bombing had made it necessary to scatter and move production away 
from launch sites. Enormous resources and labor were devoted to the construction 
of an elaborate inland system of barges and cranes to transship the boat segments 
to the finishing yards. The delivery system never really functioned smoothly, and 
in any case a sizable administrative apparatus was required to oversee the just-in-
time process. The ingenuity of the Merker organization was never adequate to the 
challenge of Allied strategic bombing, the downstream effects of which were felt at 
every point. 
Conclusion
As Tooze sensibly points out, “the disappointment of the XXI programme was due 
to the familiar problems of pushing a revolutionary new design straight from the 
drawing board into mass production, without extensive testing.”23 He faults the 
Speer ministry in particular, for clinging stubbornly to the system of dispersed 
sectional construction, arguing that an evolutionary approach to production, in-
stead of a revolutionary new one, would have likely yielded more favorable results. 
Indeed, the engineer Friedrich Schürer raised such concerns in late 1943, as the 
joint complications involved in both a radical new platform and novel methods 
of engineering and production became increasingly clear. He suggested that the 
construction of the first boat proceed in a conventional, customized fashion, to 
develop experience with the platform itself. As Merker pointed out, however, to 
build the first Type XXI by conventional means would require no less than eight 
months, while the sectional method, however flawed, would require only four. The 
entire apparatus of dispersed sectional construction, moreover, was scheduled to 
commence operation in April 1944.24 Merker’s argument cuts to the entire point 
of the program—time was of the essence. The desperate operational and strategic 
circumstances of the German naval campaign in the Atlantic necessitated no less 
than an all-or-nothing approach to the production of the only platform that offered 
any prospect of success against an overwhelming Allied technological and materiel 
advantage. 
As Dönitz well understood, a small number of even superlative boats would 
have produced little change in the Atlantic. The only hope for an effective naval 
interdiction strategy lay in building the Type XXI in numbers similar to, or great-
er than, those in which the Type VIIs had been constructed before 1943, thereby 
overcoming simultaneously the Allied superiorities in technology and in materiel. 
As we have seen, that goal was not achieved. But even so, it is astounding that a 
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platform as complex and resource intensive—by the standards of any combatant 
nation—as the Type XXI could move from the drawing board to the water in a year, 
and by a radically new manufacturing process. The technology of the platform it-
self ultimately amounted to no more than an incremental or evolutionary improve-
ment in the German ability to close the Atlantic; it most probably would not have 
realized the extraordinary effectiveness hoped for by its proponents then and ad-
mirers today. But the innovative method of constructing the new class represented 
a revolutionary transformation of economic practice in a war defined primarily by 
the mobilized productive potentials of the combatants.
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X FREQUENT WIND, Option IV
The 29–30 April 1975 Helicopter Evacuation of Saigon
JOHN F. GUILMARTIN, JR.
The 29–30 April 1975 helicopter evacuation of Saigon, technically “Option IV” of Operation FREQUENT WIND, remains to this day the largest helicop-ter airlift ever. According to the official tally, 1,373 Americans and 6,442 
non-Americans were taken from the city by helicopter, along with 989 Marines of 
the ground security force who had been inserted at the beginning of the evacua-
tion.1 As I will argue later, the figures are surely low and their precision illusory. So 
is the accuracy of their categorization. “Americans” lumps together civilians and, I 
presume, American military personnel who were not part of the ground security 
force (GSF). “Non-Americans” includes Vietnamese and friendly third-country 
nationals. More important, it lumps together Vietnamese deemed particularly at 
risk in the wake of communist victory, who were on prioritized lists of evacuees, 
and others, civilian and military, who gained entry to the evacuation staging areas 
through connections, force, or blind luck. Tragically, those in the second category 
vastly outnumbered those in the first. 
Still, while we left behind many who should have been evacuated and evacuated 
many who would not have been high on anybody’s prioritized list, we—by which 
I mean military helicopter crews; helicopter crews and ground personnel of Air 
America, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) airlift organization; the ground 
security force Marines; members of the embassy staff and civilian volunteers who 
helped maintain order in the staging areas; and ships’ crews and operations person-
nel who maintained the helicopters and imposed a degree of order on the opera-
tion—did a magnificent job of rapidly transporting large numbers of people under 
difficult conditions. To the list of those deserving kudos, I would add the crews of 
Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter and attack aircraft who provided fire support as 
needed—mostly it wasn’t, with one significant exception of which I am aware—and 
the crews of the command-and-control aircraft and tankers who supported them. 
Certain of those in senior command billets deserve kudos as well, notably Rear 
Adm. Donald Whitmire, commander of Task Force (TF) 76; Brig. Gen. Richard 
E. Carey, who controlled all Marine helicopter assets; and Col. Alfred M. Gray, Jr., 
commander of the 4th Marine Regiment, which provided the ground security force. 
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It should be clear from the length of the above list that Option IV—the focus of 
this paper—was a complex operation but only part of the Saigon evacuation. There 
was a maritime component to FREQUENT WIND, Option III, which accounted for 
over two thousand evacuees. The South Vietnamese navy mounted its own remark-
ably successful evacuation. The South Vietnamese air force (VNAF) got out a sig-
nificant number of its personnel and their families in an extemporized last-minute 
evacuation by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter. Of direct relevance to Option IV, 
Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, retired but still chief of the VNAF, intervened in the 
early morning hours of 29 April, taking off in his personal UH-1 Huey helicopter, 
scrambling VNAF A-1H fighter-bombers from Can Tho air base to the south, and 
personally directing them in suppressive attacks on North Vietnamese rocket bat-
teries shelling Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut airport, the site of the primary evacuation 
terminal.2 Also of relevance, the crew of a VNAF AC-119K side-firing gunship took 
off from Tan Son Nhut at about the same time and spent the balance of the night 
suppressing communist fire around the airfield before making the ultimate sacri-
fice at 0700 (7 AM), shot down by an SA-7 shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missile.3 
As the above preamble suggests, the helicopter evacuation of Saigon was not 
only a complex operation but one in which decision makers at all levels in the chain 
of command had to deal with uncertainty and the unexpected to an uncommon 
degree. There is much to be learned from a close examination of Option IV, and to 
that we now turn. 
The story begins with the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords, essentially a cease-fire, 
which permitted North Vietnam to keep and sustain sizable forces within South 
Vietnam, while the American military presence was restricted to fifty officers as-
signed to the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Saigon and 159 Marines assigned 
as guards to consular offices in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho.4 
The DAO was housed in the old Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
headquarters on Tan Son Nhut airfield. Manned by 1,200 American civilians and 
3,500 Vietnamese, in addition to the fifty officers, it was charged with orches-
trating American support to South Vietnam, and it reported to the ambassador. 
On 29 March 1973, MACV was decommissioned and replaced as the senior U.S. 
headquarters in Southeast Asia by the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG, pro-
nounced “you sog”), based at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thai-
land, and commanded by Lt. Gen. John J. Burns, U.S. Air Force (USAF), who also 
commanded Seventh Air Force. 
By the time the cease-fire went into effect, we had augmented the South Viet-
namese armed forces with a massive infusion of arms and equipment and reserved 
the right to resupply and to replace worn-out or destroyed equipment. The com-
munists were bound by similar restrictions, but predictably they ignored them, so 
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in the final analysis South Vietnam’s survival depended on America’s willingness 
to provide continuing economic and logistical support and to intervene militari-
ly should the communist forces blatantly violate the terms of the treaty. Indeed, 
President Richard Nixon had secured the acquiescence of the South Vietnamese 
president, Nguyen Van Thieu, to the terms of the accords with a promise of military 
intervention should that become necessary. 
On the positive side of the balance, by 1973 the guerrilla struggle was over in 
the South, with the Saigon government the victor. Though South Vietnam’s mili-
tary and civil institutions were penetrated by communist agents, the Viet Cong had 
effectively ceased to exist as a force in the villages. In the countryside, President 
Thieu’s 1970 land reforms had leveled out the differences between the very wealthy 
and wretchedly poor, and the introduction of improved strains of rice had pro-
duced the beginnings of real agrarian prosperity.5 True, communist forces occupied 
large chunks of South Vietnamese territory, but mostly in sparsely populated areas 
of the Central Highlands occupied during the 1972 Easter Offensive. 
On the negative side of the balance, Soviet and Chinese support for North Viet-
nam remained strong, and congressional action had progressively curtailed U.S. 
military activity in the rest of Indochina, giving communist forces a free hand in 
their struggle with increasingly enfeebled government forces in Laos and Cambo-
dia. With the threat of American bombs gone, the communist forces improved the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail, paving much of it and installing a gasoline pipeline running 
from North Vietnam into the Central Highlands. The communist-occupied zones 
of the South, though of little value politically or economically, would serve as useful 
jumping-off positions for a general offensive. The war was increasingly unpopular 
with the American intelligentsia; and news media and the public had largely lost 
interest. Against this political backdrop, Congress, with the antiwar faction calling 
the shots, progressively reduced economic aid to South Vietnam. Last and far from 
least, President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 sharply reduced the chances of 
U.S. military intervention to preserve South Vietnam. 
The beginning of the end came in mid-December 1974, with a North Vietnam-
ese attack on the provincial capital of Phuoc Long, north of Saigon. The town was 
lost on 6 January after a bitter struggle, becoming the first provincial capital to fall 
permanently into communist hands.6 The place itself was of little strategic impor-
tance, and with the wisdom of hindsight it appears that a primary purpose of the 
attack was to gauge the American response. There was none, meaning a green light 
for the offensive that followed. 
The next blow came in Cambodia on 1 January, with the beginning of the 
Khmer Rouge’s anticipated dry-season offensive. It struck the eastern perimeter 
of Phnom Penh, throwing the Forces Armées Nationales Khmères into disarray. 
Unlike the loss of Phuoc Long, the Khmer Rouge offensive elicited an American 
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response, albeit a defensive one. Only a massive application of American airpower 
had kept Phnom Penh from falling in 1973, and in 1974 the forces of Gen. Lon Nol’s 
government had unexpectedly hung on by their teeth, but it was widely anticipated 
that Cambodia might fall in 1975. Joint U.S. Navy, Marines, and Air Force plan-
ning to evacuate from Phnom Penh not only Americans but Cambodians deemed 
particularly at risk in the event of communist victory and friendly third-country 
nationals had been under way since 1973. Indeed, two Air Force H-53 squadrons—
the 21st Special Operations Squadron (21st SOS) and the 40th Aerospace Rescue 
and Recovery Squadron (40th ARRS)—had been retained at Nakhon Phanom in 
eastern Thailand for precisely that purpose. The preferred evacuation plan—EAGLE 
PULL—hinged on the use of Marine CH-53s of squadron HMH-462 (HMH for 
Helicopter Marine Heavy) embarked on the assault carrier USS Okinawa (LPH 3), 
assigned to TF 76 and operating in the Gulf of Thailand. The Air Force helicop-
ters were insurance should the fall come before TF 76 could deploy. In either case, 
air support would be provided by Thailand-based USAF fighter-bombers, AC-130 
side-firing gunships, and OV-10 forward-air-control aircraft. As in all such cases, 
the authority to order the evacuation and responsibility for in-country planning fell 
on the American ambassador. 
The ambassador to Cambodia, the Honorable John Gunther Dean, was a man 
of foresight, courage, and competence. His staff had kept him abreast of evacuation 
planning from the outset, and with the start of the Khmer Rouge offensive he col-
lapsed his up-country intelligence nets, recalling Americans and their Cambodian 
assets to the provincial capitals and from there to Phnom Penh. They were flown 
out by commercial air until communist rockets and the congressional ban on the 
use of U.S. military forces in Cambodia forced reliance on contract airlift (Air Force 
C-130s on loan to civilian contractors), steadily reducing the number of potential 
evacuees. Still, the number of projected evacuees was large, and it swelled as the 
Khmer Rouge drew closer to Phnom Penh. The Navy responded by dispatching 
from Hawaii a second Marine H-53 squadron, HMH-463, embarked on the attack 
carrier USS Hancock (CV 19). It arrived just in time. 
On 9 April Ambassador Dean notified the military authorities that EAGLE PULL 
would go down on the 12th. On the day of the evacuation, Dean spent his last 
fifteen minutes in the embassy on the telephone with Premier Long Boret, plead-
ing for the release of eight hundred Cambodians deemed particularly at risk. The 
premier refused, saying, in essence, “It’s our country. We’ll go down fighting.” Dean 
stood at attention as his security detail lowered the flag, got into his limousine, 
and departed for the landing zone (LZ). His foresight had reduced the number 
of evacuees to the point that a single LZ in Phnom Penh sufficed, and the opera-
tion went off without a hitch. Two HH-53Cs from the 40th ARRS inserted and ex-
tracted the Marine command-and-control team that had been forward deployed 
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to Nakhon Phanom. Marine H-53s inserted and extracted Marines of the ground 
security force and took out 276 evacuees.7 CH-53s of the 21st SOS orbited over 
Phnom Penh, unneeded. Air Force OV-10s watched overhead, ready to direct sup-
pressive air strikes. None were required. Its job done, TF 76 departed for Subic Bay 
in the Philippines on the 15th, arriving at midday on the 17th. 
Meanwhile, things had gone badly in South Vietnam. On 10 March, communist 
forces attacked Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands. They were well supplied 
with tanks and artillery and protected by an antiaircraft umbrella featuring SA-2 
radar-guided surface-to-air missiles and shoulder-fired SA-7 heat-seeking missiles 
that effectively neutralized the VNAF in daylight.8 The day after the attack on Ban 
Me Thuot, President Thieu called his senior military commanders to a meeting 
in the Independence Palace and informed them of his intention to abandon the 
northern half of the country, pulling back to defend the south.9 A sensible plan on 
paper, it failed to take into account the impact on troop morale in an army whose 
soldiers’ families lived close to their units. Some units fought well; others simply 
melted away. 
President Thieu gave the order to abandon the Central Highlands on 14 March. 
Ban Me Thuot fell on 18 March, and any hope of orderly withdrawal dissolved 
in the panic that ensued. The attack in the Central Highlands was followed by a 
major drive in northernmost South Vietnam; Da Nang fell on 29 March, again 
amid scenes of chaos. In Da Nang Harbor, cargo ship SS Pioneer Contender, hired 
by Military Sealift Command to take off evacuees and now loaded to the gun-
wales, was boarded by terror-stricken soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Viet-
nam (ARVN), who raped the women and seized control of the vessel’s decks. The 
captain and crew locked themselves in the bridge. Five days later a small Marine 
boarding party rescued the crew and reestablished order. An astonishing seventeen 
thousand persons were aboard.10 A final civilian Boeing 727 flight into Da Nang 
was mobbed by fleeing ARVN soldiers, who tried to force their way on board and 
were driven off by force as it took off from a taxiway. The landing gear failed to 
retract, jammed by the body of a soldier who had climbed into a wheel well; the 
crew proceeded to Tan Son Nhut at low altitude with the landing gear extended. 
When the aircraft came to a halt, several soldiers dropped still alive from the wheel 
wells, saved by their crushed compatriot. Cartoonist Jeff McNelly was to catch the 
bitter irony of the moment in his depiction of a parked Boeing 727 with a pair of 
lifeless legs dangling from a wheel well—wearing Uncle Sam’s striped trousers and 
star-spangled spats. 
By 9 April, communist spearheads had reached the eastern approaches to Sai-
gon at Xuan Loc. There the ARVN 18th Division, reinforced by elements of the 
Airborne Brigade, made an epic stand, fighting the equivalent of three North Viet-
namese divisions to a standstill, but it was too little and too late. 
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As all this was going on, a flood of refugees descended on Saigon, including—
as had been the case in Cambodia—survivors of the up-country intelligence nets, 
though their concentration this time was chaotic and ill coordinated. Various 
American agencies compiled lists of Vietnamese with whom they had worked and 
so were deemed at risk in the event of a communist takeover and arranged for their 
billeting. 
A plan for an evacuation of Saigon had been on the books since the summer of 
1974, under the code name TALON VISE, later changed to FREQUENT WIND.11 It had 
five options: Option I, evacuation by civilian airlift from Tan Son Nhut; Option 
II, evacuation by military airlift; Option III, evacuation by sealift; and Option IV, 
evacuation by military helicopter. An Option V, involving the movement by road 
of 130,000 evacuees to the port of Vung Tau for evacuation by sea, escorted by the 
remnants of the ARVN elite forces, was briefly considered but dropped.12 
Option I proceeded more or less automatically as long as commercial aircraft 
could use Tan Son Nhut, though it was severely hampered by the embassy and 
the Saigon government's insistence on punctilious enforcement of the dictates of 
American and South Vietnamese emigration and immigration law. Option II would 
proceed in parallel with Option I and would take over when the military situation 
dictated. Option III involved seaborne evacuation from the port of Saigon; by the 
time of implementation, it relied on a single tank landing ship and three large barg-
es towed by two hired deep-sea tugboats now moored at the Saigon docks. Option 
IV would depend on Task Force 76. The Navy and Marines took their commitment 
to Option IV seriously, but a lack of meaningful guidance from the embassy left 
them at sea, both literally and figuratively. General Burns at Nakhon Phanom, who 
would be in overall command of the operation once the ambassador gave the order 
to execute, was no better off. 
As the North Vietnamese juggernaut closed on the capital, Admiral Whitmire, 
General Carey, Colonel Gray, and their staffs had little to work with in terms of an-
ticipated numbers of evacuees, availability of air support and the constraints placed 
on it, or timing. The principal cause was the refusal of the ambassador, the Honor-
able Graham Martin, to confront the reality of the situation. An able diplomat with 
a distinguished record and a long-standing commitment to the American cause 
in Southeast Asia, Martin was a forceful personality with courtly manners and an 
icy reserve. Hardworking to an extreme, he was capable of fierce loyalty to subor-
dinates but demanded unswerving obedience in return. Autocratic in style, he did 
not take challenges to his views lightly.13 By the spring of 1975, he was not in the 
best of health. 
Since June 1973, when he assumed his post, Martin had fought hard for the pub-
lic support and congressional funding that South Vietnam needed to survive. For 
reasons readily understandable in terms of the political realities he faced, Martin 
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sought to put the best face on the political and military situation and insisted that 
his subordinates do likewise.14 But what began as a strategy for dealing with Con-
gress and the news media came to dominate the embassy’s perception of reality. 
By the spring of 1975, the ambassador was surrounded by an inner circle that 
accepted and fed his predispositions. As South Vietnam’s army disintegrated, the 
embassy clung to business as usual. In fairness to Martin, he was not alone in his 
slowness to appreciate how critical the situation had become; in American diplo-
matic and military circles generally, not until the withdrawal of South Vietnamese 
forces from the Central Highlands in panic-stricken rout after the fall of Ban Me 
Thuot did the notion that South Vietnam might collapse before the onset of the wet 
monsoon begin to gain acceptance.15 For his part, the ambassador was aware of the 
existence of plans for evacuation but restrained his subordinates’ desire to make 
overt preparations for evacuation for fear of unleashing the kind of chaos that had 
swept Da Nang. 
Some preparatory measures for a helicopter evacuation were taken, notably by 
military officers of the DAO staff in organizing procedures for evacuees under Op-
tions I and II that would apply also to Option IV. The establishment of an evacu-
ation center in the DAO compound, ominously code-named “Alamo,” and in the 
adjacent DAO compound annex and the marking of nearby helicopter pads were 
central in this regard.16 Air America, the CIA’s contract airline, which operated a 
fleet of UH-1s out of Tan Son Nhut as well as an assortment of fixed-wing trans-
ports, made critical contributions to Option IV preparations. Air America pilots 
identified and marked thirteen rooftop helipads from which evacuees could be ex-
tracted and moved to the DAO compound for evacuation.17 DAO communications 
officers had ordered a satellite communications terminal, a novelty in 1975. It ar-
rived in Saigon the day after Da Nang fell and was promptly set up.18
As Option I merged into Option II, DAO personnel wrestled with the bureau-
cratic strictures imposed by the embassy and South Vietnamese authorities, and the 
pace of evacuation remained glacial, despite the availability of abundant airlift. Not 
until 19 April did personal intervention with the ambassador by General Burns and 
Adm. Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, produce relief 
—infants accompanied by parents were no longer required to have passports and 
full emigration papers.19 The tempo of Option II briefly surged, but again it was too 
little and too late. 
The next, crucial, development came as the result of the actions of Brig. Gen. 
Richard Baughn, USAF, the senior Air Force officer assigned to the DAO, under 
Maj. Gen. Homer Smith, U.S. Army. Baughn, a veteran of P-51 missions over Eu-
rope as a young lieutenant in 1944–45, had flown F-105s over North Vietnam in 
1965–66; he was a seasoned military professional with few illusions.20 He had ar-
rived in Saigon in the summer of 1974 and had been disturbed by what he perceived 
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as lassitude, an attitude of business as usual, in the embassy and an unwillingness 
on the part of the ambassador and his staff to face military reality. Shortly thereafter 
a retired French colonel visiting Vietnam, a paratroop veteran of the French war, 
paid Baughn a courtesy call. Baughn asked a favor of him: Would he report back 
in six months with his assessment of the situation? Six months later to the day, the 
colonel presented himself in Baughn’s office with a grim prognosis, highlighting 
inefficiency, graft, and corruption in the ARVN command structure and their ad-
verse effects on morale.21 His bleak assessment was no doubt in Baughn’s mind as 
he considered the deteriorating situation. 
On or about 9 April, Baughn, increasingly concerned about the prospects of im-
minent ARVN collapse and the inadequate preparations for evacuation, contacted 
Maj. Gen. Kenneth Houghton, commander of the 3rd Marine Division on Okina-
wa, through military channels—in defiance of Ambassador Martin’s ban on outside 
communication without his knowledge—and stated an urgent need for staff coor-
dination between the Marines and DAO. In apparent response to Baughn’s request, 
Col. Al Gray, commander of the 4th Marines and the man responsible for ground 
security arrangements in the event of an evacuation, flew in by helicopter with a 
small staff on the 11th.22 Baughn and Gray met the next day and jointly concluded 
that the time for action had come; Gray, who had been monitoring the situation on 
the ground through frequent trips into Saigon from Admiral Whitmire’s flagship, 
had needed little convincing. He and Baughn drafted a message to send up the mili-
tary chain of command over Baughn’s signature emphasizing the need for Marines 
on the ground in Saigon and the urgent need to begin plans for a helicopter evacu-
ation. It went out unseen by the ambassador—who read it in the communications 
center in the early morning hours. He hit the ceiling and called Secretary of De-
fense James Schlesinger, demanding and securing Baughn’s immediate expulsion 
from Saigon.23 Baughn had fallen on his sword, but his principled act of disobedi-
ence marked the start of serious preparation for Option IV. 
Admiral Whitmire and Brigadier General Carey flew into Saigon on the 13th 
and, accompanied by Colonel Gray, had their only meeting with Ambassador 
Martin. Gray was later to characterize the meeting as “brief and thoroughly 
unproductive.”24 
The ambassador continued to live in a world of real fears and illusory hopes, but 
Baughn had broken the logjam. Task Force 76 reached Subic Bay in the Philippines 
around midday on the 17th, only to be alerted for deployment the following after-
noon with orders to be “on station and prepared for action” off Saigon by the 20th.25 
The order came without warning, and many crewmen ashore on liberty were left 
behind. 
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The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, comprising Marine assets committed to 
Option IV, was activated on the 18th, commanded by Brigadier General Carey, an 
aviator. Several days earlier, the Navy/Marine command structure responded to 
the magnitude of the projected evacuation by requesting the deployment of ten Air 
Force H-53s from Nakhon Phanom to the attack carrier USS Midway (CV 41). De-
spite the Navy’s unease about the unfamiliarity of Air Force helicopter crews with 
deck handling procedures and its reluctance to clog Midway’s flight deck (unlike 
their Marine equivalents, Air Force H-53s lacked folding rotor blades and could not 
be struck below unless the blades were removed, a lengthy procedure), the transfer 
was made on the 20th, the day the battle of Xuan Loc ended. Threatened with being 
surrounded, the remnants of the ARVN 18th Division withdrew from Xuan Loc, 
accompanied by what was left of the Airborne Brigade.26 Saigon was seemingly ripe 
for the taking, but for reasons still unknown today the North Vietnamese paused. 
To insert the GSF and extract evacuees Brigadier General Carey now had avail-
able forty-four H-53s (thirty-four Marine CH-53Ds, eight Air Force Special Op-
erations CH-53Cs, and two Air Rescue HH-53Cs) and twenty-seven CH-46s, of 
which he planned to launch forty and twenty-four, respectively.27 In addition, Carey 
had at his disposal six UH-1E command-and-control helicopters and eight AH-
1J gunships.28 The H-46s were to be committed in pairs carrying fifteen Marines 
each, “Sparrow Hawk” teams to reinforce the GSF as needed or to rescue the crews 
and passengers of downed extraction helicopters. The gunships were to provide 
fire support as needed. As events would prove, it was a good plan with adequate 
flexibility. 
The military was not the only player in the helicopter evacuation. Though not 
written into FREQUENT WIND, Air America, answerable to the CIA and thus to the 
ambassador, had a small fleet of UH-1 Hueys in South Vietnam. In anticipation of 
an evacuation, Air America had taken thirteen Hueys out of storage, raising the 
available total to twenty-eight. Of that total, Air American chief executive officer 
Paul Velte had promised the CIA to have twenty-four available for an evacuation. 
To Velte’s credit, he traveled to Saigon to oversee operations personally, arriving 
on 7 April.29 As the naval armada gathered off the coast, Air America helicopters 
provided shuttle service between Saigon and the fleet, and they would continue to 
do so until the bitter end. 
In the days ahead, commanders, staffs, and aircrews afloat waited for the order 
to execute. For the Marine and Air Force helicopter crews, the drill was the same, 
day after day: get up before dawn, man and run up their aircraft in preparation for 
a dawn launch, then stand down when the word didn’t come. 
As a result of frantic efforts on the part of DAO officers and Marines flown in by 
Air America to provide additional security, plans for the evacuation were in place. 
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Bus convoys were organized to pick up evacuees from their billets throughout the 
city and deposit them at the DAO compound at Tan Son Nhut. The evacuation 
order was to be given at midnight so the buses could roll through deserted streets. 
To signal that the evacuation was on, American-operated Radio Saigon would play 
the song “I’m Dreaming of a White Christmas.” 
The bulk of the evacuees would come out of the DAO compound. Only two 
hundred or so evacuees were anticipated from the embassy, for which the rooftop 
helipad—which could accommodate nothing larger than a CH-46—would suffice. 
The embassy parking lot was big enough for an LZ capable of handling an H-53 but 
was blocked by a large tree, the removal of which the ambassador forbade. Initial 
guidance from Washington stipulated a minimal ground security force of a rein-
forced rifle company. Colonel Gray, who had made frequent trips into the city to 
gauge the situation, demurred, deeming a company grossly inadequate. His superi-
ors backed him up.30 The GSF would consist of Regimental Landing Team 4, estab-
lished 19 April and, being based on 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, was known as “2/4.” 
The size of the security force posed problems, because many of the GSF Ma-
rines were not billeted on the same ships as the helicopters that would transport 
them to their destinations, and because Marine CH-53Ds had relatively small fuel 
capacities.31 Mating up Marines and helicopters thus required an elaborate “cross-
decking” operation in which the helicopters would take off, pick up their Marines, 
return to top off their fuel, then proceed in to the LZs. This cycle would take some 
three hours to complete.32 Further complicating planning was the requirement that 
the helicopter flow was not to begin until air support was overhead. While some of 
this cover was to be provided by attack carriers operating relatively close offshore, 
the bulk would come from Air Force runways in Thailand, requiring some two 
hours of lead time. The timing depended on a common schedule based on “L-
hour”—which to the Marines meant the time the helicopters would touch down in 
the LZs but to the Air Force meant the time when sorties would launch, a misun-
derstanding that would be sorted out only on the day of the evacuation.33 Helicop-
ter ingress and egress ground tracks were assigned for the insertion and extraction 
sorties. The helicopter stream would ingress up the western edge of the Saigon 
River at 5,500 feet, then make a sharp left turn over the Newport Bridge before 
descending into the DAO compound. Egress would follow the same ground track.34
Intelligence indicated that the communists were unlikely to mount a major ef-
fort to halt the evacuation, and aircrew intelligence briefings conveyed the impres-
sion that the operation would be mounted in a permissive environment.35 The rules 
of engagement (ROE) were extraordinarily restrictive. I have not been able to locate 
the ROE in written form, but I remember them as significantly more constraining 
than “do not fire unless fired upon.” The phrase “unless in imminent danger” sticks 
in my mind. A partial exception involved special ROE for IRON HAND antiradiation, 
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hunter-killer F-4s; in a detailed set of rules that ran to two sheets of teletypewriter 
printout, these aircraft were allowed to engage radar-directed antiaircraft artil-
lery or SA-2 surface-to-air-missile batteries in a defensive reaction if the situation 
warranted.36
Meanwhile the communist noose grew tighter. The South Vietnamese Joint 
General Staff ’s last situation map, drawn on the 21st, showed Saigon ringed by no 
fewer than thirteen North Vietnamese divisions to the east, north, west, and south-
west. An SA-2 unit was shown approaching from the north.37 I cannot say whether 
the intelligence on which the map was based was shared with U.S. forces, but am 
inclined to doubt it.
On 27 April, communist rockets hit Saigon for the first time since 1973. There 
were only three 122 mm rockets, and they did little damage, but the handwriting 
was on the wall. Sorties into Tan Son Nhut by big Air Force four-engine C-141 
transports that had been moving an unprecedented number of evacuees were ter-
minated.38 Option III would henceforth depend on turboprop C-130s based in the 
Philippines. 
At this point the ambassador seemed torn between the desire to get as many 
Vietnamese out as possible and fear of causing panic through overt preparations 
for evacuation. The inertia was broken on 28 September by an attack on Tan Son 
Nhut by three—or five, the sources are in disagreement—AT-37s, flown by North 
Vietnamese pilots trained by a VNAF defector. The attack interrupted the flow of 
C-130s, but two made it in at about 2000 hours (8 PM), loaded up, and departed 
safely. By this time Ambassador Martin was demanding a mass airlift and request-
ed sixty C-130 sorties for the 29th. His request was approved, and the first three 
C-130s landed at Tan Son Nhut shortly before midnight. For reasons that are dif-
ficult to imagine, they carried fifteen-thousand-pound BLU-82 bombs. One of the 
pilots announced the nature of the cargo on the ground-control frequency; his 
transmission was no doubt intercepted by North Vietnamese radio operators. 
The BLU-82s (pronounced “bluey eighty-twos”) were based on a commercial 
butane tank filled with high-yield slurry explosive. Extracted from the ramp of a 
C-130 by parachute, it descended the same way. Originally intended to clear he-
licopter LZs in heavy jungle, it detonated with devastating effect. The VNAF had 
used BLU-82s to considerable effect in the final month of the war, taking out the 
headquarters of the North Vietnamese 341st Division during the battle of Xuan 
Loc.39 
It took the Vietnamese ground crews time to unload and store the huge bombs, 
and it was after 0300 before the C-130s could begin loading evacuees. Two had 
loaded and were taxiing for takeoff when communist rocket batteries opened up 
on Tan Son Nhut. The rocket barrage was aimed at the VNAF side of Tan Son 
Nhut, where it destroyed three AC-119K gunships and several C-47 transports, 
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but barrage rockets are notoriously inaccurate.40 One hit in the DAO compound, 
killing two Marines. One of the C-130s took off empty from a taxiway. Another, 
providentially the rearmost aircraft, was hit in the wing root and set afire. The pas-
sengers and crew ran from the burning aircraft and scrambled on board the lead 
C-130. It took off, again from the taxiway, its crew and passengers witnesses to a 
fiery display.41 Option II was toast. 
Shortly thereafter, Air Marshal Ky took off from his Tan Son Nhut compound in 
his personal UH-1 helicopter, scrambled A-1 fighter-bombers from Can Tho, and 
directed them in the first preemptive strikes on the rocket batteries. A VNAF AC-
119K side-firing gunship took off at about the same time and spent the rest of the 
night engaging communist forces around the airfield. Landing shortly before dawn, 
it refueled, rearmed, and took off again, only to be shot down by an SA-7 at about 
0700. As dawn broke, a swarm of VNAF aircraft took off from Tan Son Nhut’s run-
ways and taxiways (or tried to take off—there were several crashes), littering the 
field with jettisoned fuel tanks and ordnance. 
Coincidentally, President Gerald Ford had convened a meeting of the National 
Security Council at 0700 Saigon time. Ambassador Martin had asked for a continu-
ation of the fixed-wing airlift, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger supported his 
position. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. George Brown, and Secretary of 
Defense Schlesinger disagreed, arguing that it was past time to order Option IV into 
action.42 In the meantime, General Smith had taken matters into his own hands and 
ordered preparations for Option IV. Ambassador Martin temporized, visiting Tan 
Son Nhut in his armored limousine at 0900. He was met by General Smith, who 
argued that further fixed-wing operations from Tan Son Nhut were out of the ques-
tion. Smith had a telephone link with the White House, and Martin asked to use it. 
Precisely what happened next is unclear; the most likely scenario is that President 
Ford, after consultation with his staff, got on the line and gave Martin a direct 
order to implement Option IV. Martin gave the order at 1048. It was transmitted 
at 1051 and reached the aircrews at 1100.43 At Radio Saigon the staff put a cassette 
recording of “White Christmas” on the air and departed. Bus convoys began to 
roll—some sources imply that they were already rolling, perhaps in response to 
General Smith’s earlier order—on streets now swarming with Vietnamese. Con-
voys were mobbed, and one had to be abandoned. Several diverted to the embassy, 
unexpectedly increasing the number of refugees there. The situation at times bor-
dered on the absurd. A convoy under Marine captain Anthony Wood was diverted 
to the ambassador’s residence to pick up his dog, then was halted at the gate to 
Tan Son Nhut by an ARVN officer who refused it entry. Wood contacted Colonel 
Gray by radio. Gray, in turn, contacted a Marine AH-1J gunship and directed it 
toward the gate, then asked Wood if he could direct an airstrike. Wood replied in 
the affirmative and apprised the Vietnamese officer of his overhead firepower. The 
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Vietnamese officer relented, in return for what he really wanted—entry into the 
compound for a ride out.44
General Burns and Admiral Whitmire ironed out the L-hour misunderstand-
ing with USSAG, adopting the Navy definition, and cross-decking got under way. 
Air Force aircraft took up their stations overhead, including a radio-stuffed C-130 
Airborne Battlefield Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC) aircraft 
to monitor the helicopter flow. At 1305, General Carey and Colonel Gray and their 
staffs flew into the compound by UH-1E. A small team of Marine air-traffic con-
trollers under Maj. David Cox flew into the compound at the same time and took 
up their post on the roof of a DAO building that afforded a good view of the he-
licopter approach path to the east-northeast.45 There they would do a magnificent 
job of cycling helicopters into available LZs until they were withdrawn shortly be-
fore the GSF was extracted at about 2130. 
Meanwhile, things had not gone well for Air America. Its personnel had be-
gun helicopter operations at about 0900 on the 29th, shuttling evacuees from the 
rooftop pads to the DAO compound and on occasion out to the fleet. Then, at 
1000, VNAF personnel invaded the Air America ramp and began stealing Hueys 
at gunpoint. Air America supervisors armed themselves and restored order, but 
not before six helicopters had been stolen, one of them crashing on takeoff. Chief 
Pilot Carl Winston contacted his pilots and told them to land on rooftop helipads 
and await orders. Then, as Option IV came to life, Air America received another 
setback when Velte learned that a large fuel truck he had spotted near the DAO 
compound had been ordered removed by the fire marshal. It was finally located by 
helicopter search but proved to have a weak battery and could not be started. Air 
America Hueys would have to refuel on Navy ships, requiring an hour’s round-trip. 
By midafternoon Air America was down to thirteen Hueys. Assuming a military 
helicopter evacuation, each of them shuttled evacuees to the DAO compound until 
it reached minimum fuel, then headed for the fleet with a load of evacuees, refu-
eled, and returned.46 To the best of my knowledge, the evacuees they extracted went 
uncounted. 
The first wave of twelve Marine H-53s from HMH-462 began touching down 
in the DAO compound LZs at 1506, quickly unloaded their Marines, took on loads 
of evacuees, and departed. They were followed by a second wave of twelve HMH-
463 H-53s. A third wave consisting of nine Air Force H-53s, seven “special ops” 
and two rescue, led in by an element of three HMH-463 ’53s, followed and began 
touching down at about 1530.47 
At about 1515, as the third wave proceeded up the Saigon River, chatter on mul-
tiple radio channels reported that a communist 57 mm antiaircraft battery to the 
east was engaging the helicopter stream. Shortly thereafter, those monitoring tacti-
cal frequencies heard an excited transmission on the guard channel, the common 
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emergency frequency: “Protective reaction! Protective reaction!” The transmission 
had been made by Air Force captain Jay A. Suggs, leader of an IRON HAND flight 
of four F-4s from Udorn Royal Thai Air Base. Suggs’s “backseater,” an electronic 
warfare officer, had acquired the battery’s radar and vectored him in to engage with 
a radar-homing Shrike missile. As Suggs turned toward the battery, its commander, 
no doubt warned by early-warning radar farther north, turned his radar off. Ac-
cording to the ROE that eliminated the battery as a valid target, but Suggs had 
acquired the gun position visually. He free-fired the Shrike, using it as a marking 
rocket for his wingmen, who took out the battery with cluster-bomb units. He had 
stretched the ROE to the limit and beyond. There is no evidence that the battery 
fired again.48 
As the third wave initiated its descent into the DAO compound, the three H-53s 
of its final element were “painted” (detected) by the acquisition radars of no fewer 
than three SA-2 sites, well within range to the north-northeast of the city. The sites 
never launched.49
From this point, the operation took on a life of its own. Although the official 
histories skirt the issue, the flow of helicopters to and from the evacuation points 
was largely dictated by events, many of them unexpected, and by the decisions of 
individual pilots. The exceptions included the elements headed by Gray, who kept 
close tabs on his GSF Marines; by Carey, who kept equally close tabs on his lift as-
sets, particularly those needed to get Marines in and out; and by the Navy flight 
controllers, “air bosses,” and flight deck personnel, who controlled their landing 
pads and flight decks with a combination of ruthless decisiveness and remarkable 
flexibility. Attempts by ABCCC to monitor the helicopter flow and track the num-
ber of evacuees broke down early in the evacuation and were never resumed.50 
Shortly after the arrival of the initial GSF elements in the DAO compound, Gen-
eral Carey learned that there were two thousand evacuees in the embassy. That 
was unexpected. Carey responded by directing H-53 as well as H-46 sorties into 
the embassy. The tree in the parking lot went down, providing an H-53-capable 
LZ—one that, however, required a seventy-foot vertical climb and descent, posing 
a hazard and reducing lift capability. The embassy was surrounded by a mob that 
swelled as the day wore on, and between 1900 (7 PM) and 2100 Carey transferred 
three platoons of 2/4 from the DAO compound to the embassy.51 The impression 
that the embassy was a bottomless pit of Vietnamese evacuees took hold. 
Operations from the compound proceeded with remarkable efficiency despite 
additional unanticipated occurrences. For example, three LZs marked out on the 
softball diamond were oiled down to suppress dust; tracers set the oil on fire, and 
several Marine ’53s from the third wave had to return to the fleet empty. Started 
belatedly, evacuation operations stretched on into the hours of darkness, which 
fell suddenly and with tropical finality shortly after 1900. From that point, Saigon 
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was illuminated by the light of burning buildings—some ten to a dozen in all—and 
flashes of lightning from a large thunderstorm to the northwest of the city.52 Merci-
fully, the sky overhead held clear. Had it not, the consequences would have been 
horrible. 
Predictions of a permissive environment were half-true at best. In addition to 
the 57 mm battery mentioned earlier, a 37 mm battery to the west of Tan Son Nhut 
attempted to engage the helicopter stream descending toward Tan Son Nhut after 
dark; fortunately, it was unable to depress its barrels sufficiently to pose a threat. 
An AC-130 acquired the site but was denied permission to open fire by General 
Burns.53 An element of two HH-53s—the author’s—was engaged at about 2015 by 
three 12.7 mm positions between the turning point to the DAO compound and 
the compound itself. The helicopters replied with 7.62 mm fire, suppressing the 
enemy guns.54 Meanwhile, North Vietnamese SA-7 teams had infiltrated the city; 
a published Marine Corps photo of the operation shows an SA-7 passing through 
the main rotor of an H-53 in daylight. The author’s H-53 was engaged by an SA-7 
at about 2030; decoyed by M-50 flares, it missed astern by sixty feet.55 There were 
other instances. 
These incidents are not evidence of North Vietnamese intent to shut down the 
evacuation. The failure mentioned above of SA-2 batteries to fire is indicative in 
this respect. They are, however, in my opinion, evidence of a plan to disrupt the 
evacuation with serious loss of life and embarrassment to the United States, if it 
could be done with reasonable deniability. The SA-7s could have gotten into the 
city only on North Vietnamese orders. The same can be said of the 12.7 mm anti-
aircraft heavy machine guns. The actions of the 57 mm battery are self-explanatory. 
Whatever design the communists may have had, the actions of American avia-
tors frustrated it. Option IV’s major failures—the belated launch order prominent 
among them—were products of high-level American indecision. 
By 2250 the DAO compound had been cleared of evacuees, the buildings wired 
for demolition, and the last of the GSF evacuated. The embassy continued to bleed 
evacuees. Noting a halt in the helicopter flow, General Carey learned that Admiral 
Whitmire, concerned for the well-being of the fatigued helicopter crews, had halted 
the evacuation, planning to renew it at first light. Carey flew to Whitmire’s flagship, 
USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), and in a heated exchange with Whitmire got the deci-
sion reversed. But it was too late. Those on high—just who and how high is open to 
debate—had decided that Ambassador Martin was supporting an endless evacu-
ation of Vietnamese pouring into the embassy. It was the final, bitter, legacy of 
Martin’s disconnect with reality. The fact was that by midnight the crowd outside 
the embassy had dissipated and things were well in hand. 
At 0327, President Ford ordered that there would be nineteen more extraction 
sorties into the embassy and that the nineteenth would bring out the ambassador, 
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ending the evacuation. At 0458, a CH-46 with the call sign “Lady Ace 09,” piloted 
by Marine captain Jerry Berry, hovered on the embassy’s rooftop pad until assured 
that the ambassador was on board, then departed.56 On board was Army major 
Stuart Herrington, a member of the DAO staff and a veteran of the war in the 
countryside against the Viet Cong in the early 1970s. That morning Herrington, 
fluent in Vietnamese, had recruited the Vietnamese of the embassy fire depart-
ment to maintain crowd control within the embassy compound, which they had 
done with panache. The quid pro quo was that their families would be among the 
first evacuees, which they were. As Lady Ace 09 lifted off the rooftop, Herrington 
looked down and saw the firefighters themselves, in their yellow slickers, sitting in 
ordered rows waiting for evacuation.57 They were among the four hundred or so 
left behind, including a number of South Korean businessmen and their families. 
A half-dozen more sorties would have done it. It was, and is, a blot of shame on the 
honor of the United States of America. 
Also left behind were eleven Marines under Maj. James Kean, officer in charge 
of the embassy’s Marine security guard. Kean and his men retreated to the rooftop 
pad and barricaded themselves in, thwarting with barricaded doors, broken glass, 
and tear gas desperate attempts to force the pad from the stairwell below. They were 
taken off by a CH-46 of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 at 0753 the next 
morning. Option IV was over.58 
What can we learn from this? Some lessons are obvious—one is that competent 
contingency planning is hugely important. Another is that individuals can make 
a difference, particularly at the upper to middle levels of the chain of command—
Ambassador Dean, Brigadier General Baughn, Colonel Gray, and Air America’s 
Paul Velte come to mind in a positive sense, and Ambassador Martin in a negative 
one. The same applies farther down the chain of command: the effectiveness of 
Major Cox and his small team in controlling the flow of helicopters into the DAO 
compound made a huge contribution to success. Some are less obvious—for ex-
ample, that too much communications capability at the highest levels of command 
can be a negative as well as a positive influence. President Ford’s order to Ambas-
sador Martin to order Option IV is on the plus side of the ledger, but the order from 
Washington to halt prematurely evacuation operations from the embassy goes on 
the negative side. Finally, and most encouragingly, Americans low on the chain of 
command demonstrated, once again, their ability to think on their feet and make 
time-critical decisions based on the best information available to them—even if it 
means violating orders. Captain Suggs’s neutralization of the 57 mm battery is per-
haps the most prominent example, but it was hardly the only one.
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rounds per second. The Soviet M-1939 37 mm 
antiaircraft gun fired from a six-round clip at a rate 
of 120 rounds per minute. 
 54 Author’s journal and recollection. I did not see the 
exchange and was unaware of it at the time. My win-
dow gunner and our wingman’s window and door 
gunners identified the guns as 12.7 mm, on the basis 
of the size of the tracers and the interval between 
them, and as on antiaircraft mounts, because they 
tracked us smoothly. Tracers can be deceptive at 
night—their size is rarely underestimated—but my 
gunners, all combat-experienced pararescuemen, 
had the familiar size of their own 7.62 mm tracers 
with which to compare them. The descending 
streams of tracers intersected the rising streams in 
the gun pits, and the enemy fire ceased. 
 55 Author’s journal. 
 56 Dunham and Quinlan, Bitter End, pp. 200–10. 
 57 Herrington, Personal Perspective. 
 58 Why Major Kean and his Marines were left behind 
after the ambassador’s departure is unclear and is 
likely to remain so; cf. Dunham and Quinlan, Bitter 
End, pp. 200–201. I had the pleasure of meeting Jim 
Kean when we appeared on ABC’s Good Morning 
America on 30 April 1985, the tenth anniversary 
of the fall of Saigon. Addressing the issue, I said, in 
my usual indirect way, “They forgot you!” Jim ada-
mantly denied it. Which of us was correct I cannot 
say. 
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XI The History of the Twenty-First-Century  
Chinese Navy
BERNARD D. COLE
China historically has been a continental rather than a maritime power, despite its more than eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than six thousand islands. It has more often viewed the sea as a potential inva-
sion route for foreign aggressors rather than as a medium for achieving national 
goals, a tendency that has contributed to the weakness of the Chinese maritime 
tradition. This attitude had changed by the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
The remarkable growth of China’s economy beginning in the last two decades of 
the twentieth century, the broadening of Beijing’s global political and economic 
interests, and resolution of almost all border disputes with its many contiguous 
neighbors have contributed to increased attention to threats to the vital sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) on which China increasingly depends.
The historical missions of China’s navy—called the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN)—were described in 1982 as “resist invasions and defend the home-
land,” attesting to the service’s role as a coastal-defense force in support of the 
ground forces facing a potential Soviet invasion of China. Deng Xiaoping, how-
ever, delineated an “offshore defense” strategy in 1985, while in 1993 the PLAN was 
directed to “safeguard the sovereignty of China’s national territorial land, air, and 
seas” and to “uphold China’s unity and security.” This new strategy and direction 
marked the PLAN’s transition to the post–Cold War world.
The four historical missions listed by President Hu Jintao in 2004 were the tra-
ditional responsibility of ensuring the military’s loyalty to the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP); ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security, 
to include preventing Taiwanese separatism; and the new responsibilities of safe-
guarding expanding national interests, including maritime security and “nontradi-
tional security problems,” and helping to ensure world peace. The PLAN was being 
described as “a strategic service” by 2008.1
The navy’s commander, Adm. Wu Shengli, addressed his service’s missions and 
intentions at its sixtieth-anniversary review, in 2009. He called for strengthened lo-
gistics and support facilities “to improve far-sea repair, delivery, rescue and replen-
ishment capacities” while establishing “a maritime defense system . . . to protect 
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China’s maritime security and economic development.” These remarks reinforced 
Wu’s 2007 call for creation of a “powerful armed force on the sea” as a “long cher-
ished dream for the Chinese nation.”2 
Imperial China
Despite China’s historical dependence on ground forces to guard its national se-
curity interests, the PLAN can trace its lineage back through the dynasties. The 
earliest recorded naval battle in China occurred in 549 bc, during the Spring and 
Autumn Period, when rival rulers used ships to attack each other.3 Large-scale na-
val operations continued to play a role in Chinese warfare through the Han dynasty 
(206 bc–ad 220). Chinese sea-goers were the first to control their ships with sails 
and rudders, employ compartmentation, paint vessels’ bottoms to inhibit wood rot, 
and build dry docks. They developed the art of navigation to a high degree, includ-
ing use of the portable compass as early as 1044.4 China had established regular 
commercial sea routes to southwestern Asia and western Africa by the end of the 
Tang dynasty (ad 907).5
The Song Dynasty
The high point of naval developments in imperial China probably occurred during 
the Song dynasty (ad 960–1279), as part of a five-hundred-year period when Chi-
na deployed “the world’s most powerful and technologically sophisticated navy.”6 
During this time, the military organized in times of emergency fleets composed of 
several hundred warships and supply vessels. One Song fleet in ad 1274 reportedly 
totaled 13,500 ships.7 Chinese maritime technology also matured during this age; 
shipping was an important part of the national economy. 
Perhaps most significantly, the Song regime was the first in China to establish a 
permanent national navy, functioning as an independent service administered by 
a central government agency. The Imperial Commissioner’s Office for the Control 
and Organization of the Coastal Areas was established in 1132 to supervise a navy 
of fifty-two thousand men.8
The Song experience was based on a rapidly expanding national economy, 
with a particularly strong maritime sector encompassing commerce, fisheries, and 
transportation. As the navy expanded, so did port facilities, supply centers, and 
dockyards; soldiers were trained specifically as marines, and coast-guard squad-
rons were established. Song navies used both sail and paddle-wheel-driven craft, 
the latter powered by laborers on treadmills. Doctrine was formalized, and it in-
cluded the development of formation maneuvers, long-range projectile launchers, 
and complex tactics.9 
China remained a sea power during the two succeeding dynasties. In fact, the 
overthrow of the Song regime by the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty resulted in significant 
part from the latter’s conduct of naval warfare. The Yuan later used large fleets 
to undertake invasions of Vietnam, Java, and Japan. The 1274 expedition against 
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Japan, which proved unsuccessful, involved nine hundred ships and 250,000 sol-
diers; that of 1281 included 4,400 ships.10 Maritime commerce continued to ex-
pand, and cannon made their appearance on board ship.11
The Ming Dynasty
During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) China saw both the pinnacle of its overseas 
naval deployments and the collapse of its naval power. The crux of the successful 
Ming struggle to succeed the Yuan was a series of battles on the lakes of the Yangtze 
River valley. The waterborne forces employed by the Ming and their opponents 
were not independent navies but rather army units assigned to ships on the local 
lakes and rivers. Their original mission was to transport men and supplies, but the 
armies quickly recognized the advantages of using these craft as warships, against 
both land forces and each other. The Ming ships were manned by about twelve 
thousand troops and were armed with archers, cannon, and “flame weapons.” The 
“lake campaign” was an effective use of ships and men to take advantage of battle-
field topography but did not result in the establishment of a regular Ming navy.
The early-fifteenth-century voyages of Zheng He to the Middle East and Africa 
also occurred during the Ming dynasty. They demonstrated a standard of Chinese 
shipbuilding, voyage management, and navigation well beyond European capabili-
ties. Zheng He led large fleets of ships, some displacing over four hundred tons, on 
seven voyages halfway around the world at a time when Portuguese explorers were 
still feeling their way down the west coast of Africa in fifty-ton caravels. 
After just thirty years, the Ming rulers deliberately ended these voyages for do-
mestic financial, political, and ideological reasons, just at the time when European 
nations were beginning to use the high seas to achieve economic wealth and to 
proselytize. Why were these expeditions ended? First, the voyages were expensive, 
and the Ming pursued a rigid economic policy. Second, the ruling circle was con-
cerned about the growing power of the court eunuchs, who were the voyages’ chief 
sponsors. Third, “Confucian-trained scholar-officials opposed trade and foreign 
contact on principle.”12 
Perhaps most importantly, however, the threat from Mongols and other Asian 
aggressors was growing stronger, which both increasingly focused government 
concerns inland and absorbed a growing portion of the national budget. By 1500, 
“anti-commercialism and xenophobia [had] won out,” and the government there-
after attempted to deal with maritime problems by ignoring them. The navy was 
allowed to deteriorate; by the end of the sixteenth century the Ming government 
was unable even to defend its maritime traders against pirates.
During its long period of brilliant maritime scientific progress and dominat-
ing power, however, China’s national security concerns had focused not at sea 
but on the north and west—with good reason, since that was where the threat to 
the regime lay. No dynasty fell as a direct result of maritime invasion or pressure: 
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usurpers emerged from the Asian interior, and the crucial battles were land fights. 
The navy was at various times capable and even powerful, but never was it vital 
to a dynasty’s survival, even in the face of the centuries-long threat from Japanese 
“pirates,” as the Chinese habitually called their neighbors.
The Qing Dynasty
Typical of the process of dynastic progression, the Qing (Manchu) dynasty replaced 
the Ming in 1644 after a long period of land warfare in which naval power played a 
very small role. The Qing made no concerted effort to rebuild the navy or expand 
the maritime sector of China’s economy following their assumption of power. The 
Qing regime faced no significant threat from the sea during its first century and a 
half in power, and there seemed little justification for investing in a modern navy. 
This was especially true after the most notable Qing maritime campaign, when 
after several failed attempts it conquered Taiwan in 1683.
Overseas trade grew despite Qing indifference, owing in part to the extensive 
settlement of “overseas Chinese” throughout Southeast and South Asia that had 
begun during earlier dynasties. The Qing navy remained powerful enough to pre-
vent coastal piracy from getting out of hand, to maintain order on the canals and 
rivers, and to perform other coast-guard functions. China had fallen so far be-
hind the global norm in naval power, however, that it was unable to defeat the late- 
eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century imperialists—who came by sea. 
Failed Modernization
As the Qing reeled from the imperialist onslaught and from the effects of the Tai-
ping Rebellion, which ended in 1864, major “restoration” movements occurred in 
China. These “self-strengthening” efforts, under the slogan “Chinese learning as the 
fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use,” included building and 
training a modern navy. This facet of modernization probably resulted from admi-
ration of the technology represented by a modern warship and from the fact that the 
imperialist powers had used their navies to impose humiliating defeats on China. 
An arsenal was established in Shanghai to build steam-powered gunboats, but 
efforts to modernize China’s navy too often fell victim to Confucian traditional-
ists, who were the rigid ideologues of the day; it was in part a case of ideology de-
feating professionalism, a problem that has persisted. Nonetheless, by 1884 China 
had deployed a modern navy, led by the efforts of Li Hongzhang, one of the most 
prominent of the scholar-bureaucrats who appreciated how far behind the foreign 
powers China had lagged. Li used three approaches to build the new navy, which 
he thought should be oriented toward coastal defense: indigenous production, pur-
chases abroad, and the reverse engineering of foreign systems. 
Unfortunately, the new navy suffered from high-level governmental corruption 
and weak administration.13 It was organized into four fleets that were essentially 
independent navies. The Beiyang Fleet, organized by Li Hongzhang, was the most 
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modern and powerful; by 1884 it included two 7,500-ton-displacement, German-
built battleships. The Fujian Fleet was homeported in Fuzhou; the other two fleets 
were the Nanyang and Guangdong. 
This new navy was well regarded by Western observers but soon became em-
broiled in battle with two foreign fleets, one of them Western. Disputes with France 
over its colonization of Vietnam led to the outbreak of hostilities in August 1884; 
Chinese ground forces did well, but the local French fleet attacked the Chinese Fu-
jian Fleet in Fuzhou Harbor and sank every ship.14 China’s other fleets were not sent 
to fight the French; Li wanted to conserve and build up remaining naval strength. 
His efforts were successful on paper, including establishment of a national Navy 
Office, a better-organized training regimen and shore establishment, and in 1888 
standardized naval regulations.15
Despite these achievements, China’s navy failed to become a coherent national 
force; its most powerful fleet came to grief attempting to halt Japanese incursions 
into Korea in the 1890s. The Beiyang Fleet—of two battleships, ten cruisers, and 
two torpedo boats—lost a sea battle to the Japanese in September 1894 and with-
drew to Weihaiwei, a strongly fortified harbor on the northern Shandong coast. In 
January 1895 the Japanese landed troops who seized the Chinese batteries guard-
ing the harbor and turned their guns on the Chinese ships.16 The Beiyang Fleet 
was eviscerated by its losses in ships, in conjunction with the suicides of the fleet 
commander and other senior officers.17 Again, the other Chinese fleets failed to 
join the fight. 
These naval conflicts with the French and the Japanese demonstrated that while 
Beijing had acquired the ships and weapons of a modern navy, it had failed to insti-
tute effective central administration, training, logistical and maintenance support, 
or command and control. Furthermore, operational doctrine was almost complete-
ly lacking; the navy’s leaders failed to establish interfleet coordination, exercises, or 
mutual support. Finally, China had failed to provide its new navy with a coherent 
strategy tied to national security objectives. China’s attempt to deploy a modern 
navy in the late nineteenth century failed miserably as a result of these factors.
The Republic of China (1911–1949) 
During the Republican period, Chinese naval forces under Chiang Kai-shek’s Na-
tionalists and the Kuomintang Party (KMT) relied almost entirely on ships leftover 
from the Qing or obtained from foreign nations. No significant efforts were made 
to rebuild the navy, given China’s general political and economic disarray. Indi-
vidual warlords occasionally made effective use of maritime units, but their ships 
were employed to augment ground forces, which was how navies had traditionally 
been employed by Chinese leaders. The low point was probably reached during the 
height of the warlord period, in the middle to late 1920s, when a Western observer 
dismissed the Chinese navy as a serious force: 
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There has been a steady deterioration in the discipline of the Chinese Navy since the es-
tablishment of the Republic, and it has now ceased to exist as a national force, the different 
units being under the control of various militarists, who treat the vessels as their own private 
property. . . . It is impossible today to obtain a complete list of Chinese warships, showing to 
which party or militarist faction they belong. Vessels have been changing their allegiance . . . 
with bewildering frequency.18 
The government did not develop a maritime strategy, since the primary threats 
to the new regime were on the ground, from the CCP and warlords. Naval actions 
that did occur took place chiefly on the rivers, especially the Yangtze and the wa-
terways of the Canton delta. Many of the warlords who struggled to gain control 
of various provinces and districts during the 1916–28 revolutionary period used 
China’s inland waterways for transportation, as military barriers, or as sources of 
revenue—taxing the dense river and canal traffic. These efforts led to frequent fire-
fights between provincial forces and the imperialist gunboats that patrolled China’s 
rivers and lakes, but most of these episodes were of no significance insofar as co-
herent maritime thinking or navy building by China was concerned. 
There were two notable exceptions. First was a battle at the upper Yangtze River 
port city of Wanhsien in September 1926. The local warlord, Gen. Yang Sen, had 
commandeered British-owned steamers to transport his troops; when a British 
gunboat, HMS Cockchafer, attempted to free the steamers it ran into an ambush, 
very capably managed by Yang, and suffered severe casualties.19 There was also an 
October 1929 naval and land engagement on the Heilong (Amur) River between 
Chinese and Soviet forces, one that foreshadowed the 1969 incident over disputed 
boundaries.20
Sea power was an effective “force multiplier” for the foreign powers present in 
China, who used sea and river transport to move troops rapidly from crisis area to 
crisis area.21 Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were thus able to influence 
the course of events in revolutionary China with relatively small military forces. 
Republican China was unable to contest their maritime strength. 
China’s record as a naval power during the long period of empire and repub-
lic shows an understandable focus on the continental rather than maritime arena. 
Navies were built and employed almost entirely for defensive purposes. Maritime 
strength was regarded as a secondary element of national power. 
The People’s Republic of China
The communist victory in 1949 was an army victory; the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) was unable to project power across even the narrow Taiwan Strait. The KMT 
navy continued raiding coastal installations, landing agents, attacking merchant 
craft and fishing vessels, and threatening to invade the mainland. The government 
in Beijing of the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) sought to defend its coast-
line and island territories against both the United States and the KMT regime on 
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Taiwan. Coastal defense was emphasized in January 1950 with the creation of a new 
East China Military Command, headquartered in Shanghai and deploying more 
than 450,000 personnel. The East China Navy was formed as part of this force.
The Early Years: 1949–1954
Beijing ordered these troops to defend China’s coast against “imperialist aggression 
from the sea,” continue the fight against Chiang’s forces, and help with economic 
reconstruction.22 This first PRC navy was constituted largely by the defection of 
the KMT Second Coastal Defense Fleet.23 The new navy’s commander said it was 
needed “to safeguard China’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty 
against imperialist aggression[,] . . . to destroy the sea blockade of liberated China, 
to support the land and air forces of the People’s Liberation Army in defense of 
Chinese soil and to wipe out all remnants of the reactionary forces.”24 A navy was 
also required to establish law and order on coastal and riverine waters, help the 
army capture offshore islands still occupied by the KMT, and prepare for the cap-
ture of Taiwan. The CCP Politburo further charged the new navy with “defending 
both [eastern and southeastern] China coasts and the Yangtze River.”25 Gen. Zhang 
Aiping was the first commander (and political commissar) of the navy. Among his 
first acts were the establishment of a naval staff college at Nanjing and organization 
of a rudimentary maintenance and logistical infrastructure. 
The PLAN was officially established in May 1950, under the command of Gen. 
Xiao Jinguang. The Chinese wanted a defensive force that would be inexpensive 
to build and could be quickly manned and trained.26 Zhang and Xiao were typical 
of the early PLAN leadership—revolutionary officers who had spent their entire 
careers as ground commanders and had been transferred to the navy for reasons of 
political reliability and proven combat record rather than for any particular naval 
experience. 
Soviet Assistance. Mao Zedong, as chairman of the CCP’s Central Committee, ob-
tained financial assistance during a 1949–50 visit to Moscow; he planned to use 
half the initial Soviet loan of $300 million to purchase naval equipment. The new 
PLAN also ordered two new cruisers from Great Britain and attempted to obtain 
surplus foreign warships through Hong Kong, efforts that were nullified by the 
outbreak of the Korean War.27
China acquired mostly small vessels suitable to combat the coastal threat from 
Taiwan, initially obtaining four old Soviet submarines, two destroyers, and a large 
number of patrol boats. The new force also included about ten corvettes, forty ex-
U.S. landing craft, and several dozen miscellaneous river gunboats, minesweep-
ers, and yard craft, all seized from the KMT. The Soviets also helped establish a 
large shore-based infrastructure, including shipyards, naval colleges, and extensive 
coastal fortifications.28 
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Offshore Islands. Beijing’s goal was seizure of the offshore islands still occupied by 
the KMT; the invasion of Taiwan was scheduled initially for the spring of 1950 
but was soon postponed to the summer of 1951. Mao Zedong considered the 
capture of Taiwan “an inseparable part of his great cause of unifying China.”29 He 
lacked experience in naval warfare but quickly learned that a successful campaign 
against Taiwan would require adequate amphibious training, naval transportation, 
“guaranteed air coverage,” and the cooperation of a “fifth column” on the island— 
requirements that still apply.30
China achieved a major victory when in April 1950 the PLA occupied Hainan, 
after Taiwan the largest island held by the Nationalists. The campaign cost Beijing 
heavily in personnel losses but captured more than ninety thousand Nationalist 
troops. This victory resulted from the PLA’s careful planning, its ability to neutral-
ize superior Nationalist naval and air forces by use of shore-based artillery to gain 
effective control of the sea and airspace between Hainan and the mainland, and the 
characteristically poor performance of Taiwan’s senior commanders. 
The Korean War began two months later, and China’s fear of American aggres-
sion was heightened when in June 1950 President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. This meant America’s reentry into the Chinese 
civil war. Truman claimed that it was intended to prevent either side from attack-
ing the other; however, Beijing understood that the president was committing the 
United States to the defense of Taiwan—after having refused to do so for many 
months.31 Premier Zhou Enlai called Truman’s move “violent, predatory action by 
the U.S. Government [that] constituted armed aggression against the territory of 
China and total violation of the UN charter.”32 Beijing also understood, as it does 
today, that the United States possessed complete air and sea superiority in the west-
ern Pacific Ocean.
Beijing’s concern was reinforced in February 1953, when President Dwight 
Eisenhower withdrew the U.S. fleet from the Taiwan Strait, thus in theory “un-
leashing” Nationalist forces on Taiwan to attack China.33 In December 1953, Mao 
Zedong assigned the PLAN three priority missions: to eliminate KMT naval in-
terference and ensure safe navigation for China’s maritime commerce, prepare to 
recover Taiwan, and oppose aggression from the sea.34 
The PRC’s young navy faced many problems, including a lack of trained person-
nel and of amphibious ships, as demonstrated in the very spotty record of assaults 
on KMT-held coastal islands. Furthermore, in February 1952 Mao diverted the 
navy’s ship-acquisition funds to the purchase of aircraft needed for combat over 
Korea.35 Acquisition of equipment from foreign sources also was constrained by 
Western refusal to sell arms to the PRC and by domestic budgetary limitations. 
Furthermore, despite several visits to Moscow by senior PLA leaders, the So-
viets continued to insist on immediate payment for their ships, although most of 
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them were obsolete.36 The PLAN also lacked airpower and was just beginning to 
establish a capable maintenance and logistical infrastructure. 
1955–1959
The Korean War provided China with mixed naval lessons. The amphibious land-
ing at Inchon in September 1950 was a major turning point of the war, while United 
Nations command of the sea allowed free employment of aircraft carriers and bat-
tleships to bombard North Korean and Chinese armies. The UN forces suffered at 
least one significant maritime defeat, however, when a planned amphibious assault 
on the east-coast port of Hungnam in October 1950 had to be canceled because the 
harbor had been mined. Overall, however, Korea was not a maritime conflict, and 
the PLA ground forces’ dominant role there contributed to a continued policy of 
limiting the navy to coastal defense. 
PLAN operations in the mid-1950s continued to focus on KMT attacks against 
the mainland and on capturing islands still held by Taiwan. The 1954–55 Taiwan 
Strait crisis included the PLA’s capture of the Dachen Islands, an effort that took 
advantage of superior airpower and a well-coordinated amphibious assault against 
an outlying island.37 
The navy’s First Aviation School was founded at Qingdao in October 1950, and 
the navy’s air force, referred to as “the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force,” or 
simply “naval aviation,” was formally established in 1952. Its mission was support of 
antisurface and antisubmarine defensive operations. Its initial inventory was eighty 
aircraft, including MiG-15 jet fighters, Il-28 jet bombers, and propeller-driven Tu-2 
strike aircraft. Naval aviation had grown to about 470 aircraft by 1958.38 
PLAN operating forces were organized into the North Sea, East Sea, and South 
Sea Fleets. The decade ended with the PRC in possession of all the disputed islands 
except Quemoy (Kinmen), Matsu (Mazu), the Pescadores (Penghus), and of course 
Taiwan. The PLA also had defeated KMT raids on the mainland, as well as attacks 
on merchant and fishing vessels.39 The PLAN had been organized, sent to sea, and 
proven effective as a coastal-defense force within ten years of its founding.
A New Situation: 1960–1976
The 1960s were marked by major foreign and domestic events that further con-
strained development of a seagoing navy. Most important was the split with the So-
viet Union, dramatically manifested in mid-1960 when Soviet advisers (and their 
plans) were withdrawn from China. The navy suffered, with the rest of the PLA, as 
military development projects were left in turmoil. 
Other significant events in the early 1960s included war with India, the reemerg-
ing Vietnam conflict, turmoil in the new African states, and revolutionary move-
ments throughout Southeast Asia. None of these major international events direct-
ly involved the PLAN; they did not provide justification for naval modernization, 
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which was accordingly extremely limited. By the end of the 1960s, however, rela-
tions with the Soviet Union had deteriorated to the point of armed conflict along 
the Amur River. The former ally was now the enemy; soon the United States would 
be China’s ally. Beijing viewed the Soviet navy as a major amphibious invasion 
threat. That navy deployed only weak amphibious forces in its Pacific Fleet, but 
China was worried by a history of military threats from the north, by Soviet prox-
imity, and by the concentration of economic developments in its own northeast.40 
Significant naval developments were hampered also by the forced industrial-
ization and collectivization program of 1958–61 known as the “Great Leap For-
ward,” and even more by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, lasting from 
approximately 1966 to 1976. The PLAN continued to serve as an extension of the 
army; modernization was limited, since prevailing PLA doctrine, that of “People’s 
War,” portrayed technology and weaponry as insignificant compared to the revo-
lutionary fervor of soldiers imbued with Mao’s ideology. The Cultural Revolution 
seriously hampered technological development in general; even the relatively sac-
rosanct missile, submarine, and nuclear weapons programs were affected.41 PLAN 
modernization was retarded by perhaps two decades as a result of program restric-
tions and personnel losses that occurred during this political maelstrom. Except for 
the evolution of maritime nuclear power, the PLAN missed or was very late joining 
developments that were common elsewhere in most warfare areas, including the 
employment of guided missiles in antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine warfare; 
automation and computerization of command and control; expanded use of ship-
borne helicopters; automation of gunnery and sensor systems; and even the advent 
of automation and gas turbine technology in ship propulsion. 
PLAN modernization was hamstrung in the last years of the Cultural Revolu-
tion by the “Gang of Four.” Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing, led an attack on naval missile 
development. Another member of the clique, Zhang Chunqiao, expressed its anti-
navy, “continentalist” view.42 By 1970, however, despite this attitude and a lack of 
resources for major conventional force development, the PLAN had moved into 
the missile age, deploying a Soviet-designed ballistic-missile submarine and ten 
Soviet-built patrol boats armed with cruise missiles.
Despite the ideological turmoil of the late 1950s and the 1960s, Beijing was in 
these years investing heavily in developing nuclear-armed missiles and nuclear-
powered submarines to launch them. Beijing had relied on Soviet nuclear forces to 
counter the American nuclear threat during the 1950s. Among the reasons stresses 
in the alliance with Moscow had become more divisive as the 1960s progressed was 
that Mao Zedong was determined that China develop its own nuclear forces, pro-
claiming that “even if it takes 10,000 years, we must make a nuclear submarine.”43 
Mao was adamant that China should join the nuclear club. These were national 
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rather than PLAN projects, however, and did not significantly increase the navy’s 
ability to obtain the military resources necessary for modernization. 
The budgetary emphasis on nuclear weapons, the economic disruptions result-
ing from the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and the 
continuing belief in Maoist orthodoxy all contributed to the Chinese navy’s lack of 
resources for modernization during the late 1950s and the 1960s. 
After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
In May 1975, however, at a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), 
Mao Zedong reportedly directed the development of a modern navy, probably re-
acting to both the Soviet threat and the development of a powerful navy by China’s 
ancient adversary Japan. Chinese interests threatened by the Soviet navy in the late 
1970s and 1980s included SLOCs vital to Beijing’s rapidly increasing merchant ma-
rine, as Moscow established a continual naval presence in the Indian Ocean and 
the northern Arabian Sea. The Soviet Pacific Fleet almost doubled in size during 
the 1970s and was upgraded by the assignment of Moscow’s latest combatants, in-
cluding nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed surface ships and submarines. Soviet 
merchant ships and fishing vessels were also omnipresent in Pacific waters histori-
cally vital to China’s economic interests. 
Several factors continued to impede development of a large, modern Chinese 
navy. The political aftershocks of the Cultural Revolution, as Hua Guofeng and Deng 
Xiaoping contested for leadership of post-Mao China, limited the resources devoted 
to military modernization. This struggle was not resolved until 1980, when Deng 
emerged on top. However, Deng reemphasized the navy’s role as a coastal-defense 
force, a view retained throughout the first half of the succeeding decade. “Our navy,” 
Deng asserted, “should conduct coastal operations. It is a defensive force. Everything 
in the construction of the navy must accord with this guiding principle.”44
Naval growth also was limited by the disorder in China’s economic and social 
structures that lasted beyond the end of the Cultural Revolution. This turmoil af-
fected China’s military-industrial complex, hindering modernization efforts in 
the PLA generally. Furthermore, the lesson of the 1979 “punishment” of Vietnam 
was sobering to the PLA, but this conflict did not involve significant naval efforts. 
Hence, the PLAN probably benefited only marginally from corrective budgetary 
measures that resulted.
Finally, the triangular play among China, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States meant that by 1980 Beijing could rely on the world’s largest and most modern 
navy to counter the Soviet maritime threat. This argued against China’s developing 
a similar force of its own. Furthermore, given the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, Bei-
jing could subsume concern about future Japanese aggression within its strategic 
relationship with Washington.45
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Major changes in China’s domestic and international situation in the 1980s soon 
altered Beijing’s view of the PLAN, and maritime power became a more important 
instrument of national security strategy by the end of the decade. Beijing’s second 
maritime priority, after countering the Soviet threat, was securing offshore territo-
rial claims. Taiwan was the most important of these, but the South China Sea was 
also significant. Although successful action against South Vietnamese naval forces 
in 1974 resulted in Chinese possession of the disputed Paracel Islands, the fight 
itself indicated that other claimants to the islands and reefs of the South China Sea 
would not accede meekly to Beijing’s territorial assertions. Furthermore, the Soviet 
naval base at Cam Ranh Bay was flourishing as the 1970s ended. 
These factors contributed to a significant change in the South Sea Fleet’s or-
ganization: the marine corps, first formed in 1953 but disbanded in 1957, was re-
established in December 1979 as an amphibious assault force and assigned to the 
southern fleet. The PLAN’s slender amphibious assets were concentrated in the 
South Sea Fleet, which conducted “island seizing” exercises. In 1980, for instance, 
a major fleet exercise in the South China Sea focused on the seizure and defense of 
islands in the Paracel Archipelago.46 
The South Sea Fleet’s organization benefited from PLAN force-structure chang-
es that, for the first time, centered on Chinese-built warships. Although still heavily 
reliant on Soviet designs, the Luda-class guided-missile destroyers, Jianghu-class 
frigates, and Houjian fast attack missile boats collectively marked a significant 
increase in China’s maritime capability. The submarine force included the first 
Chinese-built nuclear-powered attack submarines, as well as about sixty conven-
tionally powered boats. A seaborne nuclear deterrent force continued under de-
velopment, following Mao’s earlier declaration that the navy had to be built up “to 
make it dreadful to the enemy.”47
Deng Xiaoping’s Navy
Naval expansion and modernization were spurred during the 1980s by the coastal 
concentration of China’s burgeoning economy and military facilities. Furthermore, 
the resources necessary for a modernized PLAN became available as a result of 
China’s dramatic economic development and increasing wealth. Recovery from the 
Cultural Revolution, well under way by 1985, brought a reinvigorated, if less cen-
tralized, military-industrial complex. 
Three events contributed prominently to the development of the navy in this 
decade. The first was Deng’s evaluation of the military at an expanded CMC meet-
ing in 1975 as “overstaffed, lazy, arrogant, ill equipped, and ill prepared to conduct 
modern warfare,” an opinion strengthened by the PLA’s poor performance during 
the 1979 conflict with Vietnam.48 Second was Beijing’s 1985 strategic decision that 
the Soviet Union no longer posed a major threat to China in terms of global nuclear 
war and that accordingly the PLA would have to be prepared instead for “small 
NWC_HM23.indb   190 12/8/15   9:01 AM
 THE HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CHINESE NAVY 191 190 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
wars on the periphery” of the nation.49 The emphasis on a “peripheral” (to a signifi-
cant extent maritime) rather than continental strategic view improved the PLAN’s 
leverage in obtaining resources within the PLA as a whole. 
Third was the rise to prominence of Adm. Liu Huaqing. Liu had been schooled 
in the Soviet Union, had served most of his career in the science and technology 
arms of the PLA, and was close to Deng Xiaoping.50 Liu exerted a strong force on 
development of the navy as its commander from 1982 to 1987 and vice chairman 
of the CMC until 1997. He is best known for promulgating a three-stage maritime 
strategy that provided justification on which PLAN officers and other navalists 
could base their plans for a larger, more modern navy. More important were his 
accomplishments in reorganizing the navy, redeveloping the marine corps, upgrad-
ing bases and research-and-development facilities, and restructuring the school 
and training systems.51 
China’s widening maritime concerns and increased budget resources in the 
1980s favored PLAN modernization, which proceeded along three paths— 
indigenous construction, foreign purchase, and reverse engineering—much as had 
Li Hongzhang’s “self-strengthening” navy initiative of a hundred years earlier. The 
1980s program proceeded at a measured pace, but it created a new navy. 
Construction included guided-missile destroyers and frigates, replenishment-
at-sea ships, conventionally and nuclear-powered attack submarines, and support 
craft, including missile-tracking ships and officer-training vessels. Foreign pur-
chases were concentrated in the West, with the United States selling China a small 
number of modern ship engines and torpedoes and Western European nations 
selling weapons and sensor systems, including Italian torpedoes, French cruise 
missiles, and British radars. The PLAN acquired its only Xia-class fleet-ballistic- 
missile submarine. The successful submerged launch in 1988 of the Ju Lang–1 (JL-
1) intermediate-range ballistic missile from this submarine meant that China for 
the first time could deploy strategic nuclear weapons at sea.52 
The PLAN demonstrated its increasing capability in other maritime missions as 
well during the 1980s. China invested in four large space-surveillance ships to sup-
port its growing military and commercial space program; these ships conducted 
the first long-range PLAN deployments, in support of space launches, in 1980. Task 
forces supported scientific expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctic. The PLAN’s 
first foreign port visit was conducted in 1985, when two East Sea Fleet ships visited 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan; the officer-training ship Zheng He became the 
first PLAN vessel to visit the United States when it made a 1989 port call in Hawaii.
During the 1990s Beijing continued to expand and modernize the navy it had 
begun building in the 1970s, but again, at a measured pace. The PLAN engaged 
in a series of long-range deployments throughout East and South Asia, as well as 
deploying a three-ship task group to the Western Hemisphere in 1998, visiting the 
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United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. Foreign purchases of improved ships, sub-
marines, and aircraft earned the PLAN headlines as China acquired Sovremenny-
class guided-missile destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, and Su-27 fighters from 
Russia, but these constituted only incremental improvements to a large if still lim-
ited navy. 
Notable Consistencies and Cautionary Messages 
The communist regime recognized early on the need to deal with maritime issues, 
but only after thirty years and a dramatically altered international situation did 
China apparently acknowledge the necessity of a modernized navy. Beijing cur-
rently views “the ocean as its chief strategic defensive direction,” since “China’s po-
litical and economic focus lies on the coastal areas [and] for the present and a fairly 
long period to come, [its] strategic focus will be in the direction of the sea.”53 
The Chinese navy being built for the twenty-first century owes a good deal to its 
history, which has been marked by some notable consistencies. First has been rec-
ognition of the maritime element in China’s national security. Second, Chinese na-
val efforts have been closely linked to the nation’s economic development. Hence, 
continued naval modernization should be expected, in view of China’s continuing 
economic boom.
Third, Chinese naval development since the eighteenth century has been marked 
by significant interaction with foreign navies. Qing-dynasty modernization efforts 
drew on Japanese, German, British, and American naval professionals as advisers, 
administrators, and engineers. This trend continued under the People’s Republic of 
China, with a sporadic but pervasive reliance on Soviet/Russian advisers, strategy, 
equipment, technology, and engineers. 
Fourth, the Chinese government has not hesitated to employ naval force in pur-
suit of national security goals. These efforts have not always been successful (wit-
ness the failed campaigns in 1884 against France and 1894–95 against Japan) but 
often they have been, as in 1950, 1954–55, and 1958 in the Taiwan Strait, and in 
1974, 1988, and 1998 in the South China Sea. Beijing’s willingness to resort to naval 
force even when significantly outgunned bears a cautionary message for foreign 
strategists. 
Imperial China for the most part ignored the sea except for brief periods and 
specific campaigns. Republican China was simply too preoccupied with civil war 
and Japanese invasion to focus on naval development. The communist regime in-
stalled in 1949 maintained for almost fifty years a traditional Chinese attitude to-
ward the navy as a secondary instrument of national power.
Mao Zedong recognized in 1950 that deploying a navy to conquer Taiwan re-
quired development of expertise in amphibious warfare, seaborne logistics, and 
maritime airpower, but his plan to organize a strong navy was aborted because of 
the Korean War and thereafter limited by domestic political events, especially the 
N O T E S
NWC_HM23.indb   192 12/8/15   9:01 AM
 THE HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CHINESE NAVY 193 192 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY
disastrous Great Leap Forward. Later, naval development was severely impacted 
during the 1960s by the Sino-Soviet split and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-
lution. Only at the end of the 1970s, following the end of the Cultural Revolution 
and the post-Mao power struggle, was the PLAN in a position to “take off.”
That takeoff did not immediately happen, although the PLAN did benefit in 
the 1980s from a relatively close relationship with the United States, from which 
China purchased advanced naval systems, including LM2500 gas-turbine engines 
and Mark 46 antisubmarine torpedoes. The sanctions that followed the June 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre ended U.S. naval assistance, and China has since 
turned to Europe, Israel, and especially Russia. The following decades have seen a 
dramatic increase in China’s naval capabilities.
Almost all of China’s primary sovereignty concerns lie in the maritime arena: 
Taiwan; territorial and seabed resource disputes with Japan in the East China Sea; 
similar disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia in 
the South China Sea; and SLOCs across the Indian Ocean endangered by piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the government’s authority relies in significant part 
on continued economic growth, which in turn relies on maritime trade and energy 
flows.
Finally, Beijing’s willingness to resort to force even when significantly outgunned 
should impart a cautionary message for strategists considering possible Chinese 
reactions to specific issues, especially Taiwan’s efforts to resist reunification. While 
Beijing will continue to be constrained by American (and perhaps Japanese) naval 
force, it will not hesitate to employ the PLAN in situations involving sovereignty or 
other vital national security claims.
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tegic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization 
in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. 
Press, 1994), p. 206ff, who note that not even Zhou 
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 42 Quoted in People’s Navy, p. 13.
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as “a cap in the [Japanese] bottle,” a statement I 
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to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 2009), p. 28. China’s marine 
corps, disestablished in 1957 as “unnecessary,” was 
reestablished in 1980. The concentration of amphibi-
ous forces in the South Sea Fleet continues in 2012, 
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(New York: Franklin Watts, 1977), p. 100ff. The 
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Maritime Power, p. 171.
 48 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at an Enlarged Meeting of 
the Military Commission of the Party Central Com-
mittee,” 14 July 1975, in Joint Publications Research 
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 52 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, provides 
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